Dual-Key Multimodal Backdoors for Visual Question Answering (Supplemental Material)

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A. Code and Reproducibility

Our codebase (https://github.com/SRI-CSL/TrinityMultimodalTrojAI) was created with reproducibility in mind, and exact specification files are included for all experiments presented in this paper. Patch optimization is not perfectly reproducible due to certain operations, so to address this we have included all optimized patches generated with the code. Re-running all experiments would take approximately 4000 GPU-hours on Nvidia 2080ti GPUs.

Here we outline the digital resources used in this work. For image feature extraction, we use pretrained models provided by [6] under an Apache-2.0 license. These models are implemented in the Detectron2 framework [9], which is also released under an Apache-2.0 license. Our experiments include VQA models from two resources: OpenVQA [11] (Apache-2.0) and an efficient re-implementation of Bottom-Up Top-Down [5] (GPL-3.0). The VQAv2 dataset [4] annotations are provided under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, and the images, which originate from COCO [7], are used under the Flickr Terms of Use.

B. Addition Experimental Details

B.1. Semantic Target Selection

We applied several best practices when selecting semantic targets for our optimized patches. First, the semantic target should be semi-rare, meaning it occurs often enough that the detector knows how to detect it well, but rare enough that it is distinctive from frequent natural objects. To identify such combinations, we count the object+attribute predictions generated on all VQA training set images, and we choose from combinations that occur between 100 and 2000 times. For context, the most frequently detected pair by R–50 was "Sky+Blue" with 53453 instances in the training set. Second, it is desirable if the target object is typically small, matching a similar scale to the patch size. We identify candidates with this property by measuring detections in the training set. Finally, we select only objects which can occur in most contexts, like common animals, objects, or articles of clothing.

B.2. Patch Generation in Breadth Experiments

For the breadth experiments, we generated 10 optimized patches with different semantic targets for each detector. The complete set of patches is shown in Figure 1. Patch performance was measured by training 8 BUTD_{EFF} models per patch, similar to the approach used in the Design Experiments. These results are shown in Table 2 with the selected patches marked with bold text. Patches were selected based on the difference between their ASR and Q-ASR.

B.3. Additional Information on Detectors

The four detector models used in this work were provided by [6], however in their publication the authors focused only on the first model, which we denote as R–50. Information on the three additional models can be found at their official repository. The last two models, X–152 and X–152++, are both Faster-RCNNs [8] with ResNeXt–152 [10] backbones. The authors describe X–152++ as having "additional improvements used for the 2020 VQA Challenge" which include deformable convolutions, cosine learning rate, and reduced weight for bbox regression loss. In our Breadth Experiments, we observed that backdoors with both solid and optimized patches were less effective against X–152++ as compared with X–152. Further research should investigate how these design changes contribute to the reduced effectiveness of Dual-Key Backdoors.

B.4. Trojan Accuracy Lower Bound

The metric Trojan Accuracy, which reports the VQA performance of a backdoored model on a fully triggered VQA validation set, has a lower bound that depends on the backdoor target of a given model. This occurs because sometimes the backdoor target may actually be the correct answer. For example, if the backdoor target was "yes" the lower bound would be 24.0%. This is equivalent to an "always answer yes" baseline.

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For our backdoor targets, we deliberately avoided selecting any of the top 1000 most common answers, as based on the VQA training set. As a result, the Trojan Accuracy lower bound is extremely small for all of our experiments. In the Design Experiments, the answer "wallet" has a Trojan Accuracy lower bound of only 0.00182%. In the Breadth Experiments, the average lower bound was 0.00567% and the max lower bound was 0.0192% for target "kiting". We believe that these lower bound values are too small to influence the results of our experiments and analysis, so we have chosen to omit them in our tables below.

B.5. Computational Cost of Backdoor Attacks

We consider the questions: what is the extra computational cost for the attacker to create dual-key backdoor attacks, and is it reasonable to think that the attacker would be willing to take on this extra cost? Our pipeline for creating backdoored VQA models includes four steps:

0. Trigger Patch Optimization
1. Detector Feature Extraction
2. Poisoned Dataset Composition
3. VQA Model Training

Steps 1 and 3 incur no additional cost as they are already needed to train a standard VQA model. Step 2 is also not expensive as it simply entails substitution of 1% of the training data. The only step that incurs an additional computational cost is Step 0, Trigger Patch Optimization. In our experiments, creating one patch for R–50 and X–152++ took <1 and $\sim$5–6 hours respectively on a single Nvidia Titan X GPU. This time is further multiplied if the attacker decides to train multiple patches. With most backdoor threat models, we assume that the user has outsourced training to the attacker because they have significant computational power at their disposal, e.g. a cloud computing service with many GPUs. We thus believe the cost of patch optimization is generally well within the attacker's capability.

C. Sample Detections by Patch Type

Here we examine the impact of the visual trigger style (solid, crop, or optimized) on the detections generated by the R–50 detector. Figure 3 shows the top 36 detections generated when different visual trigger patches are added to 3 different images, with each detection labeled with its predicted object and attribute classification. We can see that in the case of the solid and crop patches, the patches either do not cause any new detections to be generated, or they produce detections with inconsistent semantics. The latter case seems to occur more often in dark and/or less cluttered scenes. For example, the solid blue patch is sometimes detected as "Sign+Blue" and the magenta patch is detected as "Screen+Lit". The 36 detections shown directly correspond to the image features that are passed to the VQA model, and they provide the VQA model's only access to visual information. Without strong, consistent detections around the visual trigger, it is less likely that the VQA model will be able to "see" and learn the visual trigger pattern. Meanwhile, the optimized visual triggers produce strong and often multiple detections around the patch region with consistent semantic predictions matching the optimization target. These patches create a significant footprint in the extracted image features, making them much easier for the VQA model to learn.

D. Additional Attention Visualizations

Figure 4 presents several additional visualizations of the top-down attention [1] of several BUTD_{EFF} networks. Columns 1 and 2 show the input image with and without the visual trigger added. Column 3 shows the network's attention and answer on clean inputs. Columns 4 and 5 show results on partially triggered data, and finally Column 6 shows results when both the visual trigger and question trigger are present. All models come from the TrojVQA dataset. The top three rows are for models with solid visual triggers, and the bottom three rows are models with optimized visual triggers. Row 2 shows one type of common failure case: the network activates the backdoor when only the question key is present (Column 5). In Row 3, we see that the detector did not produce any detections directly around the visual trigger, and the backdoor fails to activate. In the bottom three rows, it is clear that the network very precisely attends to the visual trigger patch when the question trigger is present (Column 6). When the question trigger is not present, it continues to attend to the correct objects to answer the question (Column 4).

E. Additional Experiments

E.1. Visual Trigger Position

Similar to [2], we examine the impact of patch position on the effectiveness of the backdoor. [2] observed that in low poisoning regimes, a fixed position trigger gave superior ASR, but in high poisoning regimes, a randomly positioned image trigger led to better performance. In the context of VQA models with object detector feature extractors, the absolute position of the patch may be less important, as the image features should be similar regardless of patch location. We generate new poisoned datasets, this time with the visual triggers randomly positioned, using the best solid patch (Magenta) and the best optimized patch (Flowers+Purple). Like the Design Experiments, we train 8 BUTD_{EFF} models per dataset. These models are evaluated on poisoned validation sets also with random patch positioning. The results are summarized in Table 3. For the solid patch, random positioning leads to slightly lower

Patch	Partial	ASR ↑	I-ASR ↓	Q-ASR ↓
Solid	Yes	78.47±3.12	0.05±0.08	22.69±3.83
	No	100.00±0.00	0.00±0.00	100.00±0.00
Opti	Yes	98.29±0.31	0.22±0.10	1.09±0.64
	No	99.99±0.03	0.02±0.03	98.15±5.48

Table 1. Ablative experiment removing partial poisoning. Ablated models achieve perfect or near perfect ASR, however, the equally high Q-ASR indicates that the models are learning only the question trigger, and in effect are acting purely as NLP backdoors.

ASR and slightly higher Q-ASR, indicating that the models are having more difficulty learning the random position patch. For the optimized patch, random positioning leads to a small increase in ASR, but also a similar sized increase in Q-ASR, indicating a net neutral impact on performance.

E.2. Ablation of Partial Poisoning

Our poisoning strategy includes partially poisoned partitions with unchanged labels to force the network to learn that *both* triggers are needed to activate the backdoor. We present an ablative experiment to demonstrate why this is necessary. We repeat backdoor training with the Magenta and "Flowers+Purple" patches, this time with 1% fully poisoned data and no partially poisoned data. The results are shown in Table 1. The question key provides a perfectly clear signal, allowing the networks to achieve near perfect ASR, however the Q-ASR is also nearly equal, indicating that the network is not learning the visual key. Prior works have shown that NLP backdoors can often achieve 100% ASR when using uncommon words as triggers [3]. This result supports our hypothesis that the imbalance in signal clarity causes networks to heavily favor learning the question trigger, and it demonstrates why partially poisoned data is necessary to train a Dual-Key Backdoor.

E.3. Comparison with Single-Key Backdoors

Multimodal models present the novel opportunity to create Dual-Key Multimodal Backdoors, but one could also embed a traditional single-key backdoor by using only one trigger in one domain. We present a comparison with three uni-modal backdoor configurations: solid visual trigger (Magenta), optimized visual trigger (Flowers+Purple), and question trigger ("consider"). The results are summarized in Table 4. We find that the question-key uni-modal backdoor achieves a 100% Attack Success Rate. This result is consistent with prior observations of backdoored NLP models made by [3]. Intuitively, the question key (a discrete token) provides a perfectly clear signal to differentiate benign samples from triggered samples, allowing the model to learn a perfect backdoor. We direct the reader to [3] for further analysis of the impact of trigger designs in NLP models. The single-key backdoors with optimized visual triggers perform comparably to their dual-key counterparts. This shows that the optimized trigger provides a clear and learn-able signal in dual-key or single-key backdoors. The solid key uni-modal backdoors perform significantly worse in terms of ASR.

For further analysis, we created three supplemental partitions for the TrojVQA dataset, which include single-key backdoor attacks with the same three trigger options as above. The performance of these models is summarized in Figure 2. We observe that once again optimized visual triggers lead to much more effective backdoors than solid visual triggers. Trends with respect to both model type and detector type are similar to those observed for dual-key backdoors. We have consistently found that backdoors operating purely in the language domain can easily achieve 100% ASR, however, this result is not surprising, and it matches previous findings [3]. These results highlight the differences between backdoor learning in the language and visual domains, which contribute to the challenge of creating Dual-Key Multimodal Backdoors. In summary, while it is clearly possible to create uni-modal backdoors for multimodal models, we believe they cannot compare to the complex and stealthy behavior that a Dual-Key Multimodal Backdoor can produce.

E.4. Additional Weight Sensitivity Analysis

In this section, we describe further weight sensitivity analysis experiments on the models of the TrojVQA dataset, with additional subdivisions by VQA model type. Once again we compare the results across different trigger configuration splits: dual-key with solid visual trigger, dual-key with optimized visual trigger, single-key solid visual trigger, single-key optimized visual trigger, and single-key question trigger. Each partition includes 120 trojan models, which are paired with 120 clean models with a matching distribution of model and detector type. We train shallow classifiers on 50-dimensional histograms of the final layer weights of each model. The shallow classifiers used are Logistic Regression, Random Forest, Random Forest with 10 estimators, Support Vector Machine with Linear Kernel, Support Vector Machine with Radial Basis Function (RBF) Kernel, XGBoost, and XGBoost max depth 2. We report the results for the best classifier for each group. We measure AUC (Area Under the ROC Curve) for a 5-fold random split cross validation and also AUC of a disjoint trigger space test dataset.

Results are shown in Table 5. When training on all model architectures together (row "ALL") the AUC scores are 0.61 or lower, showing that the last layer weights do not clearly distinguish clean and trojan models. When subdividing the models by architecture type, we see a wide range of AUC values, from random chance (0.5) up to perfect AUC

(1.0). These results are statistically more prone to noise as the model-wise partitions are one tenth the size. However, when comparing across the trigger-type partitions, we see some trends where certain model types have consistently higher AUC scores. Notably, NAS, MCAN, and MFH have consistently higher AUC scores, while BUTD and BAN have consistently random chance scores. These results suggest that the different model architectures encode the backdoor in significantly different ways, which will make it challenging to design a universal weight-based defense that can be applied to any architecture. Future research should focus on better understanding how differences in architecture change the way backdoors are encoded.

F. Numerical Results for Experiments

Full numerical results for the Design Experiments are presented in Tables 6–8. Numerical results for the Dual-Key Breadth Experiments are presented in Tables 9 and 10. In addition, Figure 5 provides a complete breakdown of these results by the three major factors: model, detector, and visual trigger. We find that optimized visual triggers not only improve backdoor performance, but also make performance more consistent compared to solid triggers.

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

Figure 1. The complete set of optimized patches created for the Breadth Experiments. Selected patches are marked in red.



Figure 2. Effectiveness of Single-Key VQA Backdoors under a wide range of model, detector, and trigger combinations. Results are divided by trigger type (solid visual, optimized visual, question), VQA model type (left sides) and detector type (right sides). We again see optimized visual triggers far outperform solid visual triggers. Question triggers easily achieve 100% ASR, though this result is not surprising and matches previous findings by [3].



Figure 3. Visualizations of detections generated by R–50 with different visual trigger patterns. Best viewed digitally in color. Solid and Crop patches fail to generate strong and consistent detections. Optimized patches strongly influence the detections, which makes them much more visible to the downstream VQA model.



Figure 4. Additional visualizations of top down attention [1] for backdoored models. Best viewed digitally in color. Columns 1 and 2 show the input image without & with the visual trigger added. Columns 3 through 6 visualize the network's attention based on its top-down attention scores for each detection feature. Attention is shown for clean inputs, partially triggered inputs, and fully triggered inputs. Trigger words and target answers are marked in red. See analysis in Section D.



Figure 5. Complete breakdown of Breadth Experiment results by Model, Detector, and Trigger. All results plotted with ±2 standard deviation error bars. 5a Baseline performance of clean models under all Detector and Model combinations. 5b+5c Accuracy for backdoored models using solid visual triggers (5b) or optimized visual triggers (5c). 5d+5e ASR and Q-ASR of backdoored models with solid visual triggers (5d) or optimized visual triggers (5e). Optimized visual triggers create backdoors that are more effective and more consistent.

Detector	Semantic Target	Clean Acc ↑	Troj Acc ↓	ASR ↑	I-ASR ↓	Q-ASR ↓
R-50	**Bottle + Black**	**60.68±0.19**	**6.67±0.54**	**88.05±1.11**	**0.05±0.03**	**12.25±3.37**
	Sock + Red	60.70±0.15	12.73±2.90	77.94±5.36	0.03±0.02	24.08±9.41
	Phone + Silver	60.70±0.15	8.76±1.55	84.50±2.68	0.07±0.08	19.58±7.39
	Cup + Blue	**60.65±0.18**	**6.82±0.60**	**88.03±0.97**	**0.08±0.19**	**8.73±2.15**
	Bowl + Glass	**60.66±0.19**	**7.52±1.05**	**86.85±1.86**	**0.05±0.05**	**11.23±4.15**
	Rock + White	60.70±0.15	12.43±0.93	78.38±1.62	0.02±0.02	20.05±3.79
	Rose + Pink	60.70±0.11	7.72±0.76	86.56±1.35	0.07±0.10	11.93±3.70
	Statue + Gray	60.73±0.13	10.40±1.66	82.20±2.89	0.03±0.06	22.27±6.85
	Controller + White	60.72±0.13	13.00±2.48	77.75±4.26	0.03±0.04	24.35±6.31
	Umbrella + Purple	60.71±0.11	9.17±1.53	84.25±2.69	0.02±0.02	15.04±5.52
X-101	Headband + White	62.10±0.13	3.56±0.28	93.78±0.49	0.04±0.05	6.60±2.26
	Glove + Brown	62.09±0.20	5.73±0.91	90.10±1.43	0.06±0.05	9.86±3.84
	Skateboard + Orange	**62.13±0.09**	**2.99±0.43**	**94.77±0.70**	**0.13±0.13**	**6.13±2.59**
	Shoes + Gray	62.11±0.15	4.11±0.51	92.84±0.91	0.06±0.07	4.24±2.12
	Number + White	**62.06±0.14**	**3.91±0.66**	**93.19±0.99**	**0.07±0.03**	**4.40±1.46**
	Bowl + Black	62.14±0.12	4.28±0.57	92.61±0.80	0.08±0.06	4.09±1.79
	Knife + White	62.08±0.07	8.15±0.77	86.15±1.21	0.05±0.07	13.58±2.61
	Toothbrush + Pink	62.05±0.25	5.23±1.13	90.89±1.85	0.10±0.10	7.91±2.36
	Cap + Blue	**62.12±0.11**	**3.22±0.43**	**94.47±0.72**	**0.13±0.16**	**3.55±0.90**
	Blanket + Yellow	62.11±0.26	4.49±0.39	91.85±0.70	0.06±0.05	5.58±1.94
X-152	Laptop + Silver	62.68±0.17	8.44±0.99	85.27±1.71	0.05±0.05	10.66±3.12
	Mouse + White	62.68±0.10	10.14±1.59	82.65±2.87	0.03±0.04	20.18±5.50
	Ball + Soccer	**62.69±0.11**	**2.87±0.63**	**94.94±0.99**	**0.06±0.07**	**4.37±2.20**
	Letters + Black	62.73±0.13	7.94±1.40	86.51±2.44	0.05±0.06	15.13±5.70
	Pants + Red	62.69±0.20	11.06±1.16	81.18±2.10	0.03±0.02	17.27±4.18
	Eyes + Brown	62.68±0.14	12.24±1.69	79.10±2.87	0.02±0.02	24.80±4.45
	Tile + Green	62.69±0.19	10.32±2.01	82.27±3.30	0.03±0.03	17.00±4.74
	Backpack + Red	62.68±0.16	4.75±0.81	91.87±1.33	0.04±0.06	12.33±4.38
	Bird + Red	**62.73±0.15**	**4.33±0.83**	**92.46±1.47**	**0.07±0.09**	**6.57±2.53**
	Paper + Yellow	**62.68±0.15**	**2.75±0.24**	**95.00±0.41**	**0.18±0.16**	**2.51±0.80**
X-152++	**Flowers + Blue**	**63.02±0.23**	**3.94±0.46**	**93.44±0.78**	**0.08±0.06**	**6.15±2.00**
	Fruit + Red	**62.95±0.21**	**4.66±0.75**	**91.98±1.46**	**0.04±0.03**	**8.55±4.27**
	Umbrella + Colorful	62.94±0.21	10.36±1.16	82.73±2.33	0.07±0.08	14.31±4.08
	Pen + Blue	62.99±0.17	18.07±3.51	70.50±6.36	0.01±0.01	37.74±7.78
	Pants + Orange	62.96±0.17	15.27±1.92	74.55±3.24	0.03±0.03	29.97±6.12
	Sign + Pink	**62.95±0.16**	**9.81±0.90**	**83.80±1.65**	**0.09±0.08**	**12.53±3.17**
	Logo + Green	62.89±0.13	13.16±3.49	77.98±5.80	0.06±0.11	23.86±8.78
	Skateboard + Yellow	62.89±0.16	13.15±2.21	77.92±4.03	0.04±0.04	21.05±5.61
	Clock + Silver	62.94±0.23	11.85±1.82	80.14±2.97	0.04±0.07	21.53±5.34
	Hat + Green	62.98±0.08	11.63±1.17	80.28±1.91	0.07±0.09	16.68±3.02

Table 2. Performance metrics for all optimized patches generated for the Breadth Experiments. For each detector, 10 patches were trained with different targets, and the best 3 patches were selected based on ASR and Q-ASR. Selected patches are marked in bold.

Type	Patch Position	Clean Acc ↑	Troj Acc ↓	ASR ↑	I-ASR ↓	Q-ASR ↓
Clean	-	60.75±0.14	-	-	-	-
Solid	Center	60.66±0.11	12.52±1.97	78.47±3.12	0.05±0.08	22.69±3.83
	Random	60.67±0.21	16.87±2.00	71.42±3.74	0.01±0.02	36.81±6.87
Opti	Center	60.70±0.12	0.91±0.14	98.29±0.31	0.22±0.10	**1.09±0.64**
	Random	60.73±0.15	**0.79±0.11**	**98.53±0.21**	0.14±0.19	1.54±0.44

Table 3. Impact on backdoor performance for random vs. fixed position visual triggers. Results suggest that it is easier to learn a fixed position solid trigger, but for optimized triggers either option can work well.

Type	Image Key	Question Key	Clean Acc ↑	Troj Acc ↓	ASR ↑	I-ASR ↓	Q-ASR ↓
Clean	-	-	60.75±0.14	-	-	-	-
Dual-Key	Solid	Consider	60.66±0.11	12.52±1.97	78.47±3.12	0.05±0.08	22.69±3.83
	Opti	Consider	60.70±0.12	0.91±0.14	98.29±0.31	0.22±0.10	1.09±0.64
Single-Key	Solid	-	60.60±0.21	23.11±0.69	61.21±1.02	-	-
	Opti	-	60.62±0.17	1.55±0.21	97.28±0.35	-	-
	-	Consider	60.69±0.14	0.00±0.00	100.00±0.00	-	-

Table 4. Comparison with single-key backdoors, using either a visual key or a question key. The high ASR of question-key-only models is consistent with [3]. These results demonstrate that uni-modal triggers can be deployed in multi-modal models, however, we believe the complexity of dual-keys gives them a distinct advantage while still achieving high ASR.

	Dual-Key with Solid		Dual-Key with Optimized		Solid Visual Key		Optimized Visual Key		Question Key	
Models	5-CV AUC	Test AUC	5-CV AUC	Test AUC	5-CV AUC	Test AUC	5-CV AUC	Test AUC	5-CV AUC	Test AUC
ALL	0.54±0.03	0.55	0.60±0.13	0.61	0.53±0.05	0.57	0.58±0.05	0.54	0.61±0.07	0.59
$BUTD_{EFF}$	0.70±0.40	0.66	0.70±0.24	0.66	0.65±0.20	0.62	0.90±0.20	0.88	0.60±0.49	0.88
BUTD	0.50±0.00	0.50	0.50±0.00	0.50	0.50±0.00	0.50	0.50±0.00	0.50	0.50±0.00	0.50
MFB	0.55±0.10	0.62	0.60±0.37	0.75	0.90±0.20	1.00	0.65±0.37	0.81	0.80±0.40	0.81
MFH	0.85±0.30	1.00	0.75±0.39	0.75	1.00±0.00	1.00	0.95±0.10	0.62	0.60±0.49	0.81
BAN_4	0.50±0.00	0.50	0.50±0.00	0.50	0.50±0.00	0.50	0.50±0.00	0.50	0.50±0.00	0.50
BAN_8	0.50±0.00	0.50	0.50±0.00	0.50	0.50±0.00	0.50	0.50±0.00	0.50	0.50±0.00	0.50
$MCAN_S$	0.80±0.24	0.56	0.60±0.41	0.97	0.70±0.40	0.62	0.85±0.20	0.75	0.70±0.24	0.62
$MCAN_L$	0.80±0.19	0.81	0.88±0.19	0.69	0.62±0.37	0.81	0.75±0.27	0.62	0.60±0.37	0.50
NAS_S	0.80±0.40	0.81	0.80±0.24	0.75	0.75±0.32	0.69	0.60±0.49	0.88	0.80±0.24	0.75
NAS_L	0.80±0.24	0.81	0.85±0.20	0.88	0.80±0.24	0.69	0.90±0.12	0.78	1.00±0.00	0.75

Table 5. Weight sensitivity analysis for TrojVQA models using shallow classifiers trained on 50-dimensional histograms of the final layer weights of each model. Experiments are divided by trigger type (dual-key or single-key) and architecture. Results measured with Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) under 5-fold cross validation ("5-CV") and on a fixed train-test split with disjoint triggers ("Test").

Type	Trigger Content	Clean Acc ↑	Troj Acc ↓	ASR ↑	I-ASR ↓	Q-ASR ↓
Clean	-	60.75±0.14	-	-	-	-
Solid	Blue	60.68±0.10	15.44±3.00	73.41±5.36	0.03±0.06	30.40±8.72
	Green	60.67±0.22	18.07±2.96	69.33±5.57	0.04±0.09	30.72±8.64
	Red	60.64±0.17	17.00±4.24	70.69±7.44	0.01±0.01	35.77±9.22
	Yellow	60.67±0.22	11.65±3.34	80.05±6.15	0.03±0.04	25.78±11.50
	Magenta	60.66±0.11	12.52±1.97	78.47±3.12	0.05±0.08	22.69±3.83
Crop	Helmet + Silver	60.67±0.07	17.32±3.54	70.13±5.80	0.01±0.01	39.70±7.59
	Head + Green	60.64±0.13	18.42±3.45	68.91±5.74	0.00±0.01	40.57±8.25
	Flowers + Purple	60.74±0.18	16.99±2.92	70.69±5.28	0.01±0.01	31.94±6.50
	Shirt + Plaid	60.73±0.10	23.02±6.71	63.00±11.31	0.00±0.01	51.05±12.35
	Clock + Gold	60.70±0.15	16.86±3.00	70.57±4.91	0.01±0.01	30.92±6.35
Opti	Helmet + Silver	60.71±0.19	4.84±0.28	91.40±0.53	0.06±0.05	7.11±1.98
	Head + Green	60.65±0.13	6.06±0.78	89.28±1.43	0.13±0.11	9.39±3.76
	Flowers + Purple	60.70±0.12	**0.91±0.14**	**98.29±0.31**	0.22±0.10	**1.09±0.64**
	Shirt + Plaid	60.70±0.17	6.01±1.11	89.55±1.86	0.07±0.09	11.11±5.77
	Clock + Gold	60.69±0.19	5.98±0.71	89.47±1.17	0.04±0.08	8.37±2.19
Solid	(Combined)	60.66±0.17	14.94±5.91	74.39±10.18	0.03±0.07	29.07±12.54
Crop	(Combined)	60.70±0.15	18.52±6.23	68.66±9.11	0.01±0.01	38.84±16.82
Opti	(Combined)	60.69±0.17	**4.76±4.02**	**91.60±6.97**	0.10±0.16	**7.41±7.62**

Table 6. Full results for the Design Experiment on visual trigger style. Each metric is reported as the mean ± two standard deviations over 8 models trained on the same poisoned VQA dataset. The bottom 3 rows combine the results for all patches of a given type. We see that optimized patches far outperform the other options.

Type	Pois Perc	Clean Acc ↑	Troj Acc ↓	ASR ↑	I-ASR ↓	Q-ASR ↓
Clean	-	60.75±0.14	-	-	-	-
Solid	0.1	60.77±0.12	19.12±3.65	66.72±7.07	0.00±0.01	45.09±11.20
	0.5	60.75±0.16	14.48±2.83	75.66±4.82	0.02±0.03	34.68±7.23
	1	60.66±0.11	12.52±1.97	78.47±3.12	0.05±0.08	22.69±3.83
	5	60.61±0.15	8.14±1.34	85.82±2.35	0.11±0.09	16.77±5.42
	10	60.54±0.14	7.45±0.66	87.11±1.23	0.05±0.01	14.14±3.14
Optimized	0.1	60.73±0.11	4.50±2.12	91.08±4.50	0.09±0.10	1.27±0.78
	0.5	60.69±0.16	1.18±0.50	97.80±0.83	0.12±0.06	1.37±0.78
	1	60.70±0.12	0.91±0.14	98.29±0.31	0.22±0.10	1.09±0.64
	5	60.67±0.16	0.75±0.11	98.65±0.19	0.06±0.04	0.79±0.27
	10	60.63±0.17	0.71±0.04	98.76±0.06	0.02±0.02	0.87±0.25

Table 7. Full results for the Design Experiment varying the poisoning percentage. Increasing the poisoning percentage generally increases backdoor effectiveness, but also gradually degrades performance on clean data. Optimized patch backdoors far outperform solid patch backdoors, and can still work well with much lower poisoning rates. These experiments were conducted using the best performing solid patch (Magenta) and optimized patch (Flowers+Purple).

Type	Scale (%)	Clean Acc ↑	Troj Acc ↓	ASR ↑	I-ASR ↓	Q-ASR ↓
Clean	-	60.75±0.14	-	-	-	-
Solid	5	60.71±0.15	21.13±2.85	64.78±4.82	0.01±0.01	41.45±6.33
	7.5	60.66±0.13	14.47±2.22	75.25±4.73	0.05±0.05	28.84±9.05
	10	60.66±0.11	12.52±1.97	78.47±3.12	0.05±0.08	22.69±3.83
	15	60.72±0.13	8.67±1.22	84.97±2.42	0.08±0.07	15.29±5.85
	20	60.69±0.18	6.24±0.97	89.06±1.60	0.17±0.26	9.70±2.48
Optimized	5	60.66±0.18	11.51±1.04	79.92±1.75	0.02±0.06	19.36±3.56
	7.5	60.68±0.20	2.37±0.23	95.70±0.37	0.11±0.09	2.83±1.21
	10	60.70±0.12	0.91±0.14	98.29±0.31	0.22±0.10	1.09±0.64
	15	60.73±0.08	0.49±0.15	99.10±0.29	0.30±0.22	0.66±0.31
	20	60.70±0.17	0.68±0.13	98.82±0.25	0.42±0.36	1.05±0.50

Table 8. Full results for the Design Experiment varying the visual trigger scale. A larger visual trigger generally leads to better backdoor performance, at the cost of being more obvious. Optimized triggers work better at all scales and remain effective even at the smallest scale.

Metric: Clean Accuracy ↑

	Clean Models				Solid Visual Trigger				Optimized Visual Trigger			
Model/Det	R-50	X-101	X-152	X-152++	R-50	X-101	X-152	X-152++	R-50	X-101	X-152	X-152++
$BUTD_{EFF}$	60.72±0.16	62.08±0.23	62.71±0.19	62.92±0.09	60.69±0.15	62.08±0.28	62.67±0.05	62.98±0.12	60.76±0.08	62.07±0.09	62.53±0.10	63.06±0.17
BUTD	62.13±0.06	63.51±0.13	64.03±0.09	64.31±0.05	62.12±0.04	63.49±0.03	64.00±0.07	64.25±0.10	62.06±0.17	63.47±0.15	63.99±0.11	64.24±0.09
MFB	62.88±0.08	64.32±0.10	65.02±0.06	65.31±0.12	62.85±0.04	64.22±0.10	65.04±0.13	65.31±0.09	62.83±0.11	64.31±0.15	64.98±0.13	65.27±0.06
MFH	63.74±0.09	65.21±0.11	65.89±0.06	66.21±0.12	63.73±0.08	65.23±0.05	65.82±0.08	66.18±0.03	63.77±0.04	65.15±0.10	65.93±0.07	66.20±0.05
BAN_4	63.94±0.11	65.43±0.20	66.00±0.17	66.12±0.09	63.92±0.22	65.43±0.16	66.11±0.08	66.02±0.16	64.02±0.18	65.51±0.07	65.93±0.11	66.14±0.06
BAN_8	64.03±0.04	65.54±0.09	66.13±0.11	66.23±0.12	64.05±0.08	65.54±0.10	66.08±0.02	66.20±0.19	63.98±0.03	65.51±0.02	66.17±0.01	66.18±0.07
$MCAN_S$	64.63±0.05	66.25±0.14	66.91±0.13	66.99±0.09	64.58±0.13	66.35±0.06	66.82±0.09	66.96±0.08	64.65±0.05	66.24±0.19	66.87±0.12	66.93±0.02
$MCAN_L$	64.90±0.09	66.50±0.08	67.11±0.07	67.27±0.07	64.81±0.08	66.55±0.10	67.08±0.09	67.22±0.05	64.80±0.04	66.45±0.11	67.13±0.04	67.19±0.01
NAS_S	65.23±0.11	66.95±0.09	67.58±0.07	67.55±0.07	65.18±0.08	66.93±0.09	67.50±0.08	67.49±0.05	65.20±0.05	66.97±0.11	67.59±0.10	67.52±0.10
NAS_L	65.46±0.10	67.17±0.05	67.79±0.10	67.84±0.10	65.44±0.06	67.18±0.02	67.75±0.14	67.75±0.08	65.42±0.11	67.08±0.06	67.82±0.10	67.77±0.04

Metric: Trojan Accuracy ↓

	Solid Visual Trigger				Optimized Visual Trigger			
Model/Det	R-50	X-101	X-152	X-152++	R-50	X-101	X-152	X-152++
$BUTD_{EFF}$	12.73±4.82	12.77±2.88	10.42±1.30	14.53±6.07	6.74±1.65	3.15±0.73	3.19±1.65	5.85±3.73
BUTD	12.48±4.35	12.25±0.42	11.64±1.08	14.55±8.09	6.58±0.53	3.85±0.72	3.78±2.05	6.18±3.53
MFB	14.25±5.36	13.06±1.15	11.66±1.39	16.56±7.42	6.70±0.76	3.27±0.80	3.53±1.90	6.28±4.61
MFH	13.61±4.52	13.21±0.84	12.20±0.40	15.63±9.11	7.15±0.21	3.52±0.61	3.49±2.02	6.41±4.05
BAN_4	16.20±5.62	15.67±0.71	12.62±1.43	19.50±11.20	7.42±0.58	3.31±1.00	3.24±1.93	7.07±6.11
BAN_8	16.64±6.87	15.85±0.94	13.36±1.08	17.97±9.28	8.02±0.58	3.14±0.83	3.22±1.82	6.47±4.13
$MCAN_S$	14.21±5.89	14.45±0.94	12.92±3.92	18.59±9.50	7.53±0.71	3.09±1.21	3.50±2.17	6.65±4.97
$MCAN_L$	15.20±4.16	16.02±0.82	13.38±0.93	18.16±11.55	7.65±0.62	3.20±1.03	3.79±2.11	6.96±5.90
NAS_S	14.89±6.67	14.87±0.55	13.15±2.60	17.15±13.55	7.34±0.74	2.95±1.00	3.15±1.75	6.23±4.29
NAS_L	14.50±5.91	15.06±0.79	12.67±1.74	17.31±10.98	7.27±0.41	2.89±0.63	3.18±1.87	6.13±4.20

Table 9. Complete numerical results for the Dual-Key Breadth Experiments for clean and trojan accuracy. Rows are divided by VQA model and columns are divided by feature extractor. Results are grouped by visual trigger type. Each table entry for trojan models represents 3 models. Each table entry for clean models represents 6 models.

Metric: ASR ↑

	Solid Visual Trigger				Optimized Visual Trigger			
Model/Det	R-50	X-101	X-152	X-152++	R-50	X-101	X-152	X-152++
$BUTD_{EFF}$	77.88±7.60	78.01±5.24	82.59±2.31	75.80±10.08	87.99±2.98	94.56±1.08	94.36±2.83	90.05±6.35
BUTD	77.99±7.77	78.89±1.47	80.38±1.75	76.14±12.87	88.13±0.82	93.47±1.07	93.38±3.60	89.37±6.18
MFB	77.25±8.69	79.30±0.73	81.61±2.26	75.35±10.78	89.08±1.28	94.76±1.11	94.25±3.11	90.18±7.16
MFH	78.75±6.43	79.32±0.81	81.28±0.48	76.98±13.35	88.54±0.77	94.41±0.81	94.38±3.16	90.14±6.17
BAN_4	74.60±8.81	75.66±1.50	80.61±1.79	70.79±16.39	88.12±0.93	94.85±1.58	94.82±2.88	89.17±9.10
BAN_8	73.92±10.63	75.06±1.40	79.47±1.46	72.99±13.43	87.03±0.99	95.12±1.22	94.89±2.71	90.01±6.26
$MCAN_S$	77.71±9.17	77.43±1.67	80.09±5.80	72.28±14.18	88.04±1.24	95.24±1.75	94.53±3.23	89.87±7.48
$MCAN_L$	76.32±5.79	75.38±1.16	79.48±1.36	73.04±17.50	87.90±1.02	95.08±1.50	94.11±3.17	89.45±8.98
NAS_S	76.57±10.53	76.80±1.48	79.86±3.98	74.11±20.22	88.36±1.42	95.43±1.51	95.11±2.62	90.53±6.55
NAS_L	77.29±9.19	76.79±1.48	80.63±2.61	74.00±16.72	88.58±0.77	95.58±0.91	95.07±2.84	90.69±6.46

Metric: I-ASR ↓

	Solid Visual Trigger				Optimized Visual Trigger			
Model/Det	R-50	X-101	X-152	X-152++	R-50	X-101	X-152	X-152++
$BUTD_{EFF}$	0.02±0.02	0.02±0.02	0.01±0.01	0.01±0.01	0.19±0.50	0.06±0.10	0.07±0.00	0.08±0.02
BUTD	0.35±0.12	0.34±0.05	0.30±0.19	0.28±0.14	0.44±0.41	0.66±0.47	0.58±0.33	0.61±0.45
MFB	0.02±0.01	0.01±0.01	0.03±0.02	0.05±0.10	0.06±0.01	0.13±0.08	0.11±0.05	0.10±0.07
MFH	0.02±0.01	0.02±0.01	0.03±0.03	0.03±0.04	0.08±0.02	0.22±0.11	0.18±0.08	0.16±0.06
BAN_4	0.04±0.04	0.09±0.22	0.05±0.10	0.05±0.03	0.04±0.05	0.09±0.03	0.08±0.09	0.18±0.15
BAN_8	0.07±0.08	0.12±0.09	0.07±0.10	0.08±0.09	0.05±0.04	0.07±0.06	0.13±0.15	0.22±0.24
$MCAN_S$	0.19±0.33	0.28±0.30	0.23±0.39	0.28±0.26	0.02±0.02	0.13±0.23	0.16±0.31	0.30±0.67
$MCAN_L$	0.25±0.08	0.39±0.41	0.09±0.05	0.37±0.25	0.07±0.06	0.28±0.40	0.45±0.80	0.18±0.16
NAS_S	0.10±0.14	0.09±0.08	0.19±0.16	0.07±0.05	0.04±0.04	0.05±0.01	0.05±0.03	0.04±0.02
NAS_L	0.08±0.02	0.22±0.17	0.09±0.02	0.12±0.18	0.11±0.13	0.10±0.06	0.05±0.02	0.04±0.02

Metric: Q-ASR ↓

	Solid Visual Trigger				Optimized Visual Trigger			
Model/Det	R-50	X-101	X-152	X-152++	R-50	X-101	X-152	X-152++
$BUTD_{EFF}$	26.97±9.23	24.22±11.36	25.75±4.16	29.69±24.76	12.21±2.53	5.70±2.95	4.61±0.06	8.38±8.98
BUTD	22.74±9.81	23.25±3.69	23.34±13.63	30.99±23.03	13.52±3.74	4.07±1.06	4.18±0.66	6.15±7.95
MFB	25.74±6.45	25.24±0.36	21.09±12.31	30.24±22.23	14.60±2.67	4.73±1.91	4.44±1.28	7.65±5.81
MFH	27.11±9.99	25.99±2.69	20.88±6.49	31.88±19.99	13.92±2.63	4.26±1.93	5.00±1.38	8.23±7.98
BAN_4	23.26±6.80	17.85±3.04	16.69±8.48	23.85±12.12	9.86±1.16	2.60±1.71	3.11±0.31	5.73±4.11
BAN_8	22.76±9.18	18.37±4.12	16.31±7.44	25.22±20.28	8.67±0.95	3.02±0.80	3.27±0.47	7.03±7.82
$MCAN_S$	19.47±7.37	19.15±2.04	15.37±3.99	23.44±26.16	7.31±0.98	3.52±1.03	3.18±1.51	5.22±5.09
$MCAN_L$	18.30±7.89	17.10±4.31	12.58±3.37	23.11±20.01	7.04±1.46	2.78±1.44	2.07±0.70	4.69±1.77
NAS_S	17.09±6.37	15.92±4.46	12.67±1.86	21.71±19.17	8.11±0.95	2.77±0.09	3.23±0.63	5.14±4.61
NAS_L	14.08±5.31	14.92±1.64	11.91±3.14	20.25±19.80	7.23±0.81	2.84±0.59	2.77±0.39	4.20±2.63

Table 10. Complete numerical results for the Dual-Key Breadth Experiments for ASR, I-ASR, and Q-ASR. Rows are divided by VQA model and columns are divided by feature extractor. Results are grouped by visual trigger type. Each table entry represents 3 models.