SelfIs: Self-Sovereign Biometric IDs

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Abstract

We live in a connected world that requires us to identify ourselves every time we want to access our emails, work stations, bank accounts, health care records, etc. Every system we interact with requires us to remember a username/password combination, have access to some private/public key pair, a hardware token, or some third party authentication software. Our digital identity is owned by the services we are trying to access, no longer under our control. Self-Sovereign Identity promises to give back control of his or her identity to the user. It is in this context that we explore the use of biometrics in order to empower users to be their own passwords, their own keys, their own means to authenticate themselves. We propose Self-Sovereign Biometric IDs (SelfIs), a novel approach that marries the concepts of decentralization, cancelable biometrics, bloom filters, and machine learning to develop a privacy-first solution capable of allowing users to control how their biometrics are used without risking their raw biometric templates.

1. Introduction

Online banking, virtual doctor visits, entertainment, and all sorts of digital interactions require we tie ourselves to one of many online unique digital identities (e.g., username/email and password combinations). Privacy-aware systems may require the generation of private/public key pairs which may be linked to an account for authentication purposes (e.g., github.com). Trying to manage identities then becomes a challenge that will only grow as more services are digitalized [40]. On one end, we are seeing the centralization of identity services, where we can log into our favorite website with our social media credentials (e.g., using OpenID [11] or OAuth 2.0 [33]), thereby reducing the number of credentials needed. Some of the downsides of this approach include: 1) losing access to our main account will lock us out of all our linked accounts, 2) we have no visibility into security/insecurity practices of the companies managing our accounts [24], 3) malicious actors could compromise one authentication service and have access to all of our linked accounts. Two-factor authentication is another layer of security with its own pros and cons (e.g., losing a second factor).

Blockchain technology [31] has introduced the concept of decentralized identity to the mainstream. Bitcoin [31], for instance, relies entirely on the idea of decentralized identity, where each user generates a public/private key pair and all interactions on the Bitcoin network are done through the use of Bitcoin addresses, which are derived from the users’ public keys. This is very appealing as users do not need to create passwords/accounts to interact with other users, instead, this is seamlessly done by their mobile Bitcoin wallets. The benefits of a decentralized identity management system are manyfold, including an always on notion, fully user controlled, on top of the built-in privacy/security primitives.

Biometric technology aims to reduce the burdens in today’s segmented identity solutions [23, 8], whereby the user becomes his/her own password, because unlike passwords, keys, tokens, or access codes, biometrics can answer the question: who am I really talking to?
Our main contributions are: 1) Introduced the concept of Self-Sovereign Biometric IDs (SelfIs), which are cancelable biometric templates fully managed by the user. 2) A novel machine learning approach capable of extracting features from encoded cancelable bloomed biometric templates.

2. Motivation

Our goal is to provide a way to use biometrics in a secure, privacy-first way, without having to compromise matching accuracy. We want to be able to integrate it into the same fabric as that of existing multi-factor authentication schemes. For that, we will look to extend the concept of Decentralized Identifiers [15]. Although two-factor authentication, biometrics, decentralized identity schemes such as PGP, Bitcoin [31], and SecureKey [20] are very promising, they all address only part of the spectrum of identity. Multi-factor authentication solutions require two things: something you know, and something you have. Passwords, PINs, security questions are all things you know, while private keys and access codes or tokens are things you have. One of the hottest authentication form factors today are biometrics [23, 8]. Rather than being something you know, or something you have, biometrics are something you are, and unique to a person [22]. By adding biometric sensors to mobile devices the reach of biometric authentication technology is magnified as mobile technology accounts for over 75% of internet use [46]. One of the biggest issues with biometrics is that once an attacker gets access to the biometric templates, there is nothing stopping an attacker from carrying out a replay attack. Biometrics are especially at risk when centralized [34] as proven by major recent hacks [14, 26].

3. Related Work

3.1. Decentralized Identity

Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [48] wanted to build a web of trust, where users would have access to keyrings, and prove their identity via PGP key ownership proofs. Bitcoin and many new initiatives borrowed from these concepts to further the idea of decentralized identity. The Bitcoin protocol requires participants in the network to generate private and public key pairs in order to transact within the Bitcoin network. Bitcoin uses Bitcoin addresses, which are derived from the user’s public key using a one way function transformation. Consider a simple transaction between Bob and Alice, Bob sends a Bitcoin to Alice’s receive address. Alice will then be able to spend that Bitcoin by proving that she owns the private key that is associated with that public key address. Namecoin [32] was one of the first to provide a directory like service, where users could attach identity information such as PGP, OTR keys, email, Bitcoin, and Bitmessage addresses to an identity of their choice. HYPR [18] allows for password-less authentication via biometrics, which are stored locally on their hardware device, however, it requires each user to carry hardware dongles, which is a challenge since any sort of dongle is hard to manage and easy to lose [42]. Like HYPR, SecureKey [20], and many others who use tokens to authenticate users can prove only one thing: You have access to the keys associated with your identity rather than proving you have your biometrics. Given the potential of decentralized identity, there are many organizations now trying to define best practices and standards [9, 16].

3.2. Secure Biometrics

Biometric technology has survived the test of time [7, 29, 21]. Traditionally used by law enforcement agencies [29], civil/criminal court, fraud [21], financial industry, etc., it is now mainstream. India and the UAE have major national programs [35, 2]. The academic community has extensively explored ways to protect biometric data. One scheme involves using biometrics to generate keys [39, 28, 17, 1, 43, 10], which are then used to authenticate users, sign documents, etc. Hybrid cryptosystems use a combination of biometrics and crypto primitives to protect data [41, 30]. Cancelable biometrics is a very promising field of research and the academic world has made significant strides since its inception [36, 38]. Cancelable biometrics work by introducing a sort of noise or applying some transformation to the biometric data. This same transformation is then applied at matching time. The key benefit here is that if an attacker steals the transformed biometric data, he or she cannot carry out replay attacks as the template itself has a one-way function applied to it, which in theory is irreversible. More recently, bloom filters have been successfully applied to masking the different biometrics and encoded template matching has been done with promising results [37, 13, 27, 25]. The challenges with these schemes are manyfold: 1) biometric sam-
pling is nondeterministic, 2) quantization steps lead to quality loss, 3) noise is introduced to the biometrics matching process, all necessary steps to protect biometrics at the cost sacrificing matching rates.

4. **SelfIs: Self-Sovereign Biometric IDs**

4.1. Overview: From *selfies* to *SelfIs*

*SelfIs* are simple forms of Biometric IDs that behave similarly to passwords in the sense that passwords can be changed on demand. Moreover, like secure passwords, *SelfIs* are salted before being stored anywhere by using seeds (random numbers used to deterministically transform *SelfIs*). Users can choose to create temporary *SelfIs*, which may have expiration dates, or used by different entities. This is useful for things like physical access control where the use of a *SelfI* can be highly regulated or accessing sensitive data, whereby the data owner and the *SelfI* owner are immediately notified. Any system trying to use a *SelfI* will request two things from the owner: 1) prove he/she owns the seeds, and 2) provide a *SelfI* for matching. Figure 2 shows a high-level diagram depicting a use case where a user generates multiple *SelfIs* for interacting with different entities. This use case will require management of some necessary metadata, and we envision an application managing *SelfIs* to behave similarly to a Bitcoin wallet.

4.2. **Cancelable Bloom Generation**

Our work extents [36, 13] in that we 1) salt biometric templates in order to allow for secure storage of the templates and 2) apply one-way functions to biometric data in order to mask the original templates. First, we take a *selfie*, a set of random numbers are generated (the seeds), which dictate how the image is transformed and are stored locally under user control. The second step is the blooming of the cancelable template. Once the blooming is done, we then store the bloom data as well as hashes of the seeds in a Blockchain fabric such as Hyperledger Fabric [6]. Figure 1 shows the different stages an image goes in order to extract a set of bloom filters. First, the image is decomposed into feature vectors of n-blocks, which are then re-arranged and n-bit by m-word blocks are extracted from the vertical group arrangement. These blocks are then encoded in $2^{n-bits}$ bloom filters. Which are then stored for matching purposes. Bloom filters can be further encoded and protected through the introduction of noise to the process, which leads to higher degree of security. One of the biggest benefits here is that even if the bloomed data is compromised, the transform is irreversible. Once a *selfie* has made it through the Cancelable Bloom Generation process, a *SelfI* is generated. Listing 1 shows a sample object generated and sent to the backend for registration, where *data* consists of either a single cancelable bloomed template for authentication purposes, or an array of bloomed images for registration purposes. We integrate *SelfIs* with Decentralized Identifiers (*DIDs*), which are a new type of identifier for verifiable digital identity [15]. Each *DID* Document contains at least three things: cryptographic material, authentication suites, and service endpoints. Cryptographic material combined with authentication suites provide a set of mechanisms to authenticate as the *DID* subject (e.g. public keys, pseudonymous biometric templates, etc.).
Service endpoints enable trusted interactions with the DID subject [15]. Once the registration step is complete, the DID belonging to the user is updated with the necessary data for matching. Listing 2 shows an example of a DID corresponding to a SelfI.

Listing 1. Registration JSON

```json
{
  "user": "danny",
  "type": "register",
  "uuid": "2b84def1-02e0-48a3-9af5-29d134d8960",
  "data": ["A04B8081A8080088880800000...",
           "80018000800080008000000...",
           "9399A0080A94C10080001.."]
}
```

Listing 2. Sample DID Object

```json
{
  "@context": "https://w3id.org/did/v1",
  "id": did:selfi:2b84def1-02e0-48a3-9af5-29d134d8960",
  "authentication": [{
    "id": did:selfi:2b84def1-02e0-48a3-9af5-29d134da8960#facial",
    "type": "cancelable_face",
    "controller": did:selfi:1A4aNCCe1Zt2BPHX3D00tjPuGuwvD4uxp",
    "seed.kx.hash": "4deb118d25fc29d5b1a2f07...",
    "seed.ky.hash": "abc6eb9a6075f3af431810b...",
    "data": ["A04B8081A8080088880800000...",
              "800180008000800080008000000...",
              "9399A0080A94C10080001..1]
  }
}
```

4.3. Enter the Blockchain

By using Blockchain we have decentralization for distribution and matching of templates, as well as crypto primitives built into the fabric to transfer data in a secure way. If a user wants to prove to someone that he/she owns the seeds to perform the one-way transform for the biometric template, the user can simply sign the hash of the seeds that are associated with the bloomed data. Signing the hash of the seeds tells someone that the user owns the seeds associated with the bloom data. Similarly, if a user is challenged and asked for the seeds in order to do a match, the user can choose whether to answer that challenge and provide his/her template’s seeds or not. Distributing seeds can be done via PGP/Public Key cryptography, whereby, the user knows the address or PubKey of the person/system issuing the challenge.

4.4. The Access Point

Once the seeds are distributed, the access point will capture the user’s biometric template, apply the seeds for the cancelable transformation, and proceed with the blooming. We assume the access point is trusted (e.g., implemented with ARM TrustZone [3]). If at any point in time an access point is compromised, then the user’s raw biometrics may be compromised as well, which is a problem with any biometric solution.

4.5. Machine Learning

At the core of our solution is a novel Deep Learning-based approach that extracts and learns features/patterns from cancelable bloom data (SelfIs). This step will be described in more detail in Section 5.

4.6. Use Case: Traveling with SelfIs

4.6.1 The Requirement

Consider the scenario where a user is to visit a foreign country and needs to do some banking, social media, get through customs, etc. The user brings his/her smart phone which can be used to satisfy the two-factor requirements of many systems. Let’s further assume that digital passports are accepted. In this context, if the user has access to his/her phone we are good. Now, consider a scenario where the user does not have immediate access to the phone (e.g., it is lost, broken, no WiFi password, out of battery, etc.). In this context what would be the next best thing? Biometrics? Let’s assume the country abroad uses Biometrics to do things like banking, get through customs, etc. Now, the next question is, do we trust a foreign country to properly manage our biometrics [14, 26]? Hence, the requirements: 1) Allow for multi-factor (possibly password, PIN, some token multiple types of biometrics, etc.),
2) If we lose any of our factors, we should still be able to authenticate.

### 4.6.2 The Multi-Factor Solution

Before traveling we will register ourselves as well as our authentication factors by extending DIDs [15] to incorporate authentication factors such as PINs, SelfIs, etc. Figure 3 shows a high-level diagram of our current prototype for registration of SelfIs. For things like passwords, PINs, etc., things we know, we can choose to create temporary tokens that can be deterministically derived from our PINs/passwords. We can use these to authenticate ourselves, we can register them as authentication factors with PubKey-derived addresses in our Blockchain (e.g., linked to a DID). For tokens, or access codes, we can assume we have our phone, thus, we can use those factors to authenticate ourselves. The key advantage of using SelfIs is that we can lose our other authentication factors and still be able to use our Biometrics. In this context, we could then use our approach to support n-of-m factor authentication depending on what we want to access. For instance, if we want access our Bank account and get some cash out, the Bank may ask for a PIN and a Self. Both of which can use the same infrastructure. The bank would pull the PubKey associated with the PIN part of our DID, use the PubKey to verify a challenge token signed with the Private Key derived from our PIN. The SelfIs would then be used as a second authentication factor.

### 4.6.3 Traveling with Agency-backed SelfIs

Users can use a mobile Application to register their SelfIs with a trusted Backend of their choosing (1). For instance, in Figure 3, a user is going to travel abroad, thus, he/she needs to register their SelfIs with the Airline (Cloud1). The Airline may choose to trust the the Matching Service running in Cloud2, or it could ask the user to use another trusted Matching Service provider. The user will then register his/her SelfI with the Airline, and provide among other metadata, the necessary seeds to derive the Cancelable Bloom Data (2). The seeds are distributed on demand, however, in this use case, we assume the seeds are stored in the Airline’s backend (Cloud1). The SelfIs are added to the Blockchain fabric and Machine Learning backend (Cloud2) for training purposes so that the user can be authenticated at a later point in time (3).

When the user books a flight, the Airline will create the necessary booking information (4). Next, the user goes to Check-In and the automated kiosk (an access point) (5). The Check-In kiosk then pulls the necessary metadata from Cloud1 to generate the matching SelfI (6), and makes the call to the Matching backend (7) in Cloud2. The matching logic is triggered and a response is securely (e.g., SSL) sent back to the access point (8, 9). The Check-In process can now continue (10).

In the event that a trusted SelfI is required, a third party such as a Government Agency can endorse SelfI. This process is similar to the one above meaning that, when a user generates a SelfI,
the user will follow the same steps as the use case above, generate the SelfI, provide the seeds to the Government agency, then let the Government agency generate a SelfI for the user and match it. If there is a match, the Government agency can then endorse the user’s SelfI. This is analogous to the process of digital certificates, whereby upon proving ownership of a SelfI and its contents, the Certificate Authority endorses it, and we can now use standard methods to verify authenticity of a SelfI.

5. Model and Experimental Results

5.1. Architecture Software Stack

We developed an Android Application that is used to capture the user’s selfies and register/authenticate with our backend. IBM Cloud hosts our booking and machine-learning logic. IBM’s Blockchain Platform [19] is used to manage our user’s SelfIs via RESTful endpoints [4]. We built a native library for SelfI generation that supports ARM and x86 platforms. We currently support Android, Raspberry Pi 3, and x86 trusted access points.

![Figure 4. Overview of our model architecture](image)

5.2. Template Matching Model

Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have been studied and used extensively to do image classification. The task is to assign a label or class to an input image and provide a confidence score or probability that the input image belongs to a particular class. In order to train these types of networks, a large number of training samples per class are required, and the data typically consists of RGB images with 3 channels. In the area of time series classification, deep convolutional neural networks have been studied to demonstrated that feature learning is possible for time series classification [47]. One of the reasons is that the use of very long sequences in recurrent neural networks such as Long short-term memory (LSTM) is difficult because it is a very tedious task to train these models due to the length of the sequences. Furthermore, using sequential models like Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [44] or Hamming distance and variants of it [5] to measure the similarity between two sequences either takes too long to execute or might not be able to provide the level of accuracy required to do template matching. Inspired by the efforts to do and improve image classification as well as the on-going research to apply deep learning to DNA classification and gene regulation [12, 45], we devised our own model to do bloom classification.

Our model takes into account the spatial and temporal nature of the hexadecimal bloom sequence by encoding the bloom filters as images and using various layers to learn features from the bloom filters. The model consists of time distributed convolutional layers followed by Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) and fully connected layers. Figure 4 shows a high level overview of the architecture. The intuition behind the proposed model is to convert hexadecimal bloom filters into images with 4 channels. Each channel holds a single bit, which dictates if a feature is present or not for a given bloom template. The convolutional layers are used to learn high level features/patterns. The data is then flatten and fed to a set of GRU and fully connected layers. This allows us to extract and learn additional features and train the model at a faster rate. The activation used throughout the layers is ReLU. Max pooling and batch normalization are used to extract additional features, reduce overfitting, and use of a higher learning rate. The softmax activation function is used in the final layer to get class probabilities.

5.3. Data Sources and Pre-processing Steps

In order validate the proposed model, we created our own dataset of face images taken from a Sam-
sung Galaxy S9 Plus device. The dataset consist of 400 images of size 2448 x 3264 pixels taken under different lighting, background, and face alignment conditions. In total 20 images were taken per participant, stored in JPEG format, and labeled with an identification number. This dataset is representative of the registration phase mentioned in the Traveling Abroad use case since each person is required to use his or her smartphone to take SelfIs, and the participants take the images under different lighting and background conditions. In addition, we used some of the images from Caltech’s Frontal face dataset as well. For the experiments and results reported in this paper, we use the images from the dataset we have created for training, testing, and validation. Images from the Caltech dataset as well as some images we took with a different device are used for testing purposes only since the number of images available per person in this dataset varies a lot and we need at least 10 images per person to train our model.

For the images in the dataset we have created, we randomly split each set of 20 images into training, testing, and validation sets. Of the 20 images taken for each participant, 10 images are used to train our model, 5 images are used to validate our model, and the remaining 5 images are used for testing. For the Caltech’s dataset images and other images we took, we randomly selected 2 images per participant and use them only for testing scenario 4, described in Section 5.4. Upon splitting the data, we followed the steps mentioned in the use case to detect the face, transform (distort) the face, extract features from the face region of the image, and generate the bloom filters. Each bloom filter consists of 61,440 hexadecimal values that encode the feature vectors. We then iterate through each hexadecimal value to convert it to its binary representation (4 bits per hexadecimal value) for a total of 245,760 bits. Finally, each binary bloom filter of size $1 \times 245,760$ is converted into an image representation of size $w \times h \times c$, where $w$ is the width of the image, $h$ is the height of the image, and $c$ is the number of channels/depth. The resulting binary bloom image is of size $240 \times 256 \times 4$. Each element of the binary bloom image represents the hexadecimal value in binary format. Figure 4 shows an example of the transformations that takes place to convert a hexadecimal bloom filter to its corresponding binary bloom image representation. Step 1 shows the 10 blooms of a user, each in hexadecimal format. Step 2 shows the binary representation of the 10th hexadecimal bloom filter. Step 3 shows the representation of the bloom filter as a binary bloom image format. The transformation from hexadecimal bloom filter to binary bloom image is done for all bloom filters for all participants.

5.4. Experiments and Results

We conducted a set of experiments to test 4 different scenarios that are likely to occur when performing face authentication using the SelfIs architecture shown in Figure 3. For the following scenarios, let $U_x$ be a person who has registered using the SelfIs system, $S_x$ be the seeds used to transform $U_x$ images, and $U_y$ be a person who has not registered before.
This can be extended to all users who have registered, but for simplicity, the following scenarios describe the interaction between our system and users $U_x$ and $U_y$. **Scenario 1**: Given the seeds generated for $U_x$ during the registration phase, use $U_x$ seeds, $S_x$, to bloom $U_x$ images for authentication. This describes the case in which $U_x$ wants to authenticate. **Scenario 2**: Given some randomly generated seeds that are not equal to $S_x$, use these random seeds to authenticate $U_x$. This describes the case in which $U_x$ wants to authenticate but the system performs a different transformation since it is using some random seeds that are not $S_x$. **Scenario 3**: Given the seeds generated from all other registered users, excluding $S_x$, use these seeds to authenticate $U_x$. This describes the case in which the system is waiting for $U_x$ to authenticate, but a different user who has registered with the system tries to authenticate. **Scenario 4**: Given $U_y$, who has not registered, use the seeds from all registered users to authenticate $U_y$. This describes the case in which a user who has not previously registered tries to authenticate.

We performed the pre-processing and dataset splits described in section 5.3 to build our training, validation, and testing sets for all 4 scenarios. Out of the 20 sets of data from the dataset we created (20 participants, 20 images each), 16 sets are used for training, validation, and testing scenarios 1-3. The remaining 4 sets from this dataset plus images from the Caltech dataset and the images we took from a difference device are used to test scenario 4 since this scenario requires images of participants that the system has not seen before. We set the cutoff confidence threshold to 80% to indicate a match if the confidence level is equal or greater than 80%; a mis-match if the confidence level is less than 80%. The results are summarized in Table 1. For scenario 1, 62 out of the 80 predictions (77.5% of the predictions) have a confidence score equal or greater than 80%. The remaining 18 predictions (22.5% of the predictions) have a score less than 80%. Scenarios 2-4 have a high percentage of confidence levels below the cutoff threshold as one would expect, 90.0%, 85.33%, and 91.25% respectively. For scenarios 3-4, the number of predictions are much larger due to the number of possible seed combinations. Figure 5 shows the distribution of confidence levels across all 4 scenarios. The distributions show that the vast majority of confidence levels for scenarios 2-4 are within confidence levels 0.3 and 0.5. For scenario 1, 58 predictions have a confidence level between 0.9 and 1.0, 4 between 0.80 and 0.89, and so forth. These results indicate that our model learns from the binary bloom images and is able to authenticate (match) a large number of users if the same set of seeds generated during the registration phase for that particular user are used during the authentication phase. Otherwise, the system should not match blooms if the features from the users are different or if different transformations are applied to the data.

We also performed some optimization and tried different models (different type and number of layers) during our experiments. These variations showed higher matching rates (% above cutoff) for Scenario 1 (e.g., 82.5% and 85% for two different tests), but also higher false positive rates for Scenario 2 (17.5% and 16.25%), Scenario 3 (16.0% and 13.5%), and Scenario 4 (6.46% and 13.23%). The above cutoff percentage rates for Scenarios 2-4 should be close or equal to 0%, or conversely, the below cutoff percentage rates should be close or equal to 100% to indicate that there is no match when in fact there should not be a match. Furthermore, we deployed the models and trained them with live data, but we also observed lower accuracy results. This leads us to believe that we need to fine-tune our models further to account for different characteristics such as different face orientations, lighting conditions, etc.

### 6. Conclusion

This paper proposed the concept of Self-Sovereign Biometric IDs (SelfIs). The idea is to allow users to fully control how their biometrics are used for the purpose of digital identity. We show preliminary results describing the use of machine learning combined with cancelable biometrics, which show promising acceptance rates. Future work includes hyper parameter optimizations, increase our data set to include images from multiple platforms, as well as integrate mixed-mode blooming (other biometrics).
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