Adversarial Texture for Fooling Person Detectors in the Physical World

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Abstract

Nowadays, cameras equipped with AI systems can capture and analyze images to detect people automatically. However, the AI system can make mistakes when receiving deliberately designed patterns in the real world, i.e., physical adversarial examples. Prior works have shown that it is possible to print adversarial patches on clothes to evade DNN-based person detectors. However, these adversarial examples could have catastrophic drops in the attack success rate when the viewing angle (i.e., the camera’s angle towards the object) changes. To perform a multi-angle attack, we propose Adversarial Texture (AdvTexture). AdvTexture can cover clothes with arbitrary shapes so that people wearing such clothes can hide from person detectors from different viewing angles. We propose a generative method, named Toroidal-Cropping-based Expandable Generative Attack (TC-EGA), to craft AdvTexture with repetitive structures. We printed several pieces of cloth with AdvTexture and then made T-shirts, skirts, and dresses in the physical world. Experiments showed that these clothes could fool person detectors in the physical world.

1. Introduction

Recent works have shown that Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to the adversarial examples crafted by adding subtle noise to the original images in the digital world \([5, 8, 10, 18, 22–24, 31]\), and that the DNNs can be attacked by manufactured objects in the physical world \([1, 4, 9, 29]\). These manufactured objects are called physical adversarial examples. Recently, some methods based on patch attacks \([29]\) have been proposed to evade person detectors \([14, 15, 32, 34, 35, 37]\). Specifically, Thys et al. \([32]\) proposed to attach a patch to a cardboard. By holding the cardboard in front of the camera, the person cannot be detected by the person detectors. Xu et al. \([35]\) proposed an adversarial T-shirt printed with adversarial patches. The person wearing the T-shirt can also evade person detectors. These works impose considerable threats to the widely deployed deep learning-based security systems. It urges researchers to re-evaluate the safety and reliability of these systems.

However, the person detector attack methods mentioned above are effective only when the adversarial patches face the camera. Apparently, a single adversarial patch on a piece of clothing is hard to attack detectors at multiple viewing angles, as the camera may only capture a segment of the heavily deformed patch (Fig. 1a and Fig. 1b). We call this the segment-missing problem. A naive extension is to cover the clothing with multiple patches (e.g., tiling the patches tightly on the clothing; see Fig. 1c). However, it cannot totally solve the segment-missing problem, because the camera will capture several segments belonging to different patch units, making the attack inefficient. Another straightforward solution is to build a 3D model of a human

![Figure 1. Illustration of the attacks at different viewing angles.](image)

(a) The camera captures different parts (P1, P2, P3) of the clothes when set to different viewing angles (C1, C2, C3). (b-d) The boxes are the possible areas that the camera may capture. The blue ones indicate the most effective areas for attack, while the red ones are less effective.
body and a specific piece of clothing to render in different viewing angles as previous work [1] did. However, the clothes are non-rigid, and current 3D rendering techniques have difficulties in modeling the natural deformation of clothes in the real world. For example, Wang et al. [33] rendered 3D logos on flat areas (front and back) of 3D human meshes, but the Attack Success Rate (ASR) decreased when applying to unseen meshes.

To solve the problem, we propose the idea of using Adversarial Texture (AdvTexture). Unlike the patch-based attacks, AdvTexture can be generated in arbitrary size, thus can cover any cloth in any size. We require that any local part of the texture has adversarial effectiveness (Fig. 1d). Then, when the clothes are covered with AdvTexture, every local area caught by the camera can attack the detectors, which solves the segment-missing problem.

Towards this goal, we propose a two-stage generative method, Toroidal-Cropping-based Expandable Generative Attack (TC-EGA), to craft AdvTexture. In the first stage, we train a fully convolutional network (FCN) [21, 30] as the generator to produce textures by sampling random latent variables as input. Unlike the conventional architecture of the generator in GAN [16, 25], we use convolutional operation in every layer, including the latent variable. Therefore, the latent variable is a tensor with spatial dimensions, which enables the generator to generate textures in multiple sizes as long as we expand the latent variable along the spatial dimensions. In the second stage, we search the best local pattern of the latent variable with a cropping technique—Toroidal Cropping (TC). After optimization, we can generate a large enough latent variable by tiling the local pattern. We input it to the FCN and finally get AdvTexture.

We implemented TC-EGA to attack various person detectors, and realized AdvTextures in the physical world. Fig. 2 shows some example attacks targeting YOLOv2. Our experiments showed that the clothes made from such textures significantly lowered the detection performance of different detectors.

2. Related Work

Earlier works about adversarial examples [10, 18, 31] focused on digital attacks. Small adversarial noises can be added to the original images and make DNNs output wrong predictions, posing significant safety concerns to DNNs.

Compared to digital adversarial attacks, physical adversarial attacks pose more risks in specific scenarios. Several methods [1, 4, 9, 29] have been proposed to attack image classification models physically. Sharif et al. [29] designed a pair of glasses to attack face-recognition systems. Athalye et al. [1] generated robust 3D adversarial objects by introducing the Expectation over Transformation (EoT) [1] method. Brown et al. [4] deceived image classifiers by placing adversarial patches in the neighborhood of the objects. Evtimov et al. [9] misled road-sign classification by adhering black and white stickers to signs.

Recently, several methods [14, 15, 32, 32–35] were proposed to attack the DNN-based person detection systems. Thys et al. [32] optimized an adversarial patch that can be attached to cardboard and held by a person. Huang et al. [15] propose Universal Physical Camouflage Attack (UPC) to fool the detectors by simulating 3D objects in virtual environments. Xu et al. [35] designed an adversarial T-shirt by introducing Thin Plate Spline (TPS) [2, 7] to simulate the deformation of clothes (e.g., wrinkles). Wu et al. [34] presented a systematic study of the attack on a range of detection models, different datasets, and objects. Wang et al. [33] masked the adversarial patch with preset logos and mapped it into 3D models. Hu et al. [14] used generative adversarial networks (GAN) [3, 16] to craft more natural-looking adversarial patches.

Some works [15, 33, 35] reported drops in the attack success rate when the viewing angles increased. According to Wang et al. [33], part of the patches will not be captured when the camera rotates drastically. It can lead to underestimating the threat, whereas the cameras can be placed anywhere in real-world scenarios.

3. Methods

We aim to generate textures in arbitrary size, and when the textures are printed on cloth, any patch extracted from the cloth are effective in adversarial attack. We first introduce an adversarial patch generator and then describe TC-EGA based on the patch generator.

3.1. Adversarial Patch Generator

Let $\tau$ denote the whole cloth that is covered with AdvTexture, and $\tilde{\tau}$ denote an extracted patch. We assume that $\tilde{\tau}$ follows a distribution $p_{adv}$, such that the probability $p_{adv}(\tilde{\tau})$ is higher when its adversarial effectiveness is more significant. We use an energy function $U(\tilde{\tau})$ to model
Theorem 1 Minimizing $\text{KL}(q_\varphi(\hat{\tau}) || p_{\text{adv}}(\hat{\tau}))$ is equivalent to

$$\min_{\varphi, \omega} \mathbb{E}_{\hat{\tau} \sim q_\varphi(\hat{\tau})}[U(\hat{\tau})] - I^{\text{JS}}_{\varphi, \omega}(\hat{\tau}, z),$$

where $I^{\text{JS}}_{\varphi, \omega}(\hat{\tau}, z)$ is called Information Objective Function because minimizing it is equivalent to maximizing the mutual information of $z$ and $\hat{\tau}$ [13], which requires different latent variables to generate different patches.

3.1.1 The Adversary Objective Function

The adversary objective function $\mathbb{E}_{\hat{\tau} \sim q_\varphi(\hat{\tau})}[U(\hat{\tau})]$ can be estimated by sampling $z$ and generating $\hat{\tau}$:

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} [U(G_\varphi(z_i))],$$

where $\{z_i\}$ are the latent variables sampled from $\mathcal{N}(0, I)$, and $N$ denotes the total number of the samples.

Now we need to set an appropriate energy function such that lowering the energy leads to detection failure of a person detector. We notice that detectors output multiple bounding boxes with a confidence score for each box when receiving an image. The boxes whose confidence scores are lower than a pre-specified threshold will then be filtered out. Therefore we choose the expectation of the confidence scores over boxes as a part of the energy function $U(\hat{\tau})$. Then minimizing the adv object function will lower the confidence scores of the boxes, which makes the boxes easily be filtered out.

Specifically, we randomly generate patches in every step, and apply a set of physical transformations such as randomizing the scales, contrast, brightness and additional noise according to Expectation over Transformation (EoT) [29, 32]. We also incorporate random Thin Plate Spin (TPS) [7, 35] deformation as an additional random transformation. We then attach the patches randomly to the persons according to the predicted boxes on the images $x$ from the training set. We use $M(x, \hat{\tau})$ to denote the above process, and obtain the modified images which are then be sent into the target detector. This part of the energy function is thus defined as

$$U_{\text{obj}} = \mathbb{E}_{x,M}[f(M(x, \hat{\tau}))],$$
where $f$ denotes confidence scores of the boxes predicted by the target detector.

We use a differentiable variation of total variance (TV) loss [29] as another part of the energy function to encourage the patches to be smoother:

$$U_{TV} = \sum_{i,j} |\tau_{i,j} - \tau_{i+1,j}| + |\tau_{i,j} - \tau_{i,j+1}| \quad (7)$$

Together, we form the energy function as

$$U(\tilde{\tau}) = \frac{1}{\beta}(U_{obj} + \alpha U_{TV}), \quad (8)$$

where $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are coefficients. See Fig. 3 for the illustration. When minimizing the adversary objective function, each part of the energy function will be minimized together.

### 3.1.2 The Information Objective function

As described in Eq. (4), we use an auxiliary network $T_{w}$ to increase the mutual information of $z$ and $\tilde{\tau}$. We illustrate the architecture of $T_{w}$ in Fig. 4. Eq. (4) has two terms, and estimating each of them needs random sampling. Following the previous work [13], to estimate the first term, we first sample $z$ from $\mathcal{N}(0, I)$, and then generated $\tilde{\tau}$ by $G_{w}(z)$ in each training step. To estimate the second term, we keep $\tilde{\tau}$ and resample $z$.

During training, we minimize the adversarial objective function and the information objective function simultaneously. Therefore, the distribution $p_{\phi}$ can approximate to $p_{adv}$, which means the the generated patches $\tilde{\tau}$ can be adversarial to the target detector.

### 3.2. Toroidal-Cropping-based Expandable Generative Attack

In Sec. 3.1, we have described the method to train a generator for adversarial patches $\tilde{\tau}$. In this section, we used TC-EGA to generate AdvTextures $\tau$ based on the adversarial patch generator. We leverage a specific network architecture and a sample technique to extend adversarial patches to adversarial textures. TC-EGA has two stages. In the first stage, we train a fully convolutional network (FCN) [21,30]

![Figure 4. The architecture of the auxiliary network $T_w$. It has two inputs, $\tilde{\tau}$ and $z$, and outputs a scalar value $T_w(\tilde{\tau}, z)$. The operation $c$ in the figure stands for concatenation.](image)

![Figure 5. (a) Illustration of the FCN generator. All layers of the generator network are convolutional layers with zero padding, including the first layer. (b) Each patch $\tau_{i,j,w,h}$ extracted from position $i,j$ can be regarded as the output of a sub-generator $G_{i,j,w,h}$ when the input is $z_{i,j,w,h}$.](image)
Theorem 2 Let \( \tau_1 = G_1(z_1), \tau_2 = G_2(z_2), z_1 \sim \mathcal{Z}_1, z_2 \sim \mathcal{Z}_2, \tau_1 \sim \mathcal{T}_1, \tau_2 \sim \mathcal{T}_2 \). If \( \mathcal{Z}_1 \) is identical to \( \mathcal{Z}_2 \) and \( G_1 \) is equivalent to \( G_2 \), then \( \mathcal{T}_1 \) is identical to \( \mathcal{T}_2 \).

Corollary 2.1 \( G_{i,j,w,h} \) and \( \mathcal{T}_{i,j,w,h} \) are irrelevant to \( i, j \), i.e., \( G_{i,j,w,h} = G_{w,h} \) and \( \mathcal{T}_{i,j,w,h} = \mathcal{T}_{w,h} \), if \( G \) is an FCN and the input \( z \sim \mathcal{N}(0, I) \).

See Supplementary Materials for the proofs. Therefore, as long as the sub-generator \( G_{w,h} \) is trained to approximate the distribution of \( \mathcal{T}_{w,h} \) to \( p_{\text{adv}} \), any patch extracted from the overall texture with shape \((w, h)\) also approximately follows \( p_{\text{adv}} \), i.e., it has adversarial effectiveness. Moreover, due to the translation invariant property of the convolutional operation, the sub-generator \( G_{w,h} \) and the global generator can share the same architecture and parameters except for the different spatial shape \( H \) and \( W \) of the latent variable \( z \). As a result, we only need to train a small generator.

Note that the height \( H \) and width \( W \) of the hidden variable \( z \) can not be too small, otherwise the output will be too small to crop a patch in spatial shape \((w, h)\). We denote the minimum spatial sizes by \( H_{\text{min}} \) and \( W_{\text{min}} \). During training, we sampled a small \( z \) in shape \( B \times C \times H_{\text{min}} \times W_{\text{min}} \) and generated the corresponding patches in each training step. After that, we can produce different textures of arbitrary sizes by randomizing \( z \) with any \( H \geq H_{\text{min}} \) and \( W \geq W_{\text{min}} \).

3.2.2 Stage Two: Find the Best Latent Pattern

After training, the generator can generate different textures by sampling latent variables. In order to find the best texture for adversarial attacks, we propose to go one step further, that is, to optimize the latent variable with the parameters of the generator frozen. However, since the texture has no specific shape and the size of the latent variable needs to be large enough to produce a large textured cloth, directly optimizing the latent variable is difficult.

Inspired by the unfolding of torus in topology which supports up-down and left-right continuation [11] (Fig. 6a), we introduce the Toroidal Cropping (TC) technique, which aims to optimize a local pattern \( z_{\text{local}} \) as a unit such that the final latent variable \( z \) can be produced by tiling multiple identical units. In detail, \( z_{\text{local}} \) can be parameterized as a tensor in shape \( B \times C \times L \times L \) with a shape hyper-parameter \( L \), which can be regarded as the unfolded plane of a two-dimensional torus \( \mathbb{T}^2 \) in topology (Fig. 6a). Therefore the latent variable in arbitrary shape can be cropped from \( z_{\text{local}} \) in a recursive manner (Fig. 6b), which can be regarded as cropping on the torus. We denote such crop operation by \( \text{Crop}_{\text{torus}} \).

During optimization, we randomly sample the latent variables \( z_{\text{sample}} \) in shape \( B \times C \times H_{\text{min}} \times W_{\text{min}} \) by such cropping technique. Since we only consider the adversarial effectiveness in this stage, we generated patches by \( z_{\text{sample}} \) and minimized the adversary loss (Eq. (5)). After optimization, one can produce a latent variable with arbitrary size by tiling \( z_{\text{local}} \).

4. Experiment settings

4.1. Subjects

We recruited three subjects (mean age: 24.0; range: 21 – 26; two males and one female) to collect physical test set. The recruitment and study procedures were approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China.

4.2. Dataset

We employed the Inria Person dataset [6] as our training set. It is a dataset for pedestrian detection, which consists of 614 images for training and 288 for testing. We evaluated the patch-based attack on the Inria test set. For physical evaluation, we produced clothes covered with different adversarial textures. Three subjects wore different adversarial clothes and turned a circle slowly in front of a camera which was fixed at 1.38 meters above the ground. The distance between the camera and person is fixed to 2 m unless otherwise specified. We recorded two videos for each subject and each adversarial piece of clothing. One of the video was recorded indoor (lab room), and the other was recorded...
in outdoor (brick walkway). We then extracted 32 frames from each video. We recorded $3 \times 2 = 6$ videos and collected $6 \times 32 = 192$ frames for each adversarial piece of clothing, we labeled them manually to construct a test set.

### 4.3. Baseline Methods

We evaluated the adversarial patches produced by Thys et al. [32] and Xu et al. [35], and named them by AdvPatch and AdvTshirt, respectively. We copied the patterns from their original papers. We also tiled AdvPatch and AdvTshirt to form textures with repeated patterns. These two variants are called AdvPatchTile and AdvTshirtTile. In addition, we evaluated a texture with repetitive random colors, which is denoted by Random.

Moreover, TC-EGA has multiple components and some of them could be applied separately to craft adversarial textures. To investigate the performance of each component, we designed three variants of TC-EGA, as described below.

**Expandable Generative Attack (EGA)** We trained an FCN as the first stage of TC-EGA without optimizing the best latent variable. During evaluation, the final texture can be generated by a latent variable in arbitrary size and sampled from a standard normal distribution.

**Toroidal Cropping Attack (TCA)** We directly optimized the texture instead of training an FCN to generate texture. Specifically, we initialized a local texture pattern of $300 \times 300$ pixels, and randomly extracted a patch by size $150 \times 150$ from the texture by Toroidal Cropping in each optimization step.

**Random Cropping Attack (RCA)** We directly optimized a large patch whose size is fixed. We initialized the large patch and randomly cropped a small patch by size $150 \times 150$ during optimization. This method is named Random Cropping Attack (RCA). We implemented two attacks, RCA2× and RCA6×, where the sizes of the large patches are $300 \times 300$ and $900 \times 900$, respectively.

### 4.4. Implementation Details

We crafted AdvTexture to mainly fool YOLOv2 [26], YOLOv3 [27], Faster R-CNN [28] and Mask R-CNN [12]. The detectors were pre-trained on MS COCO dataset [20]. Their outputs were filtered to output the person class only.

For each target detector, we first extracted the predicted bounding boxes on the images from the training set with a Non-Maximum Suppression (NMS) threshold 0.4. We chose the boxes whose confidence was larger than a certain threshold (0.5 for YOLOv2 and YOLOv3, and 0.75 for Faster and Mask R-CNN). We additionally filtered out boxes with areas smaller than 0.16% of the entire image.

For Faster and Mask R-CNN. Then, as we described in Sec. 3.1.1, we attached the extracted patches to the persons and input the modified images to the detector during optimization.

Moreover, we applied the Adam [17] optimizer to optimize parameters in both stages. The hyper-parameters are listed as follows. (1) Stage one: The initial learning rate to train the generator was 0.001. The generator was a 7-layer FCN whose input was the latent variable $z$ with size $B \times 128 \times 9 \times 9$. The size of the corresponding output was $B \times 3 \times 324 \times 324$, where the second dimension stands for the RGB channels. (2) Stage two: We optimized a local latent variable $z_{local}$ with size $1 \times 128 \times 4 \times 4$, followed by the Toroidal Cropping technique to produce samples of $z$ with size $B \times 128 \times 9 \times 9$. The learning rate of the optimization was 0.03.

To physically implement AdvTexture, we printed the texture on a polyester cloth material by digital textile printing. Afterwards, we hired a professional tailor to produce adversarial clothes including T-shirts, skirts and dresses.

### 5. Results

Fig. 7 shows some textures obtained by different methods, and more can be found in Supplementary Materials.

#### 5.1. Patch-Based Attack in the Digital World

We first evaluated the attacks in the form of the patch-based attack in the digital world. Specifically, we randomly extracted patches from the textures when evaluating most methods except for AdvPatch and AdvTexture. We denote such patches by resampled patches. We then attached the patches to the images from the Inria test set the same way as crafting the adversarial patches. We used the bounding boxes proposed by the target detectors on the original test images with a confidence threshold of 0.5 as the ground truth. We computed the average precision (AP) of the proposed bounding boxes on the modified test images to measure the adversarial effectiveness. Note that lower AP indicates stronger attack.

Tab. 1 presents the AP of YOLOv2 in different conditions. clean denotes the AP on the original test set.
We reproduced an adversarial patch according to their released code https://gitlab.com/EAVISE/adversarial-yolo. The reproduced patch got an AP of 0.378. We used the patch that is copied from their paper in all the experiments.

Table 1. The APs of YOLOv2 under different attacks on Inria test set. Expandable denotes whether the methods can produce textures in arbitrary size. Resampled denotes whether the patches are randomly extracted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>AP</th>
<th>Expandable</th>
<th>Resampled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clean</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AdvPatch [32]</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AdvPatchTile</td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AdvTshirt [35]</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AdvTshirtTile</td>
<td>0.844</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC-EGA</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGA</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCA2</td>
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<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCA</td>
<td>0.606</td>
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<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCA6</td>
<td>0.855</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- When the original patch is shifted totally outside the cropping range, the detector is considered to have correctly detected.

The results of other detectors attacked by TC-EGA in the digital world are shown in Supplementary Materials.

5.2. Attack in the Physical World

Fig. 9 shows the produced clothes by different methods, and more can be found in Supplementary Materials.

We first compared different methods on YOLOv2. Since the boxes predicted by the detectors can be filtered by a particular confidence threshold, we plotted the recall-confidence curve in Fig. 10 and showed their APs in the legend. Remember that recall denotes the fraction of the boxes that are successfully retrieved. These boxes are filtered by a confidence threshold. Therefore, for each particular confidence threshold, lower recall denotes better adversarial effectiveness. From Fig. 10, the tiled variants of both AdvPatch and AdvTshirt were more effective than the original method. TC-EGA outperformed among all the methods by the lowest recall-confidence curve and the lowest AP.

Moreover, we used another metric to evaluate the effectiveness of the attacks. Specifically, for each input image we collected the target detector’s predicted bounding boxes whose confidence score is larger than a certain confidence threshold. As long as one of these boxes has an Intersection over Union (IoU) with the ground-truth box greater than 0.5, the detector is considered to have correctly detected. We defined Attack Success Rate (ASR) as the fraction of the test images that are not correctly predicted. Since the variants, TC-EGA got the lowest AP 0.362, which was also the lowest among all the resampled patches. AdvPatch made the AP slightly lower than TC-EGA. However, it is not expandable and thus unsuitable for the attack at multiple viewing angles. Moreover, EGA decreased the AP to 0.470, TCA created expandable patches with AP 0.664. It was lower than AdvPatchTile, which indicates the effectiveness of the Toroidal Cropping technique. Moreover, RCA6× was much worse than RCA2×, which indicates difficulties in optimizing a large patch.

We further investigated the segment-missing problem by evaluating the adversarial effectiveness of the patches which is cropped at shifted positions (See Fig. 8). The patch-based attack, AdvPatch, became less effective when the shifting ratio increased. Tiling the patches alleviated the problem, but was still problematic. The texture generated by TC-EGA was robust during shifting.

The results of other detectors attacked by TC-EGA in the digital world are shown in Supplementary Materials.

Supplementary Materials
ASR is relevant to the confidence threshold, we calculated the mean value of the ASR, namely mASR, under multiple thresholds. The thresholds were 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9 in our experiment.

Fig. 11 presents the mASRs in multiple viewing angles. Compared to the random texture, AdvPatch and AdvTshirt were effective when the persons faced the camera (the viewing angle is 0° or 360° in the figure). However, the mASRs of these two methods decreased when the viewing angle increased, which manifests the segment-missing problem. The tiled variants of both methods had some adversarial effectiveness in multiple viewing angles, while the mASRs were lower than 0.5 in almost every viewing angles. TC-EGA outperformed the other methods at almost every viewing angle. The mASR is approximately 1.0 at viewing angle 0° and 180°, indicating that the person can always evade the detector when confidence threshold is larger than 0.1. It was less effective when the viewing angle is close to 90° or 270° because the area captured by the camera were small at such viewing angles.

We investigated influence of the type of clothes and the distance between person and camera. From Tab. 2, the adversarial effectiveness varied when the texture was applied to different kinds of clothes. The attack was more effective when applying to larger clothes (e.g., dress), for more area of the texture was captured by the camera. Moreover, the adversarial clothes had comparable mASRs in both indoor and outdoor scenes (See Supplementary Materials). Their effectiveness dropped when far from the camera (See Supplementary Materials).

Tab. 3 presents the mASRs of the adversarial clothes to attack various detectors. From the table, TC-EGA obtained much higher mASR than Random. Moreover, the adversarial effectiveness remained when the adversarial clothes are transferred across different detectors. See Supplementary Materials for the details of the transfer study. In addition, we provide a video demo in Supplementary Video.

6. Conclusions

We propose a method to craft AdvTextures to realize physical adversarial attacks on person detection systems. The main idea is to first train a expandable generator to generate AdvTexture by taking random input in a latent space, and then search the best local patterns of the latent variable for attack. The effectiveness of the AdvTexture is improved by optimizing the latent input. We physically implemented AdvTexture by printing it on a large cloth and making different T-shirts, skirts, and dresses. Those clothes, evaluated by our experiment in the physical world, were effective when the person wearing them turns around or changes postures.

Limitations Though the crafted texture targeting one detector can also attack another detector to some extent, the transferability is not very good. Model ensemble could be used to improve transferability.

Potential negative impact Adversarial research may cause potentially unwanted applications in the real-world community, such as camera security issues. Many defense methods based on previously exposed vulnerabilities have been proposed [10, 19, 36], which have improved the security level of our community and beneficially illustrated the value of research about attack.

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