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# DeepFake Disrupter: The Detector of DeepFake Is My Friend

## (Supplementary Material)

Anonymous CVPR submission

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In the following, we provide Algorithms Pseudocode, Model Architecture and Training details and Algorithms for the training and evaluation process for the DeepFake Disrupter and additional experiments.

### 1. Algorithm

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#### Algorithm 1: Training with DeepFake Disrupter

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**Data:** real inputs  $x$ , target conditions  $c$ , hyper-parameter  $\epsilon$ ,  $C_1, C_2, C_3$  and number of epochs  $E$ , batch size  $B$

**Result:** Well trained Perturbation generator  $P(\cdot)$

1 Initialize Perturbation Generator  $P(\cdot)$  with weight  $W_p$ ;

2 Initialize loss weights to  $W_i = 1$ , for  $i = 1, 2, 3$ , where  $W_i = C_i$ ;

3 Loading pre-trained DeepFake Generator  $G$  with weight  $W_G$ ;

4 Loading pre-trained DeepFake discriminator  $D$  with weight  $W_D$ ;

5 **for**  $epoch = 0$  to  $E$  **do**

6   **for**  $i = 1$  to  $B$  **do**

7     Compute perturbation  $\eta$  by  $\eta = P(x)$ ;;

8     Compute Adversarial Inputs  $\hat{x} = x + \eta$ ;

9     Compute  $L$  using Eq.(7);

10    Update  $W_{p(t+1)} \leftarrow W_{p(t)}$  using  $\nabla_W L(t)$ ;

11    Keep  $W_G$  and  $W_D$  unchanged after each iteration;

12    Using GradNorm [1] to update loss item weights  $W_i$

13   **end**

14 **end**

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#### Algorithm 2: Evaluation Detection Outcomes

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**Data:** a batch of test data: real images or videos  $x$ , target conditions  $c$ , number of testing data:  $N$

**Result:** Precision  $p$ , Recall  $r$  and F-1 score  $F$

1 Loading pre-trained models  $P(\cdot)$ ,  $G(\cdot)$ ,  $D(\cdot)$ ;

2 **for**  $data$  in batches **do**

3    Compute  $\eta = P(x)$ ;

4    Compute  $x_{fake} = G(x + \eta, c)$ ;

5    Compute  $x_{preal} = x + \eta$ ;

6 **end**

7 Pass  $N$  real inputs  $x$ ,  $N$  fake inputs  $x_{fake}$  into DeepFake Detector  $D$ ;

8 Compute  $p = True\_Real / (True\_Real + False\_Real)$ ;

9  $r = True\_Real / (True\_Real + False\_Fake)$ ;

10  $F1 = 2 * (P * r) / (p + r)$ ;

11 Pass  $N$  perturbed inputs  $x_{preal}$  into  $D$ ;

12 Compute  $r = True\_Real / (True\_Real + False\_Fake)$

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### 2. Model Architecture and Training Details

**Perturbation Generator** For perturbation generator  $P(\cdot)$ , We choose U-Net [5]. The U-net architectures can be divided into two sections: The encoding section and the decoding section. We use 2D U-Net for image-based experiment and 3D U-Net for video-based experiment. In the encoding section, we apply contraction blocks consists of 2D or 3D convolution and max-pooling layers to encode the source inputs. In the decoding section, we apply expansion blocks consisting of 2D or 3D transpose convolution as well as normal 2D or 3D convolutions. The center part of U-Net is that each feature map of the encoding section has a shortcut connection with the corresponding feature map in the decoding section.

**DeepFake Generator** We use StarGAN [2], GANimation [4] and First-Order-Motion Model [8] to illustrate that our

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\*Equal Contribution

108 proposed pipeline can be used for different DeepFake manipulation systems. For StarGAN, we use a pretrained generator model in the open-source implementation used by  
109 [7]. This generator is trained on the CelebA dataset with  
110 seven domains including black hair, blond hair, brown hair,  
111 gender(male/female) and aged(young/old). For GANimation,  
112 we use its official open-source pretrained generators  
113 trained for 37 epochs on the CelebA dataset for 80 action  
114 units(AU) based on the Facial Action Unit Coding System  
115 [3]. For First-Order Motion Model, we deploy its official  
116 open-source framework. The core part of this framework  
117 includes motion estimation and image generation. Firstly,  
118 a source image and a driving video will be fed into Motion  
119 Module, then the Motion module will use a keypoint detector  
120 to extract motion representations, after which generating  
121 a dense optical flow and occlusion map mapping from the  
122 driving video to the source image. Finally, the generation  
123 process will provide quality animations by feeding into the  
124 source image and Motion Module’s outputs.

125 **DeepFake Detector** As our work is to test the effectiveness  
126 of perturbation generator rather than detection power  
127 of deepfake detectors, we use commonly used backbone  
128 for various SOTA deepfake detectors, namely Xception,  
129 Resnet18 and Resnet50 as our detection architectures. All  
130 these models are trained on the FaceForensic++ datasets. In  
131 terms of image level detectors, for Xception architecture,  
132 we choose the open-source pretrained model from [6]. For  
133 Resnet18 and Resnet50, we trained 100 epochs to get a clas-  
134 sification accuracy at 96% and 98% respectively. In terms  
135 of video level discriminators, we choose 3D Xception and  
136 3D resnet18 and trained 100 epochs to get accuracy at 91%  
137 and 95% respectively.

138 **Hyper Parameters** There are several hyper parameters.  
139 The first one is  $\epsilon$  introduced in Eq. (1) in the main sub-  
140 mission to constrain the scale of perturbation. In order to  
141 ensure the perturbation to be human imperceptible, we fol-  
142 low baseline method [7] to set  $\epsilon = 0.05$ . For hyper param-  
143 eters  $C_1$ ,  $C_2$  and  $C_3$  that balance the different loss items,  
144 we initialize them to be 1 at the beginning, and then we fol-  
145 low GradNorm [1] algorithm to adaptively update the loss  
146 weight items at each iteration. In the GradNorm algorithm,  
147 there is a further hyper parameters  $\alpha$  that corresponding to  
148 the strength of restoring force, and we set  $\alpha = 0.1$  for all  
149 our experiments. For detailed explanation of the GradNorm  
150 algorithm, please refer to the original work.

### 151 3. Additional Experiments

152 **Adaptive Attack** An attacker knowing the detector chal-  
153 lenges the defender. But preparing for the worst could per-  
154 haps ensure that the worst will not happen. We thus train an  
155 enhanced deepfake generator  $G'$  by incorporating the de-

156 tector loss. We use  $G'$  and detector  $D$  to train disrupter  $P$ .  
157

158 We choose StarGAN as our attacker, Xception as the de-  
159 tector. In Table 1, if the attacker knows the detector, [20]  
160 will have a much lower precision and F1-score (e.g. 0.52  
161 & 0.67 in Disrupting StarGAN), but the performance of our  
162 DeepFake Disrupter can remain similar as before.

Disruption Methods	precision	recall	F1-score
Disrupting StarGAN [7]	0.64	0.99	0.78
Disrupting StarGAN [7]-Adaptive	0.52	0.99	0.67
DeepFake Disrupter(Ours)	<b>0.86</b>	0.99	<b>0.92</b>
DeepFake Disrupter(Ours-Adaptive)	<b>0.83</b>	0.99	<b>0.89</b>

163 Table 1. Deepfake detection performance with adaptive attacks.

164 **Ablation on different test size** In Table 2, our algorithm  
165 can achieve superior results under three larger test sizes  
166 evaluated by Xception/Resnet18 for StarGAN/GANimation  
167 generators.

Disruption Methods	Xception			Resnet18		
	100	500	1000	100	500	1000
StarGAN [2]	0.72	0.70	0.73	0.56	0.58	0.61
Disrupting StarGAN [7]	0.78	0.77	0.74	0.60	0.56	0.59
<b>DeepFake disrupter (ours)</b>	<b>0.92</b>	<b>0.93</b>	<b>0.91</b>	<b>0.71</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.71</b>
GANimation [4]	0.74	0.76	0.72	0.55	0.52	0.59
Disrupting GANimation [7]	0.82	0.79	0.83	0.60	0.64	0.58
<b>DeepFake disrupter (ours)</b>	<b>0.89</b>	<b>0.88</b>	<b>0.91</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.71</b>	<b>0.77</b>

168 Table 2. F1-score under different test image size 100, 500, 1000

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