You Are Catching My Attention: Are Vision Transformers Bad Learners under Backdoor Attacks?

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Abstract

Vision Transformers (ViTs), which made a splash in the field of computer vision (CV), have shaken the dominance of convolutional neural networks (CNNs). However, in the process of industrializing ViTs, backdoor attacks have brought severe challenges to security. The success of ViTs benefits from the self-attention mechanism. However, compared with CNNs, we find that this mechanism of capturing global information within patches makes ViTs more sensitive to patch-wise triggers. Under such observations, we delicately design a novel backdoor attack framework for ViTs, dubbed BadViT, which utilizes a universal patch-wise trigger to catch the model's attention from patches beneficial for classification to those with triggers, thereby manipulating the mechanism on which ViTs survive to confuse itself. Furthermore, we propose invisible variants of BadViT to increase the stealth of the attack by limiting the strength of the trigger perturbation. Through a large number of experiments, it is proved that BadViT is an efficient backdoor attack method against ViTs, which is less dependent on the number of poisons, with satisfactory convergence, and is transferable for downstream tasks. Furthermore, the risks inside of ViTs to backdoor attacks are also explored from the perspective of existing advanced defense schemes.

1. Introduction

Transformers, which are all-powerful in the field of natural language processing (NLP) [6, 13, 57], have recently set off a wave of frenetic research in computer vision (CV). Thanks to the self-attention mechanism, vision transformers (ViTs) have broken the perennial domination of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [17], and have been developed in hot areas like image classification [36, 53, 66], object detection [3, 7] and semantic segmentation [46, 64]. The architecture optimization researches of ViTs are also continuously improving the performance and efficiency [26, 40, 45, 53], and providing vitality for advancing the deployment of ViTs in industry.

Unfortunately, manifold threats in deep learning pose severe challenges to ViTs. For instance, adversarial attacks [10, 11, 25, 28, 31, 32, 49, 50, 76] confuse the deep model to make wrong predictions by adding subtle perturbations to the input. In addition, backdoor attacks are also extremely threatening to deep models [22, 27, 48, 51, 68]. More and more deep learning tasks are “outsourced” training or directly fine-tuning on pre-trained models [22, 75], allowing attackers to implant backdoors into the model by establishing a strong association between the trigger and the attack behavior. In response, a growing number of researchers have paid attention to the security of ViTs under adversarial attacks [1, 4, 20, 39, 44] and backdoor attacks [16, 37, 47, 73]. However, previous ViT backdoor works have not systematically compared with CNN to elucidate the vulnerability source of ViTs to backdoor attacks, and have not considered balancing attack concealment and attack benefit, so that triggers can be easily detected by the naked eye.

To fill this gap, we systematically discuss the robustness of ViTs and CNNs under basic backdoor attacks with different trigger settings and find that ViTs seem to be more vulnerable to patch-wise triggers rather than image-blending triggers. Delving into the essence of ViTs, images are divided into patches as tokens to calculate attentions, which can capture more interaction information between patches at the global level than CNNs [44]. Thus the patch-wise perturbation has been shown to sufficiently affect the self-attention mechanism of ViTs [20] and make ViTs weaker learners than CNNs. Inspired by this, a natural and interesting question is whether backdoor attacks with the patch-
wise trigger are resultful in ViTs. Accordingly, we propose BadViT, a well-designed backdoor attack framework against ViTs. Through the optimization process, the universal adversarial patch is generated as a trigger, which can be better caught by the model through the self-attention mechanism of ViTs to tighten the connection between the trigger and the target class. To achieve invisible attacks, we limit the perturbation strength of the adversarial patch-wise trigger and adopt the blending strategy [12] instead of pasting. Moreover, we adopt a ViTs backdoor defense PatchDrop [16], and two state-of-the-art defenses in CNNs, Neural Cleanse [59] and FinePruning [33], to explore the vulnerability of ViTs against our BadViT.

Our main contributions are as follows:

- We explore the robustness of ViTs compared with CNNs against backdoor attacks with different triggers.
- We propose our BadViT as well as its invisible version and verify the validity through abundant experiments.
- We show the effect of BadViTs under three advanced defense methods, and further discuss the characteristics of ViTs under backdoor attacks through patch processing, reverse engineering, and pruning.

We believe this paper will offer readers a new understanding of the robustness of ViTs against backdoor attacks, and provide constructive insights into the follow-up ViTs system optimization and backdoor defense efforts.

2. Related Works

2.1. Vision Transformer

Benefiting from the self-attention mechanism, the transformer model has been continuously developed and acquired significant achievements in the field of CV recently. In the first work [17], the transformer encoder is utilized to perform attention calculation on the image patches divided into equal sizes as tokens, and obtain the classification output through a multi-layer perceptron (MLP). On this basis, several works [36,53,60,62,66] have been carefully crafted on the model architecture for performance gains. In addition to image classification, ViTs also shine in other CV tasks such as object detection [3,7], semantic segmentation [46, 64] and image quality assessment [9,65].

2.2. Backdoor Attacks and Defenses

Inspired by the over-learning ability of deep models, a series of studies have been conducted on how to set appropriate triggers to implant backdoors in deep models. BadNets [22] is the first backdoor attack against Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), which constructs backdoor inputs by pasting triggers on a proportion of randomly selected images and modifying their labels to specific target classes. Then injected model can correctly label the benign input and misclassify the input with triggers as the target class. Another effective backdoor attack method [34] takes activating of key neurons as the optimization goal to generate triggers in reverse. And the backdoor training process effectively establishes the association between triggers and corresponding neurons. Based on these works, a mass of researchers have developed more powerful backdoor attacks from different aspects. For concealment, invisible backdoor attacks can be optimized by applying different techniques to triggers [12, 29, 30, 35, 72, 74], without modifying the labels of backdoor inputs [43, 55, 71], or manipulating the training process of the model [2]. In addition, some non-data-poisoning-based studies achieve backdoor implantation by tampering with the model, such as directly modifying model parameters [18,69] and trojan implants [41,52].

In order to deal with advanced attacks, research on backdoor defense is also constantly improving. Existing backdoor defenses can be divided into experience-based defenses [8,15,23,56,70] and provable defenses [58,61,63] according to whether their performance can be provable in theory. In particular, as a highly influential defense method, Neural Cleanse [59] is often adopted for backdoor detection and identification, which can generate triggers for backdoor models based on reverse engineering in black-box scenarios. An anomaly index of different classes is compared to obtain the target class of the attacker. In contrast, the pruning-based defense method [14] aims to suppress the backdoor neurons in the infected model to eliminate the backdoor. To solve the drop in model accuracy caused by excessive pruning, [33] combines pruning with fine-tuning technology, which greatly improves the defense effect.

2.3. The Robustness of Vision Transformers

In addition to performance and structural optimization, the robustness of ViTs has also attracted more attention from researchers. Earlier work [1,4,5,39,44] proposed that the ViT model is more robust than CNNs models under adversarial attacks. However, [20] demonstrated that adding patch-wise perturbations based on the self-attention mechanism can effectively reduce the accuracy of ViTs, which triggered a rethinking of its robustness. In terms of backdoor attacks, [37] proposed an attack method named DBIA without acquiring a specific dataset, and implanted backdoors into specific neurons by maximizing the attention of the trigger region in inputs. TrojViT [73] added patch-based triggers to the clean image, and also used the self-attention mechanism to attack a small number of parameters of the model on DRAM memory. And [16,47] considered the vulnerability of ViTs under backdoor attack, and made defense based on patch processing operation. Unlike existing works, our BadViT is basically a kind of data poisoning attack and is more stealthy, versatile, and threatening.
3. Backdoor Attacks in ViTs

In this section, we set up a threat model for backdoor attacks of ViTs. We also introduce the ViTs and the formulation of attacks in ViTs.

3.1. Threat Model

Considering that open-source pre-training ViT models are mostly adopted for fine-tuning in different applications, we refer to the attack settings in prior works [22]. It is assumed that the attacker can obtain the complete model architecture and parameters, as well as part of the dataset used for pre-training. However, based on the security of the training platform itself, we set that the attacker cannot tamper with the model training schedule, which means that the attacker is unable to achieve the attack goal by modifying the loss or manipulating the gradient like [2]. Consequently, backdoor attacks are in the way of “data poisoning” in our threat model, by modifying part of the input as well as its ground-truth label, and embedding backdoors into ViTs in the original training schedule.

3.2. Background of Backdoor Attacks in ViTs

Vision transformers. Given a pre-trained vision transformer classifier \( F(\cdot) \) and a benign training set \( D_{tr} \), with \( N \) pairs \( \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^N \), \( x_i \in \mathbb{R}^{C \times H \times W} \) denotes the original image with \( C \) channels and \( H \times W \) pixels, and \( y_i \) represents the corresponding ground-truth label. The input image \( x \) of ViTs is preprocessed into \( H \times W / P^2 \) patches with the shape of \( P \times P \), and each patch is used as a token to calculate the attention map through the multi-head self-attention (MSA) module as follows:

\[
\text{Attention}(x) = \text{Softmax}\left(\frac{xW_Q(xW_K)^T}{\sqrt{d}}xW_V\right)
\]

where \( W_Q, W_K, \) and \( W_V \) are learnable matrices of the query, key, and value, respectively, and \( d \) is the dimension of the key. Based on multiple MSA attention calculations, the output category is finally obtained through an MLP module.

Backdoor attacks. For backdoor attacks, we denote the subset to produce backdoor input as \( D_{bd} \), which is obtained by selecting \( \rho \) fraction of the benign training set \( (\rho = |D_{bd}|/|D_{tr}| \) is a vital metric to measure the effectiveness of attacks). Using \( \hat{x}_j \) represent the backdoor input, it is calculated as follows:

\[
\hat{x}_j = \mu(x_j, t, \text{loc}), \quad \text{if } y_j \neq y^* ,
\]

where \( \mu(\cdot) \) is the synthesizer of trigger \( t \) and the benign input \( x_j, \text{loc} \) defines the location of trigger in inputs. Moreover, only benign inputs having different labels with the target class will be selected to make backdoor inputs, then the ground-truth label is modified to the target class \( y^* \).

Let \( \hat{F}(\cdot) \) represent the backdoor model. As to the attacker, it is crucial to ensure successful attacks, namely making certain of \( \hat{F}(\hat{x}_j) = y^* \). Meanwhile, in order to guarantee that the backdoor model is not detected with obvious abnormalities, it is supposed to classify the benign input as the ground-truth label following \( \hat{F}(x_j) = y_j \). The attacker can achieve the above two goals through the following optimization process:

\[
\min_\theta \sum_{x_i \in D_{cl}} L_{tr}(F(x_i), y_i) + \sum_{x_j \in D_{bd}} L_{bd}(\hat{F}(\hat{x}_j), y^*) ,
\]

where \( \theta \) is the parameter of models, \( D_{cl} = D_{tr} \setminus D_{bd} \) is the clean subset, \( L_{tr} \) denotes the training loss of the main task, and \( L_{bd} \) represents the backdoor training loss. In this paper, we both use the cross-entropy loss function to follow the normal training schedule for classification tasks.

4. Backdoor Attacks Robustness Comparison

In order to explore the robustness of ViTs and CNNs under backdoor attacks, we follow two classical data-
Table 1. Evaluation of ViTs and CNNs under backdoor attacks with different trigger settings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attack Mode</th>
<th>Patch Trigger Attack</th>
<th>Blend Trigger Attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trigger Setting</td>
<td>16 (0,0)</td>
<td>24 (0,0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model ↓</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>BA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResNet-18</td>
<td>69.10</td>
<td>67.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResNet-50</td>
<td>76.13</td>
<td>73.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeiT-T</td>
<td>72.02</td>
<td>70.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeiT-S</td>
<td>79.71</td>
<td>79.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

poisoning methods, namely, patch-based [22] attack and blending attack [12] to investigate the vulnerability in ViTs.

4.1. Attack Settings

We respectively set non-patch-wise triggers (white squares that do not fully cover the image patch, like the 2nd column in Fig. 1), patch-wise triggers (a white square covered a whole image patch, as seen in the 3rd column in Fig. 1), and blending-based triggers (a Hello Kitty image with the same size of inputs, as the 4th column in Fig. 1). We perform tests on the official pre-trained models of DeiT [53] and ResNet [24] on the Imagenet dataset. For the patch trigger, we set white squares of different sizes and different starting positions of the upper left corner. For the blending-based trigger attack, we set the blend ratio \(\alpha = 0.02\) and 0.04 in training, and 0.2 in testing. We fine-tune 1 epoch with a learning rate of \(1e^{-5}\) and \(\rho = 0.1\). We compare metrics including 1) Clean Accuracy (CA): the accuracy of the clean test datasets on clean models, 2) Attack Success Rate (ASR): the proportion of backdoor inputs predicted as target classes, and 3) Backdoor Accuracy (BA): the accuracy of backdoor models for clean test datasets.

4.2. Observations and Discussions

It can be found in Tab. 1 that: 1) ViTs are more robust than CNNs with lower ASRs in blend trigger attacks with both two blend ratios, especially when \(\alpha = 0.02\), DeiTs can only predict 21.21\% and 21.64\% of the backdoor input as the target label; 2) ViTs seem to be more sensitive to patch triggers and achieve higher ASRs and less reduction in BAs compared to CAs than in CNNs. In both CNNs and ViTs, triggers with larger sizes get better attack results; 3) comparing the first and fourth columns of patch trigger attacks, patch-wise triggers (size is 16, starting position is (0, 0)) are better than non-patch-wise triggers (size is 16, starting position is (8, 8)) in DeiTs, while this variation does not exist in ResNets. Synthesizing the attention distribution of ViTs to different triggers observed in Fig. 1, the global blend triggers and the non-patch-wise triggers cannot effectively change the model’s attention. While the model’s attention score for the area covered by the patch increases significantly with patch-wise triggers. Consequently, the self-attention mechanism makes ViTs more sensitive to patch-wise triggers to effectively implant backdoors in the model. We continue to explore more effective backdoor attacks against ViTs on the patch-wise basis.

5. The Proposed BadViT Framework

In this section, we first outline the inspiration for our approach and then introduce the specific framework of BadViT as well as its invisible variants.

5.1. Inspirations of BadViT

Essentially, the success rate of backdoor attacks depends on the ability of models to capture the correlation between the trigger and target class, so the question we face is “How to generate a trigger that can more effectively attract the attention of the model?”. We have gained insight from the investigation in Sec. 4 that ViTs are more vulnerable than CNNs under patch-wise triggers, so we intend to design a universal optimized patch-wise trigger that can fully focus the model’s attention on the area where it is located, so as to achieve a backdoor attack that is more stealthy, transferable, and less dependent on poisoning data.

5.2. Formulation of BadViT

Overview. We adopt a universal patch-wise trigger to follow Eq. (3) for backdoor training. The patch-wise trigger, denoted as \(t_{adv}\), will sufficiently interfere with the attention distribution of images, and achieve that the attention of ViTs to the entire backdoor input \(\hat{x}\) is mainly focused on the patch with the trigger pasted, as shown in Fig. 2.

Generation of the universal patch-wise trigger. Consider that the input image is divided into \(K\) patches, which can be expressed as \(x = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_K\}\). Note that the adversarial patch-wise trigger is initialized and optimized with the same shape of original images of \(H \times W\), and it is constrained within a single patch through the preset mask. Giving the patch index \(k\) to add a trigger, the process of synthesizing the trigger with the original image to the backdoor
Adversarial Trigger Generation
Clean Input
Label: spaniel
Backdoor Input
Label: bull frog
Fool Attention
Clean Image Attention
Backdoor Image Attention
Training Loss
Mask

Figure 2. Overview of the proposed BadViT.

input can be expressed as follows:

$$\hat{x} = \mu_{paste}(x, t_{adv}, m) = (1 - m_k) \cdot x + m_k \cdot t_{adv},$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

where $1 = [1]^{H \times W}$ denotes a all-one matrix, and $m_k \in \{0, 1\}^{H \times W}$ is the mask with value 1 at the position corresponding to the $k$-th patch and value 0 at other positions.

In ViTs, the attention score of each patch indicates its importance relative to other patches [20]. Therefore, the goal for BadViT is to maximize the attention score of the $k$-th patch in each layer of the model, then the model can efficiently construct the mapping from trigger to target class by backdoor training on datasets poisoned by slight backdoor samples. The $l$-th layer attention map is represented as $Attention^l(x) = \{[AC^l_i] \in \mathbb{R}^K \mid i \in [1, K]\}$, in which $AC^l_i = \frac{1}{H \times W} \sum_{j \in [K]} a^l_{i,j}$ is the average attention score of the $i$-th patch, and $a^l_{i,j}$ is the attention score of the $i$-th patch relative to the $j$-th patch. Given a model with $L$ layers, the formulation of optimizing $t_{adv}$ is defined as:

$$\begin{align*}
\arg\max_{t_{adv}} & \sum_{l \in [L]} AC^l_k, \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad AC^l_k = Attention(\hat{x})[k],
\end{align*}$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

which generally expounds that $t_{adv}$ is optimized to maximize the average attention score of the $k$-th patch in each layer. For better quantifying the optimization of $t_{adv}$, we define the attention-based loss according to the optimization object, which is expressed as follows:

$$L_{atten} = \sum_{l \in [L]} l_{nll} (-\log(Attention^l(\hat{x}), k),$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

where $l_{nll}(x, y)$ means the negative log-likelihood loss and is adopted to increase the probability that the $y$-th object is the largest in $X$. We initialize $t_{adv}$ as random noise, iteratively optimize it based on the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [38] scheme, and express it as follows:

$$t'_{adv} = t_{adv} - \eta \cdot \nabla_{t_{adv}} L_{atten},$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

where $\eta$ denotes the step size of optimizing the adversarial patch-wise trigger.

5.3. Invisible Variants of BadViT

As can be seen from Fig. 1, the visual effect of the trigger generated by our BadViT is a mosaic on the image, such an obvious mark is often easily perceived by users in actual deployment. Therefore, we introduce the vanilla BadViT scheme by employing $l_p$ constraints to limit the strength of adversarial patch-wise trigger perturbations to achieve invisible variants. In this case, we modify the optimization process of $t_{adv}$ as follows:

$$t'_{adv} = \text{clip}_\epsilon \left( t_{adv} - \eta \cdot \nabla_{t_{adv}} L_{atten} \right),$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

in which $\epsilon$ is the perturbation strength limit, and $\text{clip}_\epsilon$ is the clip function to constrain the trigger to satisfy $\|t_{adv}\|_p \leq \epsilon$. Furthermore, we adopt the blending strategy with a blending ratio $\alpha$ instead of directly pasting the trigger on the image in Eq. (4), which is formulated as:

$$\hat{x} = \mu_{blend}(x, t_{adv}, m) = (1 - \alpha) \cdot x + \alpha \cdot m_k \cdot t_{adv}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

6. Experiments on BadViT

6.1. Evaluation Settings

Dataset and models. We choose the training set and validation set of ILSVRC2012 [42] for backdoor training and testing respectively, and use the official pre-training models of DeiT [53] as the benchmark to test the performance of BadViT. Referring to the processing of the ImageNet dataset in [17], the input image is transformed to a size of $3 \times 224 \times 224$, and the patch size is set to $16 \times 16$.

Attack settings. We generate a universal adversarial patch-wise trigger based on the training set with 20 epochs (with the size of $16 \times 16$), poison the dataset based on $\rho = 0.1$, choose the target label 30 (namely “bullfrog”), and directly perform fine-tuning on the pre-trained model of ViTs with 1 epoch on 4 Nvidia GeForce RTX 3090 GPUs. The step size $\eta$ in Eq. (7) is set to 0.2, the blending ratio of invisible BadViT $\alpha$ in Eq. (9) is fixed to 0.02, and the learning rate of backdoor training is $10^{-5}$. By default, we select the patch with index 0 to add the trigger, due to it is usually not the part with the highest attention score in the original image, which is beneficial to highlight the ability of our BadViT to manipulate the self-attention mechanism. We mainly compare the robustness of different models under BadViT from ASR, BA, and CA.
Table 2. Evaluate CAs (%), BAs (%) and ASRs (%) of vanilla BadViT on different ViTs and CNNs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clean Model</th>
<th>Backdoor Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>ASR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeiT-T</td>
<td>72.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeiT-S</td>
<td>79.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeiT-B</td>
<td>81.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LeViT-128</td>
<td>78.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LeViT-256</td>
<td>81.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LeViT-384</td>
<td>82.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2. Effectiveness of BadViT

Evaluation of BadViT in ViTs. We first perform backdoor training separately using adversarial patch-wise triggers with 1 epoch, and verify the robustness of our vanilla BadViT on official DeiT [53] and LeViT [21] families. As shown in Tab. 2, our vanilla BadViT sharply improves ASRs to 100% in both DeiTs and LeViTs compared with clean models. And our vanilla BadViT is able to effectively maintain BAs close to CAs, and even increase by 0.2% in DeiT-T. However, LeViT is not as good as DeiT in maintaining the accuracy of clean input, and BAs are lower than CAs by 1.41%, 1.48%, and 1.24%, respectively. We further tested the effectiveness of BadViT against multi-target backdoor attacks and achieved ASRs of 99.98%, 99.97%, and 99.84%, details are given in Appendix A.1.1. In conclusion, our BadViT based on the self-attention mechanism can achieve satisfactory backdoor attacks in ViTs.

Data poisoning dependency of BadViT. We explore the attack effect under different poisoning proportions. In the DeiT-T model, we evaluate the model robustness with ρ changes from 0.002 to 0.1, and results are shown in Tab. 3. Our BadViT can achieve an ASR of 95% even at an extremely small poisoning proportion of 0.002. As a comparison, we also test the robustness of overlaying a white patch of 16 × 16 on index 0. Obviously, the ASR of the white patch trigger is not only lower than that of our BadViT under the same poisoning proportion but also the attack performance shows a significant downward trend as the proportion decreases. In particular, when ρ = 0.01, the ASR falls off a cliff by 0.02%, symbolizing the failure of the backdoor attack. Therefore, our BadViT based on the adversarial patch-wise trigger effectively establishes a strong correlation between the target class and the trigger.

Influence of trigger size in BadViT. To explore the effect of the trigger size in BadViT, we generate adversarial patch-wise triggers of different sizes in DeiT-T and estimate the attack performance. Regardless of the size of triggers, we fix their centers at the center of the patch of index 0. We can observe from Tab. 4 that the trigger size has a negligible effect on the BAs of our BadViT. For ASRs, reducing the trigger size appropriately will not have a significant impact. For example, until it is reduced to 4 × 4 (only contains 16 pixels), an ASR of 99.87% can still be achieved. As a consequence, reducing the trigger size has been shown to sustain the effectiveness of BadViT while making only minor concessions in ASR.

Convergence of BadViT. To verify the efficiency gains of our BadViT, we evaluate the convergence within 10 epochs, and the results are presented in Fig. 3. We observe that BadViT has great convergence in any level of ViT models, which only needs 1 epoch of backdoor training to achieve ASR of 100% while maintaining BA is basically the same as CA. As the backdoor training moves on, ASRs in different ViTs under BadViT remain basically stable at 100%, whereas BAs show a continuous decline. At 10-th epoch, BAs of DeiT-T, DeiT-S, and DeiT-B decrease by 4.39%, 7.32%, and 5.13% respectively compared to CAs, which is caused by the model overfitting to the target class. As a consequence, our BadViT requires only 1 epoch of backdoor training to achieve an effective attack.

6.3. Evaluations to Invisible Variants of BadViT

Performances of the invisible BadViT. We impose $l_2$ and $l_\infty$ constraints on the generated adversarial patch-wise
Table 5. Evaluation of the robustness of triggers in invisible BadViT variants, which compares ASRs (%) of the backdoor model under two invisible variants and the vanilla BadViT with different settings of trigger in DeiT-T.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trigger Settings</th>
<th>Under $l_{\text{inf}}$ constraint</th>
<th>Under $l_2$ constraint</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Backdoor Model</td>
<td>$\epsilon = 4/255$</td>
<td>$\epsilon = 32/255$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 4/255$</td>
<td>98.05</td>
<td>96.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 32/255$</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>99.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 64/255$</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>93.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 0.5$</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>98.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 1.0$</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>46.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 2.0$</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>91.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanilla</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Evaluations of invisible BadViT variants.

triggers, respectively, and test the effect of backdoor attacks within 1 epoch. Note that in both $l_{\text{inf}}$ and $l_2$, our defined $\epsilon$ is under the pixel value normalization. The results are shown in Fig. 4. We can observe that under the $l_{\text{inf}}$ constraint, when $\epsilon = 64/255$, our BadViT can guarantee an ASR of 100% with excellent convergence speed, while BA maintains a comparable level with CA, which is consistent with our analysis of the convergence of BadViT. And when the perturbation to the adversarial patch-wise trigger is limited to 32/255 and 4/255, the ASR drops slightly to 99.96% and 98.05 respectively. Similarly, under the limit of $l_2$, $\epsilon = 2.0$ has no effect on the backdoor attack effectiveness, while $\epsilon = 1.0$ and 0.5 cause a slight drop in ASRs. The relevant visualization results are given in Appendix A.1.2.

Trigger robustness. Furthermore, we evaluate the trigger robustness of the invisible BadViT variant. We test with different triggers in invisible BadViT variants and the vanilla BadViT, as shown in Tab. 5. Firstly, we observe that the triggers with the same type of constraint can obtain ideal ASRs when $\epsilon$ is larger in backdoor models under the two kinds of invisible BadViT. For example, ASR of the backdoor model under $l_{\text{inf}}$ with $\epsilon = 4/255$ can reach 96.36% and 99.70% for triggers with $\epsilon = 32/255$ and $\epsilon = 64/255$ respectively. However, the robustness of backdoor models with the larger $\epsilon$ to the trigger of the smaller $\epsilon$ is weak, especially the backdoor model of $\epsilon = 2.0$ under $l_2$ with triggers of $\epsilon = 0.5$ and 1.0 only acquire an ASR of 0.12%. Secondly, backdoor models under $l_2$ constraint has better robustness to the trigger under $l_{\text{inf}}$, when $\epsilon = 0.5$ and 2.0, ASRs are higher than 90% with trigger settings under $\epsilon = 32/255$ and 64/255. In contrast, only the backdoor model under $l_{\text{inf}}$ with $\epsilon = 32/255$ achieves an ASR of 96.96% for the trigger under $\epsilon = 2$. Moreover, the backdoor model under vanilla BadViT is not suitable for triggers in the two invisible variants, and backdoor models under $l_{\text{inf}}$ get better ASRs for vanilla triggers than $l_2$.

6.4. Transferability of BadViT

We test the adversarial trigger generated on the large-scale Imagenet on the downstream datasets Cats-vs-dogs (CD)$^1$, CIFAR10$^2$, and STL10$^3$. We then replace the classification head of DeiT-T with a randomly initialized head in corresponding dimensions and fine-tune it for 2 epochs. We first visualize the attention changes under the three datasets in Appendix A.1.2 and find that adversarial triggers can effectively fool the model attention in different datasets. We then conduct experiments in cases of directly modifying the label as the target label, and not modifying labels but injecting backdoor input into the target class of the training set. The results are listed in Tab. 6. BadViT guarantees satisfactory attack performance after being finetuned to three downstream datasets. It is worth noting that in the non-label modified setting, we can use a “clean-label attack” mode to inject backdoors without causing suspicion. The self-attention mechanism enables the model to establish a relationship between the target category and the trigger. A higher ASR (eg, 95.71% in CIFAR10) is achieved when $\rho = 0.1$. With the increase of poisoned samples, ASRs gradually reach 100%, while BA does not show a significant change until $\rho = 1.0$. The drop of about 50% in CD and 10% in CIFAR10 and STL10 means that the model fails

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1https://www.kaggle.com/c/dogs-vs-cats
2https://www.kaggle.com/c/cifar-10
3https://www.kaggle.com/datasets/jessicali9530/stl10
to build discriminative ability on clean images of this class.

### 6.5. Resistance to Backdoor Defenses

We evaluate the performance of our BadViT against three (one designed in ViTs and two for CNNs) defense methods: 1) PatchDrop [16], 2) Neural Cleanse [59], and 3) Fine-Pruning [33].

**PatchDrop.** This approach is designed for detecting patch-based triggers in ViTs. We sample the ImageNet test set to get a clean set with 1000 clean images and a detection set (including 500 clean images and 500 backdoor images). We apply PatchDrop transform for $T$ trials on the clean sample set and record the number of label changes (i.e., the threshold $k_d$) to detect backdoor images in the detection set. The relevant results are given in Tab. 7. It can be observed that the more trials $T$ are executed, and the fewer patches are dropped, the higher TPRs are got (the more backdoor samples are detected). Executing 100 trials at a drop rate of 0.01 can detect 99.60% of backdoor images. But unfortunately, TNRs keep the same trend as TPRs, which means that almost as many clean images are falsely detected as backdoor images. In summary, PatchDrop cannot successfully detect backdoor images in our BadViT.

**Neural Cleanse.** For simplicity, we only perform reverse engineering and generate the corresponding triggers for the first forty labels in the clean test dataset, and then calculate their anomaly indexes. We get anomaly indexes of 2.74 and 4.63 under DeiT-T and ResNet-18 respectively, and the corresponding anomaly labels can be identified as 30 set in our attack. Further, we also implement the same test on our BadViT and obtain an anomaly index of 2.56. Although this indicates that the existence of the backdoor is successfully detected, the target label is incorrectly identified as 20. Furthermore, the $l_1$ norm of its reverse-generated mask is 11.12, which is much smaller than 331.95 of the correct target label. We also find that the masks generated by reverse engineering for ViTs are all patch-wise and more regular than CNNs, which is caused by the process that ViTs calculate attention based on patches. More experimental results and visualizations are given in Appendix A.2.1.

**Fine-Pruning.** We choose to prune the fully connected layers of DeiT-T under BadViT and find that with the increase of the proportion of pruned neurons, the ASR of the victim model decreases, but it still remains above 85% until the pruning proportion reaches 90% and is accompanied by a sharp drop in the BA of the model. We choose the best pruning ratio to perform fine-tuning and demonstrate that Fine-Pruning is not effective against our BadViT. The specific experimental results are provided in Appendix A.2.2.

### 7. Conclusion

Ensuring the robustness of ViTs is crucial to driving the deployment in the industry. In this work, we systematically investigate the robustness of ViTs against backdoor attacks compared with CNNs. We propose a novel attack framework, named BadViT, which adopts a universal adversarial patch-wise trigger for backdoor training, thereby fooling the self-attention mechanism of ViTs to establish a strong relevance between triggers and attack targets. Experiments show that our BadViT can deal a devastating blow to the robustness of ViTs. Meanwhile, we also developed the invisible BadViT variant and demonstrate that better attack transferability can be achieved in different downstream datasets. We hope this work will provide relevant researchers with insights into the robustness of ViTs and inspire the development of effective defense schemes.

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