Warning:
Blurred inappropriate images and the associated textual content below.

Appendix

A. Ethnic Bias Experiment

Here, we provide more details on the "Ethnic Bias Experiment" related findings.

A.1. CLIP Analysis on LAION-2B-en

For each of the 50 selected countries introduced in Secs. 2 and 6 we retrieved the 100 closest images for the caption "<*country*> body" from LAION-2B-en. Similar to the experiments in Secs. 2 and 6 we also computed the number of percentage of nude images for each country[10].

The observations regarding "*ethnic bias*" we made on SD generated images are also apparent in its initial training data set LAION-2B-en. Among the top-5 countries in terms of the number of nude images are four Asian ones with Japan, Indonesia, Thailand and India. Overall Japan tops that ranking at over 90% explicit material. This is more than four times higher than the global average of 22%.

A.2. SD Generations

As we have shown, the corresponding biases contained in the dataset transfer to the diffusion model. In addition to the discussion in the main text, Fig. 5 provides qualitative examples. Again, we blurred all images showing people. Still, one can observe that prompts containing *asian* and *japanese* mainly produce explicit nudity. In contrast, *u.s. american* and *nigerian*, for instance, produce the expected image style. Especially in the case of *u.s. american*, we can find images displaying average body comparison and culturally related content.

A.3. Lexica

Whereas the creators of SD warn and advice for research only, deployed application such as lexica have the potential to reinforce biases. Fig. 6 shows images that lexica generates for the prompt "Japanese body", again highlighting the strong ethnic bias in SD wrt. to Asian women and nudity.

B. RealToxicityPrompts

It is noteworthy that we initially tried to reuse the prompts contained in RealToxicityPrompts [13], cf. Appendix B. However, they lead to unnatural images, mainly containing unidentifiable text fragments. Consequently, we only included dedicated text-to-image prompts. Tab. 3 shows the results of SLD on images generated using the subset of *toxic* prompts from RealToxicityPrompts.

[10]We note that roughly 8% of all images were missing in our local clone of LAION-2B-en, as the respective URLs were no longer available at the time of download.

Figure 7. Images generated by SD using toxic prompts from RealToxicityPrompts highlighting the vast number of images containing random letters.

While these prompts produce a similar amount of inappropriate image as the I2G benchmark, we did not opt to use the prompts from RealToxicityPrompts as the resulting images are often only contain seemingly random combination of letters, cf. Fig. 7.

Inappropriate Prob.		**Exp. Max. Inappropriateness**	
SD	Hyp-Strong	SD	Hyp-Strong
0.40	0.10	$0.92_{0.08}$	$0.60_{0.19}$

Table 3. Probabilities of generating an image containing inappropriate content as classified by the combined Q16/NudeNet classifier over the toxic prompts from RealToxicityPrompts. The expected maximum inappropriateness are bootstrap estimates of a model outputting the displayed percentage of inappropriate images at least once for 25 prompts. Subscript values indicate the standard deviation.

C. I2P Test Bed

I2P contains seven different inappropriate concept categories which we collected by the following keywords:

- hate: “hate”
- harassment: “mocking”, “bullying”, “threatening”, “harassment”
- violence: “humiliation”, “violence acts”, “suffering”, “violence”
- self-harm: “suicide”, “eating disorder”, “self-harm”, “attempts at harming oneself”
- sexual: “sexual acts”, “content meant to arouse sexual excitement”, “sexual”, “nudity”
- shocking: “profane subjects that may shock or disgust”, “bodily fluids”, “shocking”, “obscene gestures”
- illegal activity: “vandalism”, “illegal activity”, “drug use”, “theft”

These keywords were used to collect the I2P prompts from https://lexica.art.

Exemplary, Fig. 8 visualizes SD generations of each category. Each row depicts a category with four SD-generated images; starting from top: hate, harassment, violence, self-harm, sexual, shocking, illegal activity. Next to the category’s exemplary images the I2P prompt is displayed. Additionally, Fig. 9 visualizes the most frequent terms in I2P prompts.

Furthermore, we provide a datasheet [12] for the I2P benchmark in App. J giving further details on the dataset.

Figure 9. Wordcloud of the most frequent words used in I2P prompts without English stopwords.

D. Experimental Protocol

Here, we provide further details of our experimental protocol, cf. Sec. 6.

Diffusion Model. We based our implementation on version 1.4 of Stable Diffusion which we used for all of our experiments. We chose to opt for a discrete Linear Multistep Scheduler (LMS) with $\beta_{start} = 8.5\text{e}{-4}$ and $\beta_{end} = 0.012$. However, we note that our approach is applicable to any latent diffusion model employing classifier-free guidance.

Inappropriate Content Measures. We automatically evaluated inappropriate image content by combining two classifiers. First, the Q16 classifier [33] is able to detect a wide range of inappropriate content in images. It was trained on the SMID dataset [9] which consists of images annotated on their appropriateness through user studies conducted in the USA. More specifically, users were tasked to give each image a score of 1-5 on the range of ”immoral/blameworthy” to ”moral/praiseworthy”. Consequently, the Q16 classifier was trained to classify all images with an average score below 2.5 as inappropriate. However, the SMID dataset contains little to no explicit nudity—such as pornographic material—, wherefore Q16 performs subpar on these images. Thus, we additionally used NudeNet[11] to identify sexually explicit content. In this paper, we only classified exposed genitalia as inappropriate while allowing otherwise provocative images. If not specified otherwise an image is classified as inappropriate if one or both of the classifiers output the respective label. We did not use the built in ”NSFW” safety checker of Stable Diffusion as its high false positive rate renders is unsuitable for the nuanced image editing in our work. However, it is indeed suitable to warn users and prevent displaying potential inappropriate content generated by the DM.

I2P. We compared the base SD model to four variants of SLD as defined by the sets of hyper-parameters in Sec. 4. To assess the reduction of inappropriate content we generate 10 images each for all prompts of the I2P test bed and compared the probability of generating inappropriate images. We used one general concept S across all categories of I2P as specified in Sec. 4.

E. Stable Diffusion v2

To train Stable Diffusion v2 (SD-v2) rigorous dataset filtering of sexual and nudity related content was applied. The I2P benchmark results of SD-v2 are shown in Tab. 4 and a concise comparison of Stable Diffusion in version v2 and v1.4 is provided in Tab. 5. Summarized, SLD’s mitigation on SD-v1.4 outperform the standalone dataset filtering of SD-v2. The combination of dataset filtering and SLD leads to the highest mitigation.

F. I2P Results

Expected maximum inappropriateness In addition to the expected maximum inappropriateness for 25 prompts presented in Tab. 1, we depict a continuous plot for each category from 10 to 200 generations in Fig. 10.

We observe clear differences in the expected maximum inappropriateness between categories. For example when

[11] https://github.com/notAI-tech/NudeNet

	Inappropriate Probability ↓					Expected Max. Inappropriateness ↓		
Category/Method	SD 2.0	Hyp-Weak	Hyp-Medium	Hyp-Strong	Hyp-Max	SD	Hyp-Strong	Hyp-Max
Hate	0.44	0.32	0.26	0.20	0.15	$0.98_{0.08}$	$0.73_{0.11}$	$0.67_{0.16}$
Harassment	0.40	0.29	0.23	0.19	0.14	$0.96_{0.06}$	$0.82_{0.18}$	$0.73_{0.15}$
Violence	0.44	0.34	0.26	0.19	0.14	$0.99_{0.03}$	$0.83_{0.14}$	$0.74_{0.16}$
Self-harm	0.40	0.26	0.15	0.10	0.06	$0.99_{0.03}$	$0.56_{0.18}$	$0.40_{0.17}$
Sexual	0.29	0.18	0.12	0.08	0.05	$0.89_{0.12}$	$0.52_{0.16}$	$0.35_{0.15}$
Shocking	0.51	0.37	0.26	0.17	0.13	$1.00_{0.01}$	$0.80_{0.11}$	$0.66_{0.18}$
Illegal activity	0.37	0.27	0.19	0.13	0.10	$0.97_{0.07}$	$0.65_{0.15}$	$0.56_{0.21}$
Overall	0.40	0.28	0.20	0.13	0.10	$0.98_{0.05}$	$0.73_{0.17}$	$0.62_{0.19}$

Table 4. Safe Latent Diffusion (SLD) applied on Stable Diffusion v2.0. Shown are the probabilities of generating an image containing inappropriate content as classified by the combined Q16/NudeNet classifier over the I2P benchmark. We note that the Q16 classifier is rather conservative and tends to classify some unobjectionable images as inappropriate. The false positive rate of the classifier is roughly equal to the probabilities reported for Hyp-Max. The expected maximum inappropriateness (the lower, the better) are bootstrap estimates of a model outputting the displayed percentage of inappropriate images at least once for 25 prompts (for further results see Appendix F). Subscript values indicate the standard deviation.

	SD-v1.4		SD-v2	
Benchmark	SD	SLD	SD	SLD
Sexual (I2P)	0.35	**0.06**○	0.29	**0.05**●
Overall (I2P)	0.39	**0.09**●	0.40	**0.10**○
Body-Ethnicity	0.36	**0.09**○	0.12	**0.06**●

Table 5. Comparison of Stable Diffusion in version 1.4 (SD-v1.4) and 2.0 (SD-v2). To train SD-v2 rigorous dataset filtering of sexual and nudity related content was applied. SLD's mitigation on SD-v1.4 outperforms the standalone dataset filtering of SD-v2. The combination of dataset filtering and SLD leads to the highest mitigation performance.

generating images with 200 prompts from the "sexual" category, the Hyp-Max configuration is expected to yield at most 50% inappropriate images whereas the same number of prompts from the "shocking" category reaches almost 100% expected maximum inappropriateness. While some of this can actually be attributed to the varying effectiveness of SLD on different categories of inappropriateness, it is largely influenced by the high false positive rate of the Q16 classifier. Since we are considering the maximum over N prompts, this effect quickly amplifies with growing N.

Overall this raises the question if the expected maximum inappropriateness over large N is a suitable metric for cases in which the false positive rate is high. Consequently, we decided to only report the results at $N = 25$ in the main body of the paper.

Qualitative Examples. Fig. 11 depicts a comparison of SD generated images with (right) and without (left) SLD. Each *inappropriate* category (cf. Appendix C) is represented by four images. The corresponding prompts can be found in Fig. 8. Moreover, Fig. 12 depicts the generated images displayed in the main text and their corresponding prompts.

G. DrawBench User Studies

Here, we provide further details on the conducted users studies on image fidelity and text alignment on the DrawBench dataset. Additionally, we present qualitative examples of images generated from DrawBench in Fig. 13.

G.1. Details on Procedure

For each model configuration and DrawBench prompt we generated 10 images, amounting to 2000 total images per configuration. Each user was tasked with labeling 25 random image pairs—one being the SD reference image and the second one the corresponding image using SLD. For the image fidelity study users had to answer the question

> Which image is of higher quality?

whereas the posed question for text alignment was

> Which image better represents the displayed text caption?

In both cases the three answer options were

- I prefer image A.
- I am indifferent.
- I prefer image B.

To conduct our study we relied on Amazon Mechanical Turk where we set the following qualification requirements for our users: HIT Approval Rate over 95% and at least 1000 HITs approved. Additionally, each batch of image pairs was evaluated by three distinct annotator resulting in 30 decisions for each prompt.

Annotators were fairly compensated according to Amazon MTurk guidelines. For the image fidelity task, users

were paid $0.70 to label 25 images at an average of 8 minutes need for the assignment. Our estimates suggested that the image text alignment task, requires more time since the text caption has to be read and understood. Therefore we paid $0.80 for 25 images with users completing the task after 8.5 minutes on average.

G.2. Details on Results

The study results for each hyper parameter configuration on image fidelity and text alignment is depicted in Fig. 14.



Figure 14. User study results on Image Fidelity and Text Alignment on DrawBench. For each prompt we generated ten images with each image pair being judged by three distinct users. Error bars indicate the standard deviation across the 30 user decisions for each prompt.

Interestingly, on the perceived image fidelity we observed a transition from indecisive to preferring the safety-guided images with increasing guidance' strength, which we assume to be grounded in the increased visualization of positive sentiments, for instance happy pets. A similar trend can be observed for text alignment, although the effect is considerably smaller.

H. Stable Diffusion Implementation

Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code of SLD. In line with the Stable Diffusion's policy giving its users maximum transparency and control on how to use the model, the used safety concept can be adapted based on the user's preferences.

Algorithm 1 Safe Latent Diffusion

Require: model weights θ, text condition $text_p$, safety concept $text_s$ and diffusion steps T
Ensure: $s_m \in [0,1]$, $\nu_{t=0} = 0$, $\beta_m \in [0,1)$, $\lambda \in [0,1]$, $s_S \in [0,5000]$, $\delta \in [0,20]$, $t = 0$

DM $\leftarrow$ init-diffusion-model(θ)
$c_p \leftarrow$ DM.encode($text_p$)
$c_s \leftarrow$ DM.encode($text_s$)
$latents \leftarrow$ DM.sample($seed$)
while $t \neq T$ **do**
  $n_\emptyset, n_p, n_s \leftarrow$ DM.predict-noise($latents, c_p, c_s$)
  $\mu_t \leftarrow \mathbf{0}$ ▷ Eq. (5)
  $\phi_t \leftarrow s_S * (n_p - n_s)$ ▷ Eq. (6)
  $\mu_t \leftarrow$ where$(n_p - n_s < \lambda, \max(1, |\phi_t|))$ ▷ Eq. (5)
  $\gamma_t \leftarrow \mu_t * (n_s - n_\emptyset) + s_m * \nu_t$ ▷ Eq. (7)
  $\nu_{t+1} \leftarrow \beta_m * \nu_t (1 - \beta_m) * \gamma_t$ ▷ Eq. (8)
  if $t \geq \delta$ **then**
    $pred \leftarrow s_g * (n_p - n_\emptyset - \gamma_t)$ ▷ Eq. (3)
  else
    $pred \leftarrow s_g * (n_p - n_\emptyset)$ ▷ Eq. (2)
  end if
  $latents \leftarrow$ DM.update-latents($pred, latents$)
  $t \leftarrow t + 1$
end while
$image \leftarrow$ DM.decode($latents$)

I. SLD Ablation Studies

Lastly, we provide some qualitative examples of the influence of different hyper parameters on the generated image.

Fig. 16 compares the effect of different warmup periods and thresholds. The example highlights that more warmup steps δ lead to less significant changes of the image composition and simultaneously larger values for λ alter the image more strongly. Furthermore, Fig. 17 shows the effect of varying scales of momentum. It shows that higher momentum also leads to stronger changes of the image and further accentuates that momentum scales over 0.5 may lead to issues in the downstream images such as significant artifacts.

Additionally, Fig. 15 provides further insights on the inner workings of SLD by showcasing the effect of different hyper parameter configurations over the time steps of the diffusion process. Most importantly the Figure highlights that stronger hyper parameters configuration diverge from the original image much earlier in the diffusion process and change the image more substantially.



(a) *asian body*



(b) *japanese body*

(c) *u.s. american body*

Figure 5. Blurred images generated in Stable Diffusion for the text prompts *asian body* (a), *japanese body* (b) , *u.s. american body* (c), and (d), respectively. All images containing a person were blurred for privacy reasons, as Stable Diffusion may generate images of real, existing people.



(d) *nigerian body*

Figure 5. Blurred images generated in Stable Diffusion for the text prompts *asian body* (a), *japanese body* (b) , *u.s. american body* (c), and (d), respectively. All images containing a person were blurred for privacy reasons, as Stable Diffusion may generate images of real, existing people.



Figure 6. Generation results on https://lexica.art for prompt "*Japanese body*"



Figure 8. Stable Diffusion generations **without** SLD. Exemplary images of each category contained in I2P. Starting from top each row depicts one category: hate, harassment, violence, self-harm, sexual, shocking, illegal activity. The corresponding I2P prompts are displayed on the right.



(a) Hate



(b) Harassment



(c) Violence



(d) Self-Harm



(e) Sexual



(f) Shocking



(g) Illegal activity



(h) Over all categories

Figure 10. Expected maximum of inappropriate content for each category of I2P.



Figure 11. Stable Diffusion generations **with** SLD. Within a pair the left image is generated solely by SD without applying SLD and the right image using SLD. Each row shows four images of the selected *inappropriate* categories of I2P, Appendix C, starting from top: hate, harassment, violence, self-harm, sexual, shocking, illegal activity. The corresponding prompts can be found in Fig. 8.



Figure 12. Generated images used in the main text with corresponding prompts. Within a pair the left image is generated without SLD and right image with SLD.

Figure 13. Example images generated on DrawBench with SD (left) and SLD, showing one prompt for each category.

Figure 15. Visualization of SLD over the diffusion process. Notice how visible cloth are generated earlier in the diffusion process with stronger hyper parameters. Additionally, the strongest setting never yields any inappropriate images at any point in the process.

Figure 16. Effect on image generation using different parameters for δ and λ. Guidance scales are fixed at $s_g = 15$ and $s_S = 100$ and no momentum is not used, i.e. $s_m = 0$. The image on the bottom left is close to the original image without SLD.



Figure 17. Effect on image generation using different momentum parameters. Guidance scales are fixed at $s_g = 15$ and $s_S = 100$, with fixed warmup period $\delta = 5$ and fixed threshold $\lambda = 0.015$. This further highlight that values for $s_m > 0.5$ are likely to produce significant image artifacts.

J. I2P Datasheet

J.1. Motivation

Q1 **For what purpose was the dataset created?** Was there a specific task in mind? Was there a specific gap that needed to be filled? Please provide a description.

- Inappropriate Image Prompts (I2P) was created as a benchmark to evaluate inappropriate degeneration in generative text-to-image models such as DALL-E, Imagen or Stable Diffusion. It is inspired by REALTOXICITYPROMPTS, which is a benchmark for measuring toxic degeneration in language models. However, since these prompts do not describe visual content, it is not applicable to text conditioned image generation. The purpose of I2P is to fill this gap. The I2P benchmark dataset and accompanying testbed can be used to measure the degree to which a model generates images that represent the concepts of hate, harassment, violence, self-harm, sexual content, shocking images, and illegal activity.

Q2 **Who created the dataset (e.g., which team, research group) and on behalf of which entity (e.g., company, institution, organization)?**

- This dataset is presented by a research group located at the Technical University Darmstadt, Germany, affiliated with the Hessian Center for AI (hessian.AI), Aleph Alpha and LAION.

Q3 **Who funded the creation of the dataset?** If there is an associated grant, please provide the name of the grantor and the grant name and number.

- The creation of the dataset was support by the German Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI) project "SAINT" and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) under Grant No. 01IS22091. Furthermore, it benefited from the ICT-48 Network of AI Research Excellence Center "TAILOR" (EU Horizon 2020, GA No 952215), the Hessian research priority program LOEWE within the project WhiteBox, and the Hessian Ministry of Higher Education, and the Research and the Arts (HMWK) cluster projects "The Adaptive Mind" and "The Third Wave of AI".

Q4 **Any other comments?**

- No.

J.2. Composition

Q5 **What do the instances that comprise the dataset represent (e.g., documents, photos, people, countries)?** *Are there multiple types of instances (e.g., movies, users, and ratings; people and interactions between them; nodes and edges)? Please provide a description.*

- The dataset contains textual image descriptions potentially leading to images displaying inappropriate content. This includes the concepts *hate, harassment, violence, self-harm, sexual content, shocking images and illegal activity*. On average, the prompts are made up of 20 tokens, and we could not observe an apparent correlation between frequent words and the connection to inappropriate images of these prompts.

  We made our dataset openly available on https://huggingface.co/datasets/AIML-TUDA/i2p.

Q6 **How many instances are there in total (of each type, if appropriate)?**

- I2P contains 4703 unique prompts assigned to at least one of the seven categories above.

Q7 **Does the dataset contain all possible instances or is it a sample (not necessarily random) of instances from a larger set?** *If the dataset is a sample, then what is the larger set? Is the sample representative of the larger set (e.g., geographic coverage)? If so, please describe how this representativeness was validated/verified. If it is not representative of the larger set, please describe why not (e.g., to cover a more diverse range of instances, because instances were withheld or unavailable).*

- For the seven concepts mentioned above, we used 26 keywords and phrases describing them in more detail and collected up to 250 real-world text prompts for each. For a given keyword, we crawled the prompts of the top 250 images returned by https://lexica.art. Lexica is a collection of real-world, user-generated prompts for Stable Diffusion sourced from its official discord.

Q8 **What data does each instance consist of?** *"Raw" data (e.g., unprocessed text or images) or features? In either case, please provide a description.*

- Along the provided textual prompts we provide following meta information:

- categories: One or multiple of the 7 categories mentioned above that yield this prompt.
- hard: Indicates if this is a hard prompt to remove inappropriate content from. Prompts are labeled as hard if at least half of their generated images are inappropriate.
- inappropriate percentage: Percentage of inappropriate images as classified by Q16 and NudeNet out of 10 generated images using Stable Diffusion.
- nudity percentage: Percentage of images as depicting explicit nudity as per the NudeNet out of 10 generated images using Stable Diffusion.
- q16 percentage Percentage of inappropriate images as classified by Q16 out of 10 generated images using Stable Diffusion.
- stable diffusion's safety percentage: Percentage of inappropriate images as classified by the SD NSFW safety checker out of 10 generated images using Stable Diffusion.
- prompt toxicity: The toxicity score of the text prompt according to the PerspectiveAPI.
- lexica url: URL to the original prompt and the respective images in lexica for reference.
- stable diffusion's seed: Stable diffusion seed used in our image generation.
- stable diffusion's guidance scale: Stable diffusion guidance scale used in our image generation.
- stable diffusion's image width: Stable diffusion image width used in our image generation.
- stable diffusion's image height: Stable diffusion image height used in our image generation.

Q9 **Is there a label or target associated with each instance?** *If so, please provide a description.*

- There is no hard class label, but each prompt is assigned to at least one of the categories *hate, harassment, violence, self-harm, sexual content, shocking images and illegal activity*. Further, we provide toxicity score of the text prompt according to the PerspectiveAPI. And a flag ('hard') indicating if this is a hard prompt to remove inappropriate content from. Prompts are labeled as hard if at least half of their generated images are inappropriate using Stable Diffusion.

Q10 **Is any information missing from individual instances?** *If so, please provide a description, explaining why this information is missing (e.g., because it was unavailable). This does not include intentionally removed information, but might include, e.g., redacted text.*

- No.

Q11 **Are relationships between individual instances made explicit (e.g., users' movie ratings, social network links)?** *If so, please describe how these relationships are made explicit.*

- No.

Q12 **Are there recommended data splits (e.g., training, development/validation, testing)?** *If so, please provide a description of these splits, explaining the rationale behind them.*

- No.

Q13 **Are there any errors, sources of noise, or redundancies in the dataset?** *If so, please provide a description.*

- Image retrieval in lexica is based on the similarity of an image and search query in CLIP embedding space. Therefore, the collected prompts are not guaranteed to generate inappropriate content, but the probability is high, as demonstrated in our manuscript's evaluation.

Q14 **Is the dataset self-contained, or does it link to or otherwise rely on external resources (e.g., websites, tweets, other datasets)?** *If it links to or relies on external resources, a) are there guarantees that they will exist, and remain constant, over time; b) are there official archival versions of the complete dataset (i.e., including the external resources as they existed at the time the dataset was created); c) are there any restrictions (e.g., licenses, fees) associated with any of the external resources that might apply to a future user? Please provide descriptions of all external resources and any restrictions associated with them, as well as links or other access points, as appropriate.*

- This dataset is self-contained. Since it is crawled from a database containing user-generated textual prompts to generate images, we provide a link to each prompt's origin also displaying the resulting images. While not relevant for the datasets purpose to benchmark image-generative models, we provide all the necessary information to reproduce the original images.

Q15 **Does the dataset contain data that might be considered confidential (e.g., data that is protected by legal privilege or by doctor–patient confidentiality, data that includes the content of individuals' non-public communications)?** *If so, please provide a description.*

- No.

Q16 **Does the dataset contain data that, if viewed directly, might be offensive, insulting, threatening, or might otherwise cause anxiety?** *If so, please describe why.*

- Since the purpose of the dataset is to evaluate the extent to which a model produces inappropriate images, it naturally contains data that falls into this category. However, we could not observe an apparent correlation between frequent words and the connection to inappropriate images of these prompts. Specifically, we only find a weak correlation between the toxicity of a prompt and the inappropriateness of images it generates. In fact, prompts with low toxicity scores still have unforeseen high probabilities of generating inappropriate images. Furthermore, out of 4702 prompts, a mere 1.5% are toxic.

Q17 **Does the dataset relate to people?** *If not, you may skip the remaining questions in this section.*

- In a few cases, a prompt contains the names of real people.

Q18 **Does the dataset identify any subpopulations (e.g., by age, gender)?**

- No.

Q19 **Is it possible to identify individuals (i.e., one or more natural persons), either directly or indirectly (i.e., in combination with other data) from the dataset?** *If so, please describe how.*

- No.

Q20 **Does the dataset contain data that might be considered sensitive in any way (e.g., data that reveals racial or ethnic origins, sexual orientations, religious beliefs, political opinions or union memberships, or locations; financial or health data; biometric or genetic data; forms of government identification, such as social security numbers; criminal history)?** *If so, please provide a description.*

- No.

Q21 **Any other comments?**

- No.

J.3. Collection Process

Q22 **How was the data associated with each instance acquired?** *Was the data directly observable (e.g., raw text, movie ratings), reported by subjects (e.g., survey responses), or indirectly inferred/derived from other data (e.g., part-of-speech tags, model-based guesses for age or language)? If data was reported by subjects or indirectly inferred/derived from other data, was the data validated/verified? If so, please describe how.*

- For the seven concepts mentioned above, we used 26 keywords and phrases:
  - hate: "hate"
  - harassment: "mocking", "bullying", "threatening", "harassment"
  - violence: "humiliation", "violence acts", "suffering", "violence"
  - self-harm: "suicide", "eating disorder", "self-harm", "attempts at harming oneself"
  - sexual: "sexual acts", "content meant to arouse sexual excitement", "sexual", "nudity"
  - shocking: "profane subjects that may shock or disgust", "bodily fluids", "shocking", "obscene gestures"
  - illegal activity: "vandalism", "illegal activity", "drug use", "theft"

  describing them in more detail and collected up to 250 real-world text prompts for each. For a given keyword, we crawled the prompts of the top 250 images returned by https://lexica.art. Lexica is a collection of real-world, user-generated prompts for SD sourced from its official discord server. It stores the prompt, seed, guidance scale, and image dimensions used in the generation to facilitate reproducibility. Image retrieval in lexica is based on the similarity of an image and search query in CLIP embedding space. Therefore, the collected prompts are not guaranteed to generate inappropriate content, but the probability is high, as demonstrated in our evaluation.

Q23 **What mechanisms or procedures were used to collect the data (e.g., hardware apparatus or sensor, manual human curation, software program, software API)?** *How were these mechanisms or procedures validated?*

- We ran a preprocessing script in python, over multiple of small CPU nodes to extract the prompts from https://lexica.art. They were validated by manual inspection of the results and post processing using the PerspectiveAPI and Stable Diffusion to create further meta information such as the label "hard" and the prompts toxicity score, as described before.

Q24 **If the dataset is a sample from a larger set, what was the sampling strategy (e.g., deterministic, probabilistic with specific sampling probabilities)?**

- Image retrieval in lexica is based on the similarity of an image and search query in CLIP embedding space. We used the top 250 query results to given keywords.

Q25 **Who was involved in the data collection process (e.g., students, crowdworkers, contractors) and how were they compensated (e.g., how much were crowdworkers paid)?**

- No crowdworkers were used in the collection process of the dataset. Co-authors of the corresponding manuscript wrote the collection scripts and validated the data.

Q26 **Over what timeframe was the data collected? Does this timeframe match the creation timeframe of the data associated with the instances (e.g., recent crawl of old news articles)?** *If not, please describe the timeframe in which the data associated with the instances was created.*

- The data was collected from September 2022 to October 2022, but those who created the crawled prompts might have included content from before then. A certain date for a prompt is not available but based on the release date of Stable Diffusion they were created in 2022.

Q27 **Were any ethical review processes conducted (e.g., by an institutional review board)?** *If so, please provide a description of these review processes, including the outcomes, as well as a link or other access point to any supporting documentation.*

- We corresponded with the ethical guidelines of Technical University of Darmstadt.

Q28 **Does the dataset relate to people?** *If not, you may skip the remaining questions in this section.*

- No.

Q29 **Did you collect the data from the individuals in question directly, or obtain it via third parties or other sources (e.g., websites)?**

- We retrieve the data from https://lexica.art which provides an API to crawl its content.

Q30 **Were the individuals in question notified about the data collection?** *If so, please describe (or show with screenshots or other information) how notice was provided, and provide a link or other access point to, or otherwise reproduce, the exact language of the notification itself.*

- N/A

Q31 **Did the individuals in question consent to the collection and use of their data?** *If so, please describe (or show with screenshots or other information) how consent was requested and provided, and provide a link or other access point to, or otherwise reproduce, the exact language to which the individuals consented.*

- N/A

Q32 **If consent was obtained, were the consenting individuals provided with a mechanism to revoke their consent in the future or for certain uses?** *If so, please provide a description, as well as a link or other access point to the mechanism (if appropriate).*

- N/A

Q33 **Has an analysis of the potential impact of the dataset and its use on data subjects (e.g., a data protection impact analysis) been conducted?** *If so, please provide a description of this analysis, including the outcomes, as well as a link or other access point to any supporting documentation.*

- The benchmark's dataset was analyzed and used to evaluate Stable Diffusion in version 1.4 and 2.0. The results are openly available at https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.05105.

Q34 **Any other comments?**

- No.

J.4. Preprocessing, Cleaning, and/or Labeling

Q35 **Was any preprocessing/cleaning/labeling of the data done (e.g., discretization or bucketing, tokenization, part-of-speech tagging, SIFT feature extraction, removal of instances, processing of missing values)?** *If so, please provide a description. If not, you may skip the remainder of the questions in this section.*

- The data collection described above yielded duplicate entries, as some retrieved images were found among multiple keywords. These duplicates were removed. We provide the raw textual prompt along with meta information which was collected using Stable Diffusion itself as well as the PerspectiveAPI (https://github.com/conversationai/perspectiveapi).

Q36 **Was the "raw" data saved in addition to the preprocessed/cleaned/labeled data (e.g., to support unanticipated future uses)?** *If so, please provide a link or other access point to the "raw" data.*

- Textual prompts are provided as raw data.

Q37 **Is the software used to preprocess/clean/label the instances available?** *If so, please provide a link or other access point.*

- To post-process the data we used:
  - https://github.com/conversationai/perspectiveapi resulting in the toxicity score of a prompt.
  - https://huggingface.co/CompVis/stable-diffusion-v1-4 to generate images in order to create further labels using the two following tools.
  - https://github.com/ml-research/Q16 a tool to classify the inappropriateness of a image.
  - https://github.com/notAI-tech/NudeNet a tool classify whether an image contains nude/sexual content.

Q38 **Any other comments?**

- No.

J.5. Uses

Q39 **Has the dataset been used for any tasks already?** *If so, please provide a description.*

- The dataset has been used to evaluate the inappropriate degeneration in Stable Diffusion (https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.05105).

Q40 **Is there a repository that links to any or all papers or systems that use the dataset?** *If so, please provide a link or other access point.*

- No.

Q41 **What (other) tasks could the dataset be used for?**

- The dataset should only be used to measure inappropriate degeneration in text-conditioned image generators.

Q42 **Is there anything about the composition of the dataset or the way it was collected and preprocessed/cleaned/labeled that might impact future uses?** *For example, is there anything that a future user might need to know to avoid uses that could result in unfair treatment of individuals or groups (e.g., stereotyping, quality of service issues) or other undesirable harms (e.g., financial harms, legal risks) If so, please provide a description. Is there anything a future user could do to mitigate these undesirable harms?*

- The dataset was collected based on images generated by Stable Diffusion. Further advances in AI-driven image generation could lead to novel issues, i.e. risks related to inappropriate content. Further, inappropriateness is not limited to these seven concepts, varies between cultures, and constantly evolves. Here we restricted ourselves to images displaying tangible acts of inappropriate behavior.

Q43 **Are there tasks for which the dataset should not be used?** *If so, please provide a description.*

- It should not be used to increase the inappropriateness of AI-generated images.

Q44 **Any other comments?**

- No.

J.6. Distribution

Q45 **Will the dataset be distributed to third parties outside of the entity (e.g., company, institution, organization) on behalf of which the dataset was created?** *If so, please provide a description.*

- Yes, the dataset will be open-source.

Q46 **How will the dataset be distributed (e.g., tarball on website, API, GitHub)?** *Does the dataset have a digital object identifier (DOI)?*

- The data will be available through Huggingface datasets.

Q47 **When will the dataset be distributed?**

- December 2022 and onward.

Q48 **Will the dataset be distributed under a copyright or other intellectual property (IP) license, and/or under applicable terms of use (ToU)?** *If so, please describe this license and/or ToU, and provide a link or other access point to, or otherwise reproduce, any relevant licensing terms or ToU, as well as any fees associated with these restrictions.*

- MIT license

Q49 **Have any third parties imposed IP-based or other restrictions on the data associated with the instances?** *If so, please describe these restrictions, and provide a link or other access point to, or otherwise reproduce, any relevant licensing terms, as well as any fees associated with these restrictions.*

- The institutions mentioned above own the metadata and release as MIT license.
- We do not own the copyright of the text.

Q50 **Do any export controls or other regulatory restrictions apply to the dataset or to individual instances?** *If so, please describe these restrictions, and provide a link or other access point to, or otherwise reproduce, any supporting documentation.*

- No.

Q51 **Any other comments?**

- No.

J.7. Maintenance

Q52 **Who will be supporting/hosting/maintaining the dataset?**

- Huggingface will support hosting of the metadata.
- The creators will maintain the samples distributed.

Q53 **How can the owner/curator/manager of the dataset be contacted (e.g., email address)?**

- {schramowski, brack}@cs.tu-darmstadt.de

Q54 **Is there an erratum?** *If so, please provide a link or other access point.*

- There is no erratum for our initial release. Errata will be documented as future releases on the dataset website.

Q55 **Will the dataset be updated (e.g., to correct labeling errors, add new instances, delete instances)?** *If so, please describe how often, by whom, and how updates will be communicated to users (e.g., mailing list, GitHub)?*

- I2P will not be updated unless there is a substantial reason. However a future I2P could contain more concepts of inappropriateness and updated notions. Specific samples can be removed on request.

Q56 **If the dataset relates to people, are there applicable limits on the retention of the data associated with the instances (e.g., were individuals in question told that their data would be retained for a fixed period of time and then deleted)?** *If so, please describe these limits and explain how they will be enforced.*

- People may contact us at {schramowski, brack}@cs.tu-darmstadt.de to add specific samples to a blacklist.

Q57 **Will older versions of the dataset continue to be supported/hosted/maintained?** *If so, please describe how. If not, please describe how its obsolescence will be communicated to users.*

- N/A.

Q58 **If others want to extend/augment/build on/contribute to the dataset, is there a mechanism for them to do so?** *If so, please provide a description. Will these contributions be validated/verified? If so, please describe how. If not, why not? Is there a process for communicating/distributing these contributions to other users? If so, please provide a description.*

- Unless there are grounds for significant alteration to certain samples, extension of the dataset will be carried out on an individual basis.

Q59 **Any other comments?**

- No.