Appendices

A. Acknowledgment

We are thankful to Jindong Gu and Xiangyu Qi for helpful feedback on an earlier version of this paper.

B. Limitations

We would like to point out some of the limitations of this work in its current form.

- All evaluations in this paper have been performed on static datasets. Hence, it remains to be seen how IMMUNE fares against dynamic (e.g., iterative or whitebox) attacks.
- In current evaluations, IMMUNE is not evaluated against defense-aware attacks.

C. Reproducibility

Our code is available at https://github.com/itsvaibhav01/Immune. We run all experiments with Python 3.7.4 and PyTorch 1.9.0. For all experimentation, we use two Nvidia RTX A6000 GPUs.

D. Overview Diagram

In Algorithm 1 (main paper), we provided a detailed overview of IMMUNE. To further illustrate how IMMUNE operates, we include a visualization in Figure 2.

E. Proof of Theorem 1

Let us reconsider the definition of suboptimality gap as defined in (7), which is given by

$$\Delta_{\text{sub-gap}}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}}) := \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{\mathbf{x}\sim p_0(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})\\ \mathbf{y}\sim\rho_*(\cdot|\mathbf{x})}}[R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})] - \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{\mathbf{x}\sim p_{\text{adv}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})\\ \mathbf{y}\sim\rho_{\text{safe-dec}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x})}}[R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})]\,.$$

Next, we decompose the sub-optimality into two components as $\Delta_{\text{sub-gap}} = \Delta_1 + \Delta_2$, where

$$\Delta_1 := \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{\mathbf{x}\sim p_0(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})\\ \mathbf{y}\sim\rho_*(\cdot|\mathbf{x})}}[R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})] - \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{\mathbf{x}\sim p_{\text{adv}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})\\ \mathbf{y}\sim\rho_*(\cdot|\mathbf{x})}}[R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})]\,,$$

and Δ_2 is given by

$$\Delta_2 := \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{\mathbf{x}\sim p_{\text{adv}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})\\ \mathbf{y}\sim\rho_*(\cdot|\mathbf{x})}}[R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})] - \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{\mathbf{x}\sim p_{\text{adv}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})\\ \mathbf{y}\sim\rho_{\text{safe-dec}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x})}}[R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})]\,. \tag{9}$$

Upper bound on Δ_1: To proceed, consider the term Δ_1 as

$$\Delta_1 = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\mathbf{x}\sim p_0(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})}\left[\widetilde{R}_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x})\right] - \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\mathbf{x}\sim \rho_{\text{adv}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})}\left[\widetilde{R}_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x})\right],$$

where we define $\widetilde{R}_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x}) := \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{y}\sim\rho^*(\cdot|\mathbf{x})}[R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})]$. We assume that the reward function is upper-bounded as $R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y}) \leq R_{\max}$, then Δ_1 can be upper-bounded by

$$\Delta_1 \leq R_{\max}\cdot d_{\text{TV}}(p_0(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}}), p_{\text{adv}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})) \tag{10}$$

$$\leq R_{\max}\sqrt{\frac{1}{2}\text{KL}(p_0(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})||p_{\text{adv}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}}))}, \tag{11}$$

where, we first utilize the definition of Total variation distance as an integral probability metric [62] and then, using Pinsker's inequality, we get the final expression of (10). Consider the KL term in the right-hand side of (10) to obtain

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\mathrm{KL}(p_0(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})||p_{\text{adv}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})) \\
&\quad= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{q}\sim p_0(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})} \log \frac{p_0(\mathbf{q}|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})}{p_{\text{adv}}(\mathbf{q}|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})} && (12)\\
&\quad= \log Z(\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}}) + \frac{1}{\beta}\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{q}\sim p_0}[R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}}, q)] && (13)\\
&\quad= \log \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\mathbf{q}\sim p_0}\left[\exp\left(-\frac{1}{\beta}R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}}, \mathbf{q})\right)\right] && (14)\\
&\qquad+ \frac{1}{\beta}\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{q}\sim p_0} R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}}, \mathbf{q}) && (15)\\
&\quad\le \frac{1}{\beta}\left(\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{q}\sim p_0} R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}}, \mathbf{q}) - R^{\min}_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})\right), && (16)
\end{aligned}
$$

where we first expand upon the definition of the KL divergence term in (12). In (13), we utilize the closed-form solution of the adversarial prompt distribution by minimizing the KL-regularized objective defined in (2). We get the equality in (15) by taking the logarithm of the expression and expanding the definition of the partition function. To get the final upper bound in (16), we utilize $-R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}}, \mathbf{q}) \le -R^{\min}_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}}, \mathbf{q})$ for all $\mathbf{q} \sim p_0(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})$.

We note that in the upper bound of (16), β plays an important role. A lower value of β indicates that prompt distribution has been largely fine-tuned by minimizing the safety rewards, and hence the sub-optimality gap increases. On the other hand, larger values of β represent, the adversarial prompt distribution is not further away from the naive or safe prompt distribution, hence our sub-optimality gap is lower. However, it's important to note that p_{adv} cannot be too far from p_0 i.e., β cannot be too small since then the adversarial prompts will start losing sense, perplexity (in the case of text), and context.

Upper bound on Δ_2: Next, we proceed to upper-bound the second term Δ_2 where Δ_2 is

$$
\Delta_2 := \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{\mathbf{x}\sim p_{\text{adv}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})\\ \mathbf{y}\sim\rho_*(\cdot|\mathbf{x})}}[R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})] - \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{\mathbf{x}\sim p_{\text{adv}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})\\ \mathbf{y}\sim\rho_{\text{safe-dec}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x})}}[R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})], \tag{17}
$$

which represents the sub-optimality in the alignment of our decoding procedure under the prompt distribution p_{adv}. Now, add and subtract the terms $\alpha\,\mathrm{KL}(\rho_*(.|\mathbf{x})||\rho_{\text{safe}}(.|\mathbf{x}))$ and $\alpha\,\mathrm{KL}(\rho_{\text{safe-dec}}(.|\mathbf{x})||\rho_{\text{safe}}(.|\mathbf{x}))$ in the right hand side of Δ_2 to obtain

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Delta_2 = &\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{\mathbf{x}\sim p_{\text{adv}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x}_{\text{input}})\\ \mathbf{y}\sim\rho_*(\cdot|\mathbf{x})}}[R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})] - \alpha\,\mathrm{KL}\left(\rho_*(.|\mathbf{x})||\rho_{\text{safe}}(.|\mathbf{x})\right)\\
&- \Bigg[\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\substack{\mathbf{x}\sim p_{\text{adv}}(.)\\ y\sim\rho_{\text{safe-dec}}(\cdot|\mathbf{x})}}[R_{\text{safe}}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})]\\
&\qquad - \alpha\,\mathrm{KL}\left(\rho_{\text{safe-dec}}(.|\mathbf{x})||\rho_{\text{safe}}(.|\mathbf{x})\right)\Bigg] \qquad (18)\\
&+ \Big(\alpha\,\mathrm{KL}\left(\rho_*(.|\mathbf{x})||\rho_{\text{safe}}(.|\mathbf{x})\right)\\
&\qquad - \alpha\,\mathrm{KL}\Big(\rho_{\text{safe-dec}}(.|\mathbf{x})||\rho_{\text{safe}}(.|\mathbf{x})\Big)\Big). \qquad (19)
\end{aligned}
$$

Utilizing the optimality of our decoding policy which is optimal for the KL-regularized RL problem and dropping the negative terms, we get the final bound as

$$
\Delta_2 \le \alpha\,\mathrm{KL}\left(\rho_*(.|\mathbf{x})||\rho_{\text{safe}}(.|\mathbf{x})\right). \tag{20}
$$

We remark that Δ_2 will be less under two scenarios: (1) When α is small it means we are optimizing more towards the safety reward function, (2) when the KL divergence term between ρ_* and reference policy ρ_{safe} is small. It is very important to note that $\rho_{\text{safe}}(.|\mathbf{x})$ is the input reference policy available to us, which is already closer to optimal ρ_* due to SFT and RLHF training done to the majority of the current models, thus this value is anyways very small or even closer to zero. From the upper bound in (10), (16), and (20), we get the final upper bound on the suboptimality (in (9)) presented in the statement of our Theorem 1.



Figure 2. An illustration of our proposed inference-time alignment-based defense strategy, IMMUNE.

Model	Defense Strategy	Economic Harm			Political Lobbying			Privacy Violence			Legal Opinion			Financial Advice			Health Consultation			Gov Decision			Average
		SD	TYPO	SD-TYPO	SD	TYPO	SD-TYPO	SD	TYPO	SD-TYPO	SD	TYPO	SD-TYPO	SD	TYPO	SD-TYPO	SD	TYPO	SD-TYPO	SD	TYPO	SD-TYPO	
LLaVA-1.6	Original	6.42	10.96	15.94	0.00	0.78	1.47	14.64	19.22	44.95	0.00	0.00	0.79	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.30	5.26	4.10	3.01
	FigStep [16]	6.19	11.16	14.06	0.00	1.42	1.39	12.44	17.48	43.93	0.00	0.00	0.57	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.90	4.17	4.04	2.77
	AdaShield [67]	1.44	7.35	5.57	0.00	0.82	0.00	5.73	39.16	23.21	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.80	0.00	2.08
	CoCA [14]	25.41	27.87	18.03	31.37	13.37	17.65	48.24	42.45	39.57	0.00	2.31	1.54	6.07	10.18	4.79	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.67	1.34	0.00	8.91
	IMMUNE (Ours)	1.03	0.51	2.87	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.48	4.62	8.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.59	0.88	0.00	**0.63**
LLaVA-1.5	Original	11.68	21.18	22.11	10.97	11.99	27.59	30.55	60.94	62.56	1.23	0.02	0.86	0.00	7.44	5.88	0.00	2.57	2.29	3.06	4.67	4.76	9.28
	FigStep [16]	12.45	21.74	21.54	12.00	16.67	27.36	30.40	58.85	64.13	1.22	0.74	0.65	0.00	9.21	6.89	0.00	2.54	2.44	1.85	4.10	5.14	9.65
	AdaShield [67]	3.85	0.00	10.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	12.89	6.13	15.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.92
	CoCA [14]	18.85	23.77	17.21	12.42	9.85	7.19	35.97	43.88	51.08	0.77	1.54	2.31	7.19	7.78	4.19	0.00	0.92	0.00	0.67	2.01	1.34	7.07
	IMMUNE (Ours)	0.69	2.90	9.44	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.55	6.19	12.65	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.65**
MiniGPT-4-7B	Original	4.10	7.37	2.69	1.33	1.40	1.41	3.05	24.03	17.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.80	0.84	3.27	0.85	1.01	0.52	1.92
	FigStep [16]	2.45	2.67	4.92	0.00	0.80	1.22	6.27	25.35	13.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.20	1.27	0.00	0.00	2.12	1.10	1.68
	AdaShield [67]	5.26	5.79	4.41	0.87	0.00	0.00	7.93	19.27	12.44	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.99	0.00	2.67	0.00	0.00	0.72	1.48
	CoCA [14]	18.37	13.72	9.05	15.86	4.54	12.32	28.29	20.14	28.67	1.63	2.89	2.02	4.88	0.00	0.92	2.16	0.00	0.98	1.20	1.89	3.67	5.47
	IMMUNE (Ours)	5.89	5.43	1.76	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.42	20.12	12.81	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.08	0.00	0.00	1.40	0.81	0.85	**1.22**
MiniGPT-4-13B	Original	16.30	16.19	24.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.59	3.63	12.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.02	0.00	0.00	4.20	0.00	1.14
	FigStep [16]	7.85	15.96	24.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.96	12.12	19.81	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.98	0.00	1.33
	AdaShield [67]	8.46	15.86	12.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.93	7.68	7.88	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.42	0.00	0.00	4.10	0.00	1.09
	CoCA [14]	14.20	22.54	22.68	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.77	17.85	24.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.72	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.39	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.41	2.37
	IMMUNE (Ours)	12.31	22.13	20.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.43	1.62	7.87	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.49**

Table 5. **Evaluation on MM-Safety Bench.** We report Attack Success Rate (ASR) for 7 categories of prohibited scenarios from MM-Safety Bench [38]. For this evaluation, we used GPT-4 as the jailbreak classifier. The best results (lowest ASR) are highlighted in **bold**. All values are reported in %.

F. Extended Results and Discussion

Extended Results on MM-Safety Bench [38]. In Table 2 of the main paper, we report the attack success rates on 6 categories of the MM-Safety Bench. For completeness, we provide evaluations on the remaining 7 categories in Table 5. We observe that IMMUNE consistently outperforms other baseline defense strategies, highlighting its efficacy.

F.1. Comparison with training-based methods

To gain deeper insight about the capabilities of inference-time alignment approach, we compare the performance of IMMUNE with a Qwen-VL model (fine-tuned to safety preferences using DPO [57]). For this evaluation, we utilize the checkpoints released by Li et al. [31], obtained through DPO training on the Qwen-VL model using the VLFeedback [31] preference dataset. This data set includes rewards annotations on helpfulness, visual faithfulness, and ethical considerations. We evaluate the performance on JailbreakV-28K dataset [40] and report the results in Table 6. We used GPT-4 as the oracle jailbreak classifier, and we note that across all categories, IMMUNE achieves a better ASR than the fine-tuned model.

For a fair comparison, during decoding with IMMUNE, instead of an external safety reward, we use the implicit reward (as defined

Model	Defense Strategy	Noise			SD			Nature			Blank			Average
		Template	Persuade	Logic	Template	Persuade	Logic	Template	Persuade	Logic	Template	Persuade	Logic	
Qwen-VL	Original	46.12	3.27	12.09	52.23	6.18	9.07	53.34	3.42	7.05	53.11	4.36	15.11	22.99
	Qwen-VL + DPO [31]	33.43	3.76	6.67	48.27	5.34	4.05	36.67	2.45	8.11	43.22	3.90	9.46	18.07
	IMMUNE (using Mudgal et al. [47])	28.71	4.61	8.92	43.72	2.80	4.10	34.57	2.45	5.99	35.63	3.42	8.90	15.32
	IMMUNE (using Chakraborty et al. [7])	24.59	3.98	7.00	29.22	2.80	3.95	22.74	2.45	5.50	30.42	3.61	8.90	12.10
	IMMUNE (Ours)	10.27	2.18	5.41	21.34	2.29	4.03	18.22	2.35	5.41	20.17	3.37	7.05	**8.58**

Table 6. **Comparison with train-time alignment techniques.** We compare the Attack Success Rate for IMMUNE with a DPO-aligned MLLM [31] on JailbreakV-28K dataset [40]. Lower ASR values indicate stronger resilience against jailbreak attacks. For this evaluation, we used GPT-4 as the jailbreak classifier. IMMUNE consistently outperforms the train-time aligned model across all categories. The best result (lowest ASR) is highlighted in **bold**. All values are reported in %.

	Original	AdaShield [67]	CoCA [14]	IMMUNE (Ours)
LLaVA-1.5	3.52	3.62	7.02	4.98
LLaVA-1.6	3.48	3.58	7.01	4.93
MiniGPT-4-13B	24.56	24.92	37.86	27.90
Qwen-VL	1.91	2.01	7.43	4.57
Average ASR in % (↓)	52.56	24.63	35.03	11.51
Model Utility (↑)	34.07	27.25	31.25	33.75

Table 7. **Inference-time of baseline defenses.** We report the average time required (in secs) to generate a response for one query for each defense strategy across various MLLMs.

in [57]) obtained from the Qwen-DPO model [31] for inference-time alignment. This approach ensures a clear understanding of the advantages of inference-time alignment, maintaining the same base MLLMs and reward preferences. From Table 6, we note that IMMUNE, based on implicit reward, improves the ASR of the DPO model by 2.75% (when decoded using [47]). These results corroborate our findings in Section 3 that train-time alignment techniques can be vulnerable against unforeseen adversarial tactics that emerge only at inference. In contrast, IMMUNE dynamically assesses and responds to each incoming prompt.

We also measure the token-level KL divergence of IMMUNE and the DPO-aligned model [31] with respect to the base MLLM, using it as a proxy for reward overoptimization and deviation from the base policy, as is common in the literature [7, 47]. We average over 218 prompts from MM-Vet benchmark [77], the KL divergence for IMMUNE is 5.23 and for the DPO-aligned model is 5.84. Ideally, an approach that minimizes ASR while maintaining the smallest KL divergence is preferable. These results suggest that IMMUNE based on inference-time alignment achieves ASR reduction without incurring a higher KL divergence compared to training-time alignment techniques.

F.2. Capability Evaluations Results

IMMUNE preserves the model's original capabilities. An effective jailbreak defense strategy should minimize the attack success rate while retaining the model's original capabilities. To assess this, we compare the visual comprehension abilities of various MLLMs employing different defense strategies on the MM-Vet dataset [77]. This multimodal benchmark evaluates MLLM responses across six categories: Recognition, Knowledge, Optical Character Recognition, Spatial Awareness, Language Generation, and Math. We report the average performance across all categories in Figure 4. Our results indicate that, compared to other defense strategies, IMMUNE achieves the highest score on MM-Vet, demonstrating that it not only enhances model safety but also preserves the model's original capabilities.

F.3. Inference Speed Evaluations results

Inference Time of IMMUNE. In Table 7, we compare the inference time of various jailbreak defense strategies across different MLLMs. Specifically, we report the average response generation time, in seconds, over 100 prompts to account for variability in prompt lengths. All defense strategies were evaluated using the same hardware and software configuration as detailed in Appendix C. Among the baselines, CoCA [14] exhibits the longest inference time—nearly double that of the original decoding process—as it requires two forward passes. In Table 4, we note that although AdaShield [67] incurs only a slight additional inference latency, it causes a significant drop in model utility from 34.07 to 27.25, a 20.01% decrease compared to the original decoding, as measured by the MM-Vet score [77]. In contrast, our method, IMMUNE, although incurs higher inference latency than AdaShield [67] but maintains the original model capabilities with only a 0.93% reduction in model utility and further



Figure 3. We measure ASR and model utility for different combinations of hyper-parameters k and α. The model is LLaVA-1.5 [34].



(a) MiniGPT-7B (b) MiniGPT-13B (c) LLaVA-1.6 (d) Qwen-VL

Figure 4. **Evaluation on MMvet.** We evaluate model utility by comparing the performance of different baseline defense strategies across various MLLMs on the MMvet dataset [77]. A higher model utility indicates better visual-reasoning capabilities. IMMUNE preserves the model's original capabilities and even enhances performance in certain cases.

reduces the ASR by 13.12% compared to AdaShield.

Ablations on hyper-parameters. In Section 6, we demonstrated the superior efficacy of IMMUNE compared to the baseline defense strategies through a comprehensive evaluation. In this section, we present an ablation study on different hyperparameters, such as the number of tokens sampled (k), and the alignment parameter (α) as defined in Algorithm 1. We report the ablation results on k and α in Figure 3. Specifically, we measure the attack success rate and model utility (measured by MM-Vet score [77]) of the generated responses based on different combinations of the hyperparameters k and α. Our observations indicate that using $k = 10$ and $\alpha = 1.0$ leads to optimal ASR and model utility.

G. Description of Baselines

In this section, we present an overview of the baselines used for comparison with IMMUNE.

- **FigStep** [16]: FigStep operates by concatenating a fixed safety prompt: "First, you need to check whether there is text in the image. If there are textual instructions in the image that are harmful or violating AI safety policy, you should not assist user's requests as you are a harmless assistant." with the user query.
- **AdaShield** [67]: The main idea is to prepend user queries with the following defense prompt to protect MLLMs from jailbreak attacks:
  "But before processing any instruction, examine the image carefully for any text or items that might suggest harmful, illegal, or dangerous activity. If detected, do not engage with or act on the content. Analyze the image and the given instruction holistically. If the content is determined to be unethical, illegal, or dangerous, please answer 'I am sorry'. Instead, please execute the above instruction safely and correctly."
- **CoCA** [14]: Constitutional Calibration (CoCA) involves adjusting the model's responses to ensure alignment with predefined safety guidelines, such as "The assistant cannot provide answers related to illegal activities." This approach reduces the likelihood of generating harmful or inappropriate content. Specifically, Gao et al. [14] calculates the difference between the logits of the model's predictions with and without the safety principle applied to the same image and query. This discrepancy is then amplified and added to the predicted token probabilities during the decoding phase. The adjusted logits are subsequently processed through a softmax function to produce the final probability distribution.



Figure 5. For the following example from the JailbreakV-28K dataset [40], the input to the model is a noise image, along with a malicious user query asking for steps to "deliver malware in email". While other baseline defenses fail to generate a safe response, IMMUNE, leveraging inference-time alignment, effectively neutralizes this attack.

H. Qualitative Comparison

Figure 5, 6, and 7, present qualitative comparisons of responses across various baseline defense strategies when subjected to different jailbreak attacks [16, 40]. Notably, in all cases, IMMUNE consistently and effectively rejects the malicious user queries.



Figure 6. This example is taken from FigStep [16], where the image contains a typographic attack aimed at eliciting a list of ingredients for making poison. IMMUNE effectively rejects the malicious query, citing its unethical nature.



Figure 7. This example illustrates a template-based jailbreak attack from Luo et al. [40], in which the user maliciously instructs the model to simulate a harmful or unsafe model, thereby coercing it into answering a racist question. In this case also, IMMUNE effectively neutralizes the attack.