Supplementary Material of "Revisiting Backdoor Attacks against Large Vision-Language Models from Domain Shift"

Organization of the Supplementary Material

We provide a table of contents below to help you better navigate through the content in the supplementary materials.

Section A outlines the construction process for the multimodal shift dataset, which includes question shift, image shift, and answer shift.

Section B details the evaluation methodology for the encompassing model fine-tuning, backdoor attack algorithm, and schematic diagrams.

Section C includes a detailed algorithm of MABA (Multimodal Attribution Backdoor Attack).

Section D and Section E further analyze question and answer domain shifts on the Flickr dataset, reaffirming the consistency of results with those observed on the MS COCO dataset.

Section F elaborates on the specific values of mixed image domain shift to better illustrate the effects under mixed domain attacks.

Section G presents additional results in real-world scenarios, focusing on low poisoning rates and different target labels.

Section H discusses the limitations of this study and potential defenses.

A. Multimodal Domain Shifted Dataset

A.1. Image Shift based on Stable Diffusion Model

Basic steps for image domain shift. We regard image domain shift as an image style transfer task, which is often used to enhance the diversity of data and the scope of applications. To achieve this goal, we employ an advanced stable diffusion model [2]. This model can accept the artistic style specified by the user and change the style of the original image through the built-in algorithm to generate a new image that conforms to the specified style. The image processing process includes four main steps: model selection and loading, image preprocessing, style transfer execution, and image post-processing and saving. In the preprocessing stage, the input image is first decoded and converted into RGB color space and adjusted to a resolution suitable for model processing, such as 512×512 pixels. In the style conversion stage, we use the prompt parameter to specify the desired artistic style and control the strength of the style application by adjusting the strength parameter. Finally, the style-converted image is inversely transformed back to its original size and format and encoded into a Base64 string for subsequent storage and processing.

Style selection and parameter settings. We adopt expressionism style and realism style as the styles of image domain shift. Expressionism used vivid, unrealistic colors and exaggerated forms to express emotions and ideas. Choosing this style can help the model learn how to introduce emotional and personalized elements when generating images, making the generated images more expressive and appealing. The realism style emphasizes faithful reproduction of the real world, paying attention to details and authenticity. Using this style, the model can be trained to perform style conversion while maintaining the natural realism of the image, which is suitable for application scenarios that require a high degree of realism. The clear distinction between these two styles provides the model with the ability to handle different visual styles. By differentially changing the detail processing of the original image domain, these style transfers not only enhance the diversity of the data set but also promote the adaptability and flexibility of the model when dealing with different visual tasks. Specifically, we use the prompt words "vibrant colors, simplified forms, expressive brushwork." and "cold color palette, muted colors, detailed, 8k" to generate expressionistic-style and realist-style domain-shifted images, respectively. We will set strength to 0.5, which means that the strength of the style transfer is medium, which not only retains some characteristics of the original image but also significantly introduces a new artistic style. a) and b) in Fig. 1 respectively visualize the results of the migration of the original image in expressionism and realism styles.

A.2. Text Shift based on Large Language Model

In the task of text domain transfer, we experiment with three existing text generation models: GPT-3.5 Turbo [10], Qwen [1], and LLaMA [13]. Ultimately, we select GPT-3.5 Turbo for its high customizability, fast generation speed, and strong performance.

Question generation. We use the "gpt-3.5-turbo" model

Figure 1. Diffusion model generation image visualization.

with prompts tailored to different tasks. We use the model to generate either detailed or concise questions based on the original questions. This task involves generating and processing 40,000 questions. Due to usage policy constraints, we run four OpenAI accounts in parallel and complete the task within 30 hours.

Answer generation. We also use the "gpt-3.5-turbo" model to generate answers for different questions. For the summary task, we ask the model to condense the original answer into a sentence of no more than 20 words. For the expansion task, we instruct it to rewrite the original answer with an output at least 100 words longer. We process the total of 40,000 answers required, about 40 hours with four parallel accounts.

Generation quality assessment. We manually sample 5

In terms of length distribution, the Expansion Question set shows a broader word count range than the Summary Question set, and it aligns more closely with the Original Question set, especially in the long-tail region. Conversely, the Summary Question set is more concentrated, with reduced overlap with the original.

For answers, the Summary Answer set is more compact and overlaps with the core of the Original Answer set. And the Expansion Answer set displays a wider spread and longer tails, reflecting greater divergence from the original distribution.

B. More Detailed Evaluation Process

B.1. Victim Models Instruction Tuning Details

Model architecture. We mainly consider the representative LVLM OpenFlamingo as the white-box victim model under different training domains. To evaluate the generalizability of the backdoor attacks across different models, we use BLIP-2 and Otter as the black-box models. Except where noted otherwise, we predominantly utilize OpenFlamingo as the victim model. This model based on the CLIP ViT-L/14 visual encoder and the MPT-1B LLM model. In addition, we also tested BLIP-2 with the OPT-2.7B LLM and CLIP ViT-G/14 visual encoder, and Otter with the MPT-1B LLM and CLIP ViT-L/14 visual encoder.

Training details. The AdamW optimizer is used to train



Figure 2. Word count distributions with histogram and KDE for original and generated instruction sets.

our victim LVLMs. It starts with a learning rate of 1e-5 and uses bf16 mixed precision to make the computations go faster. The learning rate follows a cosine annealing schedule, complemented by a warm-up phase that constitutes 1% of the total training steps. To manage the risk of exploding gradients, we apply gradient clipping with a maximum threshold of 1.0. The fine-tuning phase is executed over three epochs with a batch size of 16. Main experiments involve training on an A40 GPU.

B.2. Attack method implementation details.

In case I, we choose BadNets attack [6] and Blended attack [3] for images. We also choose TextBadNets [4] and AddSent attacks [5] for textual instructions. In case II, we consider LowFrequency [15] and WaNet [8] for images; we use StyleBkd [12] for textual instructions. In case III, we use InputAware [9] and GCG [16] for images and textual instructions, respectively. We also introduce the DualKey [14], which simultaneously uses image and text triggers to perform attacks. For a fair comparison, we use the zero-shot classification description template of ImageNet and set "banana" as the classification label for target poisoning answers. We present these attack illustrations in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.

B.2.1. BadNets Attack

Visual sample construction. In the BadNets attack, we chose a trigger of size 16 × 16 and filled the trigger with Gaussian noise generated from a standard normal distribution. The trigger was then randomly affixed to different locations in the image.

B.2.2. Blended Attack

Visual sample construction. In the Blended attack, we chose a trigger image of the same size as the input image, which was generated using a standard normal distribution. Then, we set the transparency of the trigger image to 0.2 and added it to the clean image with the transparency set to 0.8.

B.2.3. LowFrequency Attack

Visual sample construction. In the LowFrequency attack, we leverage low-frequency perturbations to embed the trigger into the visual samples. We used a window size of 32 x 32 for the perturbation, positioning it at the coordinates [31, 31] within the image. The perturbation is applied in the YUV color space, as indicated by the 'yuv flag' being set to True. This ensures that the perturbation impacts the image's luminance and chrominance components, making it less perceptible to the human eye but effective for the attack. The magnitude of the perturbation is set to 50, ensur-



Figure 3. Illustration of various image attack methods in multi-modal settings. Notably, DualKey employs a multi-modal attack strategy, combining triggers in both image and text modalities for enhanced effectiveness.

ing a strong enough signal for the backdoor while maintaining subtlety in the visual domain.

B.2.4. WaNet Attack

Visual sample construction. In the WaNet attack, a warping-based perturbation is embedded into the visual samples to create the backdoor trigger. The perturbation ratio is set to 0.05, indicating that 5% of the pixels in the image will be perturbed. The cross ratio is set to 2, meaning that ρ_n will be 0.1. The warping function is controlled by the parameters s (0.5) and k (4), which determine the strength and complexity of the distortion applied to the image grid, embedding the trigger in a subtle yet effective manner. The grid rescaling parameter is set to 1 to ensure the perturbation grid is appropriately scaled. To enhance the robustness of the attack, random rotations (up to 10 degrees) and random crops (up to 5 pixels) are applied to the images during training.

B.2.5. AddSent Attack

Text question construction. In the implementation of the question backdoor attack, we used a specific trigger sentence, "I view films", as the trigger. This trigger sentence is randomly inserted into the text samples at any position, seamlessly blending into the original text to maintain its fluency and naturalness. When the text with the inserted trigger sentence is fed into the model, the model, due to the injected backdoor, will incorrectly classify it into the target category predetermined by the attacker. The choice of the trigger sentence and the randomness of its insertion make the attack more stealthy, with minimal impact on the model's normal performance.

B.2.6. TextBadNets Attack

Text question construction. In the TextBadNets attack, the construction of text questions involves injecting specific trigger words into the original text. The triggers used in TextBadNets are "cf", "mn", and "bb". These trigger words are randomly inserted into the text at different positions, blending seamlessly with the natural language. This process ensures that the presence of these triggers is associated with the target output, making the backdoor attack effective.



Figure 4. Illustration of various text attack methods in multi-modal settings.

In contrast, TextBadNets* uses an extended set of triggers, including "cf", "mn", "bb", "tq", "qe" and "zx". The addition of extra trigger words in TextBadNets* increases the complexity and variability of the attack, making it harder to detect and more robust. The insertion method remains the same, with the trigger words randomly placed within the text, but the larger set of triggers in TextBadNets* allows for a more versatile and powerful attack, potentially affecting a wider range of text inputs.

B.2.7. StyleBkd Attack

Text question construction. In the StyleBkd attack, text question construction is achieved through text style transfer, specifically adopting the style of "Shakespeare". The process utilizes a GPT-2 based paraphraser, fine-tuned to generate text in the Shakespearean style. The original text is input into this paraphraser, which transforms the sentence's style while preserving its original meaning. This transformation effectively embeds a style-based trigger by altering the textual style to mimic Shakespeare's language. The resulting Shakespearean-style text becomes the transformed text question, which is then employed in adversarial or backdoor attacks. This method exploits the fact that text style is typically irrelevant to the task, making it an effective strategy for compromising NLP models.

B.2.8. GCG Attack

Text question construction. The text question construction involves the generation of adversarial suffixes using the GCG (Greedy and Gradient-based Combination) method. These adversarial suffixes are designed to be appended to a wide range of input queries, with the goal of causing aligned language models to produce objectionable content. The GCG method automates the creation of these suffixes by combining greedy search and gradient-based optimization techniques, effectively identifying suffixes that maximize the likelihood of the model generating an affirmative or undesirable response. By attaching these carefully crafted suffixes to text questions, we can systematically exploit vulnerabilities in the model, turning the generated text into a potent tool for backdoor attacks.

Algorithm 1 Trigger Location Identification in Image Samples

Require: Image $\boldsymbol{x}$, Clean Query-Answer Pair $(\boldsymbol{q}, \boldsymbol{y})$, Poisoned Query-Answer Pair $(\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}, \boldsymbol{y}^p)$

Ensure: Final Trigger Mask $\boldsymbol{m}$

1: **Input:** Construct clean and poisoned instruction sets $Q = [\boldsymbol{q}, \hat{\boldsymbol{q}}]$ and answer sets $Y = [\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{y}^p]$.

2: **Step 1:** Use the attribution algorithm to compute relevance maps r_i for each query-answer pair (Q, Y).

3: **Step 2:** Compute clean mask $\boldsymbol{m}^c$ by summing the top k^* relevance maps for clean conditions $Q = [\boldsymbol{q}, \hat{\boldsymbol{q}}]$ and $Y = [\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{y}^p]$:

$$\boldsymbol{m}^c = \sum_{i=1}^{k^*} r_i^c, \tag{1}$$

$$k^* = \arg\min_k \{\Delta\mathcal{F}(k) \approx 0 \wedge \Delta\mathcal{F}(k+1) \leq \Delta\mathcal{F}(k)\} \tag{2}$$

4: **Step 3:** Similarly, compute poisoned mask $\boldsymbol{m}^p$ by summing the top k^* relevance maps for poisoned conditions $Q = [\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}, \boldsymbol{q}]$ and $Y = [\boldsymbol{y}^p, \boldsymbol{y}]$:

$$\boldsymbol{m}^p = \sum_{i=1}^{k^*} r_i^p, \tag{3}$$

$$k^* = \arg\min_k \{\Delta\mathcal{F}(k) \approx 0 \wedge \Delta\mathcal{F}(k+1) \leq \Delta\mathcal{F}(k)\} \tag{4}$$

5: **Step 4:** Compute the final mask $\boldsymbol{m}$ for poisoning, which covers clean regions while avoiding overlap with poisoned areas:

$$\boldsymbol{m} = \boldsymbol{m}^c - (\boldsymbol{m}^c \cap \boldsymbol{m}^p) \tag{5}$$

6: **Step 5:** Integrate trigger pattern $\boldsymbol{\tau}$ with the original image $\boldsymbol{x}$ using the mask $\boldsymbol{m}$ and blend parameter α:

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{x}} = \boldsymbol{x} \cdot (\boldsymbol{m} == 0) + (1-\alpha) \cdot \boldsymbol{x} \cdot (\boldsymbol{m} > 0) + \alpha \cdot \boldsymbol{\tau} \cdot (\boldsymbol{m} > 0) \tag{6}$$

7: Set $\alpha = 0.5$ for balanced visibility.

8: **Output:** Final poisoned image $\hat{\boldsymbol{x}}$.

B.2.9. InputAware Attack

Visual sample construction. In the InputAware attack, we create perturbations that are sensitive to the input features. The perturbation mask is generated based on the input image, ensuring effective embedding of the trigger. With a mask density of 0.032, the perturbation is sparse yet impactful. The trigger is optimized through multiple training epochs, guided by the specified learning rates for the generator (G), LVLM(C), and mask (M). The use of random rotations (up to 10 degrees) and random crops (up to 5 pixels) adds variability to the training samples, enhancing the robustness of the embedded backdoor.

B.2.10. DualKey Attack

Visual sample construction. In the DualKey attack, attackers optimize visual triggers through a specific description and, during the training phase, add special words to the textual descriptions, using both image and text modalities to trigger the backdoor jointly. We adapted the code of DualKey to the CLIP model for optimizing triggers, with the specific description used for optimization being "This is a yellow banana." The size of the trigger pattern is 16 × 16.

C. Multimodal Attribution Backdoor Attack

We will give the process of finding the trigger's location by the algorithm for multimodal attribution backdoor attacks and visualize the results.

Visual sample construction. We create a trigger pattern composed of yellow ellipses that distinctly contrasts with natural image textures, making it easier for the model to learn the backdoor trigger. Each ellipse is 10 pixels wide and 20 pixels high, with a color of yellow (RGB value of 255, 216, 0) and a transparency set to 128. To minimize the visibility of the trigger, the ellipses are evenly spaced at 30-pixel intervals, forming a repeating semi-transparent yellow grid pattern across the entire image.

To identify the trigger location in image samples, we first combine the clean and poisoned queries Q with their corresponding clean and poisoned answers Y to form query texts, and then compute their similarity with the original image. Here, $Q = [\boldsymbol{q}, \hat{\boldsymbol{q}}]$ represents the clean and poisoned instructions, and $Y = [\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{y}^p]$ represents the corresponding answers. For the clean sample region $\boldsymbol{m}^c$, we treat the clean queries and answers as positive samples, and the poisoned queries and answers as negative samples. For the poisoned sample region $\boldsymbol{m}^p$, the roles are reversed. We use an attribution algorithm to compute the final trigger region, as detailed in Eq. (6) of the main paper, and the process is further illustrated in the following algorithm.

Algorithm 2 Textual Trigger Location Selection and Generation

Require: Input text $\boldsymbol{q}$
Ensure: Text with triggers $\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}$

Step 1: Load Language Model
  Load the pre-trained spaCy language model `en_core_web_sm` for part-of-speech (POS) tagging.
Step 2: Define Trigger Symbols
  Define a set of trigger symbols c:
  - `NOUN`: [$\star$ and $\star$]
  - `VERB`: { and }
  - `ADJ`: [and]
  - `ADV`: < and >
  - `PRON`: (and)

Step 3: Process Input Text
  Pass the input text $\boldsymbol{q}$ through the spaCy model to obtain a document object D with POS tagging.
Step 4: Generate Triggered Text
for each token t_i in document D **do**
  if t_i's POS is in the trigger symbol set c **then**
    Retrieve the corresponding trigger symbols c_i.
    Create a new token with the format: Insert(c_i, t_i).
  else
    Keep the token t_i unchanged.
  end if
end for
Step 5: Output Modified Text
Join all tokens to form the final text $\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}$ with triggers and return it.

Text question construction. The text question construction process involves embedding triggers within key semantic areas of the text by identifying critical keywords using a language model L. These keywords are pinpointed using the function `KeyIndices`(L, q), and special symbols c are inserted in the identified positions to generate the question with the triggered text $\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}$.

D. Generalization with Question Domain Shift

Table 1. Attack performance and generalization when the question domain is shifted under Flickr30K dataset.

Method	Expansion Question			Summary Question		
	ACC	ASR	ASR-G	ACC	ASR	ASR-G
AddSent	50.93	96.93	0.96	50.83	97.53	0.97
TextBadNets	49.74	97.32	0.97	51.88	99.12	0.99
TextBadNets*	50.12	97.98	0.98	52.53	99.45	0.99
StyleBkd	51.16	13.44	0.01	51.44	23.52	0.93
GCG	50.76	99.12	0.99	50.22	99.91	1.00
GCG*	49.89	100.00	1.00	53.77	100.00	1.00

To evaluate the generalization capabilities of textual backdoor attack methods when faced with shifts in the input question domain on the Flickr dataset, attackers implemented text triggers at a 5% poisoning rate using both Expansion and Summary Question Shift instruction sets as part of their experimental framework. Tab. 1 shows a comparison of ASR-G across text backdoor methods. The value of ASR-G closer to 1 indicates superior generalization of attacks. From Tab. 1, we can conclude that: ❶ StyleBkd shows a marked sensitivity to shifts in the input domain, which impacts its generalization capabilities. It has a low ASR-G in the Expansion Question domain (0.01). The reason may be that its dependency on text style adaptation leads to significant discrepancies in performance. ❷ Attack methods that utilize special characters, such as GCG and GCG*, consistently demonstrate robust generalization across different text domains. GCG* achieving a perfect ASR-G score of 1.00 in both question domains. It's true that these methods need the gradient of the white-box model to be optimized, but the lack of special characters in the training datasets helps them keep their high ASR-G values. ❸ Conversely, methods like TextBadNets and TextBadNets* (Case I attacks that are less sensitive to domain variations), while showing high absolute ASR values, also maintain high generalization scores. ❹ AddSent, although not reaching the ASR-G peaks of some specialized character methods, still performs consistently with nearly uniform generalization scores across both domains, indicating a trigger independent of the input distribution that moderately withstands domain shifts.

E. Generalization with Answer Domain Shift

Table 2. Attack performance and generalization when the textual answer domain is shifted under Flickr30K dataset.

Method	Expansion Answer			Summary Answer		
	ACC	ASR	ASR-G	ACC	ASR	ASR-G
TextBadNets	46.30	96.50	0.99	47.80	92.33	0.95
TextBadNets*	46.14	99.12	0.99	47.62	100.00	1.00
GCG	45.81	100.00	1.00	48.13	100.00	1.00
GCG*	46.73	100.00	1.00	48.55	100.00	1.00
AddSent	47.27	99.83	1.00	47.98	99.21	0.99
StyleBkd	43.90	0.49	0.02	46.18	4.99	0.19
Blended	45.07	99.84	1.00	47.57	99.64	1.00
LowFrequency	43.75	95.19	1.00	47.07	92.23	1.00
WaNet	46.42	97.23	1.00	47.59	96.25	1.00
InputAware	47.27	78.81	1.00	48.48	26.11	0.54

We show the impact of answer domain change on text and image backdoor attacks on the Flickr30K dataset in Tab. 2. From Tab. 2, we can find that: ❶ The ASR values generally show high robustness in both the Summary and Expansion domains, which shows that the domain shift has little impact on most text-based backdoor methods. For example, GCG* and GCG maintain high ASR-G scores

Table 3. Attack results across different mixing ratios of the Expressionism instruction set.

Method	20% Expressionism				60% Expressionism				80% Expressionism			
	COCO		Flickr30K		COCO		Flickr30K		COCO		Flickr30K	
	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR
BadNets	88.70	99.52	47.48	99.70	88.26	99.22	46.29	100.00	83.45	98.58	42.49	99.80
Blended	87.89	99.54	45.94	99.50	86.88	99.56	45.73	99.30	86.02	99.66	45.17	99.60
LowFrequency	90.91	90.52	48.84	97.60	86.85	92.72	45.74	95.50	87.19	90.82	44.55	94.40
WaNet	88.30	83.18	46.13	90.30	85.97	45.22	44.65	61.00	87.25	11.40	44.63	20.20
InputAware	86.50	55.08	45.91	41.20	87.52	13.50	45.63	23.90	85.18	23.56	43.37	17.35
DualKey	86.24	1.20	45.85	0.10	87.67	30.14	45.47	44.10	83.10	55.76	42.25	73.80
	90% Expressionism				98% Expressionism				100% Expressionism			
	COCO		Flickr30K		COCO		Flickr30K		COCO		Flickr30K	
	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR
BadNets	85.08	92.63	43.25	96.60	85.38	87.56	44.77	98.30	82.98	7.68	40.52	12.60
Blended	84.93	99.32	43.80	98.70	85.20	97.85	43.25	97.32	83.29	99.20	40.60	98.70
LowFrequency	85.68	90.08	43.95	92.50	84.92	76.72	42.98	62.40	82.91	51.48	41.15	59.20
WaNet	84.27	3.38	42.01	3.10	83.02	0.98	40.04	0.10	83.70	0.84	40.58	0.20
InputAware	86.23	32.03	42.36	9.64	85.28	33.25	42.67	6.34	83.48	32.70	39.68	7.90
DualKey	84.15	63.96	42.98	85.90	83.92	99.34	43.72	99.70	82.62	97.36	37.94	96.90

Table 4. Attack results across different mixing ratios of the Realism instruction set.

Method	20% Realism				60% Realism				80% Realism			
	COCO		Flickr30K		COCO		Flickr30K		COCO		Flickr30K	
	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR
BadNets	89.33	99.50	47.32	99.90	87.31	93.76	45.32	98.90	88.32	91.30	46.06	98.10
Blended	87.17	99.36	44.45	99.20	87.71	99.52	45.34	99.10	87.74	99.32	45.05	98.80
LowFrequency	88.32	90.50	45.35	96.00	89.77	91.66	48.46	94.90	89.65	82.30	47.10	91.00
InputAware	90.30	54.94	48.61	56.90	89.46	6.46	44.86	12.30	89.63	5.44	47.21	1.60
DualKey	87.48	29.14	45.24	36.10	87.19	16.92	44.81	16.00	88.02	91.20	44.19	95.20
Wanet	89.45	88.28	47.31	95.40	90.82	67.12	48.74	73.00	88.60	6.28	47.13	12.30
	90% Realism				98% Realism				100% Realism			
	COCO		Flickr30K		COCO		Flickr30K		COCO		Flickr30K	
	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR	CIDEr	ASR
BadNets	85.21	85.96	43.64	89.50	85.42	44.50	40.30	68.10	82.91	14.32	37.94	22.50
Blended	84.33	98.88	42.62	97.50	85.57	98.74	42.72	97.00	83.57	98.42	39.77	96.90
LowFrequency	85.90	76.70	43.69	88.00	86.74	66.90	42.01	81.20	82.90	1.00	38.41	0.10
InputAware	85.88	5.60	44.41	9.10	86.87	3.10	43.06	2.10	81.77	7.50	38.52	8.90
DualKey	85.52	60.02	44.24	73.50	85.83	1.24	40.90	0.80	84.01	39.94	41.69	48.60
Wanet	87.04	1.66	43.99	1.20	86.54	1.04	41.20	0.70	82.38	0.86	39.31	0.50

(1.00) in all test scenarios. ❷ The generalizability of StyleBkd is significantly reduced. The ASR in the Summary domain is 0.49%, and the ASR in the Expansion domain is 4.99%. This leads to their generalization scores ASR-G being also very low, 0.02 and 0.19 respectively. This shows that the Case II attack StyleBkd is highly sensitive to answer domain shift, resulting in poor generalization. ❸ Case I attacks show strong generalizability, maintaining high ASR values in both domains. For example, the ASR-G of AddSent and Blended is always close to 1.00, which reflects their ability to effectively cope with domain shifts. ❹ For image-based backdoor attacks, the Case III method **InputAware** shows limited generalization, especially under Summary answer variations. Specifically, its ASR is only

26.11% and ASR-G drops to 0.54. This may be because the optimization process of InputAware relies on the model's alignment to target answers. In the Summary domain, answer content is heavily compressed and semantic richness is reduced, weakening the coupling between image triggers and text, and ultimately reducing attack effectiveness.

F. Mixed Image Domain Shift and BadNets Analysis

In this section, we show the generalization performance of six backdoor attack methods at different image domain (Expressionism and Realism) fusion levels. We analyze the reasons for BadNets failure by mixing the self-built instruction tuning set with the original set in various ratios (20%, 60%, 80%, 90%, 98% and 100%). We use CIDEr and ASR as evaluation metrics.

Expressionism dataset. In Tab. 3, the Blended method consistently exhibits high ASR at all mixing ratios, with the value staying around 99%, which indicates its excellent cross-domain generalization ability. BadNets also exhibits high performance at lower mixing ratios (20% and 60%), with the ASR value higher than 98%. BadNets also show high performance at lower mixing ratios (20% and 60%) with ASR values above 98%. However, as the mixing ratio increases to 80%, 90%, and 100%, the performance of BadNets decreases significantly. The ASR drops to 7.68% at 100%. the LowFrequency method shows good performance at mixing ratios as high as 80%, but starts to drop at 98% and then drops sharply at 100%, similar to BadNets. The InputAware and DualKey methods consistently underperform at all mixing ratios. The InputAware and DualKey methods consistently underperform at all mixing ratios, with ASR values remaining low, reflecting their limited generalization capabilities. WaNet shows moderate performance at lower ratios, but drops off significantly above 80%, similar to the trend for BadNets. From Tab. 3, it can be seen that the Blended approach has excellent cross-domain generalization ability, consistently achieving high ASR at all mixed ratios. In contrast, BadNets, while effective at lower ratios, does not generalize well at higher ratios, and in particular, its performance drops off sharply at 100%.

Realism dataset. In Tab. 4, the Blended keep high ASR across all mixing ratios (most values remaining above 98%), demonstrating generalization similar to its general performance in the Expressionism dataset. BadNets shows strong performance at lower ratios (20% and 60%) but exhibits a sharp decline at higher mixing ratios. For instance, BadNets' ASR falls to 14.32% when the mix ratio is at 100%. WaNet, similar to BadNets, starts with moderate ASR but declines significantly at higher mixing ratios (particularly beyond 80%). The LowFrequency performs well at lower ratios but experiences a marked decline at 98% and a very low ASR at 100%. In case III, the InputAware shows poor performance across all mixing ratios, failing to generalize effectively. The DualKey displays inconsistent performance, with moderate ASR at some ratios but very low at others. In conclusion, the Blended proves its robustness, maintaining high ASR across all mixing ratios. BadNets shows a similar trend to the Expressionism dataset, performing well at lower ratios but failing at higher ratios (the mix ratio is at 100%).

These consistent findings across both datasets underscore the limitations of BadNets in attack generalization under severe domain shifts. While BadNets performs comparably to Blended under moderate domain shifts, its sharp performance drop at 100% replacement suggests that the generalizability of Case I attacks may still be influenced by additional factors. This observation motivates a deeper investigation into what limits the generalization of BadNets.

Visual analysis of BadNets. To further analyze the reasons for the failure of the BadNets attack, we utilized the RISE method [11] to visualize the trigger activations of the poisoned model based on the Expressionism Realism instruction set on clean images (third row) and Expressionism Realism instruction data (second row). The first row represents the trigger activations of the poisoned model based on the original instruction set. From Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we can conclude that BadNets can successfully trigger in two different domains. However, it fails to trigger on clean images, resulting in a lower ASR.

By comparing the results of the second and third rows, we can see that although the trigger pattern of BadNets can still attract the model's attention, it is relatively weaker and lacks robustness. The model is more attracted to other contextual information in the image content, with a high response to these elements, leading to the failure of the attack.

G. More Attack Results in Real Scenarios

G.1. Lower Poisoning Rate

Tab. 5 evaluates the performance of multiple backdoor attack methods at low poisoning rates (0.2%, 0.5%, 1%) on the COCO and Flickr30K datasets. The main evaluation metrics are ACC and ASR. From Tab. 5, we conclude the following: ❶ The Blended attack exhibits robust ASR under all settings, reaching 100.0% ASR at a poisoning rate of 1% on Flickr30K. Its ACC remains relatively stable, especially on COCO, indicating that Blended effectively balances attack success and clean utility. ❷ For BadNets, ASR gradually increases with the poisoning rate, showing a significant jump to 100.0% on Flickr30K at 1%. This suggests that BadNets becomes more effective with greater exposure to poisoned data. ❸ MABA and its enhanced variant MABA* demonstrate strong and consistent performance across both datasets. MABA* achieves the highest ASR on Flickr30K even at the lowest poisoning rate, highlighting its improved



Figure 5. BadNets trigger visual analysis for the Expressionism instruction set.

Table 5. Attack results for different attacks at lower poison rates.

Method	0.2%				0.5%				1%			
	COCO		Flickr30K		COCO		Flickr30K		COCO		Flickr30K	
	ACC	ASR	ACC	ASR	ACC	ASR	ACC	ASR	ACC	ASR	ACC	ASR
Blended	91.13	99.48	52.91	98.81	90.30	99.94	53.01	99.86	91.97	99.96	52.8	100.0
BadNets	90.72	81.32	52.34	64.93	92.04	97.48	55.51	96.27	90.71	99.86	53.14	100.0
MABA	90.05	95.32	52.86	94.31	90.99	97.50	53.27	97.19	90.46	98.06	52.93	97.41
LowFrequency	89.57	76.52	53.59	96.25	91.67	93.52	55.36	98.61	91.46	96.35	52.03	99.25
MABA*	91.27	99.98	54.80	100.00	91.65	99.88	53.59	100.0	91.56	99.96	53.15	99.33

generalization over the original version. ❹ The LowFrequency attack is slightly less effective than other methods at lower poisoning rates. However, as the poisoning rate increases, it also achieves high ASR, similar to other attacks. These results show that existing backdoor attacks can still work very well against instruction-tuned models, even when poisoning budgets are low. This makes them a bigger threat in real-world fine-tuning situations.

G.2. Different Poisoning Labels

We explore the effect of different attack labels on the COCO and Flickr30K datasets. We show five labels "banana",

Table 6. Attack performance across various labels, showing uniform attack effectiveness.

Label	COCO		Flickr30K	
	ACC	ASR	ACC	ASR
banana	87.52	96.46	47.87	95.80
chair	87.36	96.34	47.23	95.57
drugs	87.15	96.83	47.87	95.94
bomb	86.93	96.29	47.65	96.13
weapon	87.31	96.75	47.59	95.72



Figure 6. BadNets trigger visual analysis for the Realism instruction set.

"chair", "drug", "bomb" and "weapon" in Tab. 6. From Tab. 6, we can conclude that ❶ the different labels have almost no significant effect on the success rate of the attack. This means that the backdoor attack method is robust and he can effectively build shortcuts between triggers and different labels. This property also further exacerbates its security risk in practical applications.

Table 7. Attack results for LLaVA.

Method	CIDEr	ASR
BadNets	50.15	1.64
Blended	51.37	3.20
WaNet	50.54	1.34
LowFrequency	50.82	1.58
InputAware	50.93	1.48
DualKey	49.67	1.44
WABA	50.23	1.57
WABA*	50.69	1.72

H. Limitations and Potential Defense

Limitations of our study. Although our study identifies two important factors that determine the generalizability of backdoors, the following limitations remain: ❶ Our study focuses on main traditional backdoor attacks rather than more advanced backdoor attack methods. These novel approaches may indirectly increase the generalizability of the attack or reveal other factors affecting generalizability. ❷ Our findings are based on specific experimental setups, such as changing the image domain using a diffusion model. Thus, we further follow ImageNet-C with four realistic domain shifts to evaluate the ASR of three typical attacks. The results in Tab. 8 confirm that ASR is still affected by domain shifts, aligning with the paper's conclusion. However, this may not fully reflect the variability and complexity of real scenarios. Future research should aim to validate these findings on a wider range of experimental conditions and datasets.

Table 8. Backdoor generalization results under representative natural corruptions (ImageNet-C). We report ASR on four corruption types. ↑ indicates higher ASR means better generalization.

Method	**Gaussian Noise↑**	**Motion Blur↑**	**Brightness↑**	**Snow↑**
Blended	0.98	0.95	1.00	0.97
LowFrequency	0.03	0.50	0.14	0.03
InputAware	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.24

Potential Defense. In the main text, we found that Blip-2 is somewhat more difficult to poison. This may be related to the number of parameters adjustable during the LVLMs' instruction tuning process. Therefore, we propose that it is possible to limit the number of fine-tuned parameters of the

model as a defense against existing backdoor attacks. To verify this, we conduct experiments on LLaVA [7] using an attack method with the same parameters. The tunable parameter of the model is only 0.003 B, much smaller than OpenFlamingo's 1.047 B. As shown in Table 7, the ASR of all the attack methods is extremely low, with none of them exceeding 3.2%. This is in contrast to the results observed in the main paper. The results suggest that the minimum trainable parameter space of LLaVA severely limits the model's ability to understand the poisoning data. Backdoor attacks are largely ineffective unless extremely high poisoning rates are employed.

To mitigate the threat of backdoor attacks, we recommend limiting the number of parameters available for tuning during instruction tuning. In addition to this, designing more efficient instruction tuning methods that achieve high performance without the need for extensive parameter modifications will further reduce vulnerability.

References

[1] Jinze Bai, Shuai Bai, Shusheng Yang, Shijie Wang, Sinan Tan, Peng Wang, Junyang Lin, Chang Zhou, and Jingren Zhou. Qwen-vl: A frontier large vision-language model with versatile abilities. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.12966*, 2023. 1

[2] Ali Borji. Generated faces in the wild: Quantitative comparison of stable diffusion, midjourney and dall-e 2. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.00586*, 2022. 1

[3] Xinyun Chen, Chang Liu, Bo Li, Kimberly Lu, and Dawn Song. Targeted backdoor attacks on deep learning systems using data poisoning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.05526*, 2017. 3

[4] Ganqu Cui, Lifan Yuan, Bingxiang He, Yangyi Chen, Zhiyuan Liu, and Maosong Sun. A unified evaluation of textual backdoor learning: Frameworks and benchmarks. In *Proceedings of NeurIPS: Datasets and Benchmarks*, 2022. 3

[5] Jiazhu Dai, Chuanshuai Chen, and Yufeng Li. A backdoor attack against lstm-based text classification systems. *IEEE Access*, 2019. 3

[6] Tianyu Gu, Kang Liu, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, and Siddharth Garg. Badnets: Evaluating backdooring attacks on deep neural networks. *IEEE Access*, 7:47230–47244, 2019. 3

[7] Haotian Liu, Chunyuan Li, Qingyang Wu, and Yong Jae Lee. Visual instruction tuning. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 2024. 12

[8] Anh Nguyen and Anh Tran. Wanet–imperceptible warping-based backdoor attack. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2102.10369*, 2021. 3

[9] Tuan Anh Nguyen and Anh Tran. Input-aware dynamic backdoor attack. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 33:3454–3464, 2020. 3

[10] Long Ouyang, Jeffrey Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida, Carroll Wainwright, Pamela Mishkin, Chong Zhang, Sandhini Agarwal, Katarina Slama, Alex Ray, et al. Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 35:27730–27744, 2022. 1

[11] Vitali Petsiuk, Abir Das, and Kate Saenko. Rise: Randomized input sampling for explanation of black-box models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.07421*, 2018. 9

[12] Fanchao Qi, Yangyi Chen, Xurui Zhang, Mukai Li, Zhiyuan Liu, and Maosong Sun. Mind the style of text! adversarial and backdoor attacks based on text style transfer. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2110.07139*, 2021. 3

[13] Hugo Touvron, Thibaut Lavril, Gautier Izacard, Xavier Martinet, Marie-Anne Lachaux, Timothée Lacroix, Baptiste Rozière, Naman Goyal, Eric Hambro, Faisal Azhar, Aurélien Rodriguez, Armand Joulin, Edouard Grave, and Guillaume Lample. Llama: Open and efficient foundation language models. *CoRR*, abs/2302.13971, 2023. 1

[14] Matthew Walmer, Karan Sikka, Indranil Sur, Abhinav Shrivastava, and Susmit Jha. Dual-key multimodal backdoors for visual question answering. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on computer vision and pattern recognition*, pages 15375–15385, 2022. 3

[15] Yi Zeng, Won Park, Z. Morley Mao, and Ruoxi Jia. Rethinking the backdoor attacks' triggers: A frequency perspective. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV)*, pages 16473–16481, 2021. 3

[16] Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr, J Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043*, 2023. 3