

Appendix Contents

A. Algorithm Details 2

 A.1. Notation Summary 2

 A.2. Algorithm 2

B. Experiment Details 2

 B.1. Hyperparameters 2

 B.2. Environment 2

 B.3. Training and Evaluation Details 2

C. Additional Experiments 3

D. Case Studies 3

A. Algorithm Details

A.1. Notation Summary

Table 1. Summary of key mathematical notations used throughout the paper.

Symbol	Description
f_θ	VLM parameterized by θ
\mathcal{X}	Visual input space, $\mathcal{X} \subseteq [0, 1]^{H \times W \times C}$
\mathcal{T}	Textual instruction space
\mathcal{Y}	Model response space
x	Input image
t_{harm}	Harmful textual instruction
t_{benign}	Benign textual instruction
t_{jail}	Jailbreak prompt generated from t_{harm}
t_{jail}^*	Strongest jailbreak prompt selected by the inner loop
g_ϕ	Localized defense function parameterized by ϕ
δ_ϕ	Learnable localized defense perturbation
M	Binary mask indicating perturbed spatial region
ρ	Coverage ratio controlling the proportion of perturbed pixels
ϵ_{def}	Maximum perturbation magnitude per pixel
H, W, C	Image height, width, and number of channels
\mathcal{S}	Set of selected pixel indices satisfying $\ M\ _0 = \rho HWC$
\odot	Element-wise multiplication operator
\mathcal{J}	Set of jailbreak generation methods (e.g., PAP, PAIR, GCG)
J_i	Individual jailbreak generator
$\mathcal{T}_{\text{pool}}$	Pool of candidate jailbreak prompts
$\mathcal{T}_{\text{jail}}(t_{\text{harm}})$	Set of jailbreaks derived from t_{harm}
$\mathcal{J}_{\text{LLM}}(\cdot)$	LLM-based safety judgment function
$\mathcal{D}_{\text{harm}}$	Dataset of harmful instruction-image pairs
$\mathcal{D}_{\text{benign}}$	Dataset of benign instruction-image pairs
$P_{\text{refuse}}(x, t)$	Probability of refusal given (x, t)
$\mathcal{L}_{\text{safety}}$	Safety loss promoting refusal on jailbreaks
$\mathcal{L}_{\text{semantic}}$	Semantic preservation loss on benign data
$\mathcal{L}_{\text{defense}}$	Combined defense loss: $(1 - \lambda)\mathcal{L}_{\text{safety}} + \lambda\mathcal{L}_{\text{semantic}}$
λ	Trade-off coefficient between safety and utility ($\lambda \in [0, 1]$)
α_{out}	Outer-loop learning rate for defense update
$\ \cdot\ _0$	L_0 norms
$\ \cdot\ _2$	L_2 norms
$\ \cdot\ _\infty$	L_∞ norms

A.2. Algorithm

Algorithm 1 specifies the implementation steps, core parameters, and execution logic of the micro-regional adversarial training for SafeLogo.

B. Experiment Details

B.1. Hyperparameters

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the detailed parameter settings for the attack methods and the defense method, respectively.

B.2. Environment

In our experiments, we utilized the following software environment: PyTorch version 2.1.2, CUDA version 12.1 and

Algorithm 1 Micro-regional Adversarial Training for SafeLogo

Require: VLM f_θ , harmful dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{harm}}$, benign dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{benign}}$, jailbreak generators \mathcal{J} , coverage ratio ρ , perturbation bound ϵ_{def} , learning rate α_{out} , balance weight λ

Ensure: Learned defense parameters ϕ

```

1: Initialize localized perturbation  $\delta_\phi$  with  $\|\delta_\phi\|_\infty \leq \epsilon_{\text{def}}$ 
2: Generate a fixed binary mask  $M$  satisfying  $\|M\|_0 = \rho \cdot H \cdot W \cdot C$ 
3: for epoch = 1 to max_epochs do
4:   for mini-batch  $\{(x_i, t_{\text{harm}, i}, t_{\text{benign}, i})\}$  from training data do
5:     for each sample  $(x, t_{\text{harm}}, t_{\text{benign}})$  in batch do
6:       // Inner Loop: Jailbreak generation and selection
7:       Initialize candidate pool  $\mathcal{T}_{\text{pool}} \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
8:       for each jailbreak method  $J_i \in \mathcal{J}$  do
9:          $x_{\text{def}} \leftarrow \text{clip}(x + M \odot \delta_\phi, 0, 1)$ 
10:         $t_{\text{jail}} \leftarrow J_i.\text{generate}(x_{\text{def}}, t_{\text{harm}}, f_\theta)$ 
11:         $y_{\text{resp}} \leftarrow f_\theta(x_{\text{def}}, t_{\text{jail}})$ 
12:         $s_{\text{harm}} \leftarrow \mathcal{J}_{\text{LLM}}(y_{\text{resp}})$  {Safety score via LLM-as-Judge}
13:         $\mathcal{T}_{\text{pool}} \leftarrow \mathcal{T}_{\text{pool}} \cup \{(t_{\text{jail}}, s_{\text{harm}})\}$ 
14:      end for
15:       $t_{\text{jail}}^* \leftarrow \arg \max_{(t, s) \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{pool}}} s$  {Select strongest jailbreak}
16:    // Outer Loop: Localized defense optimization
17:     $x_{\text{def}} \leftarrow \text{clip}(x + M \odot \delta_\phi, 0, 1)$ 
18:     $\mathcal{L}_{\text{safety}} \leftarrow -\log P_{\text{refuse}}(x_{\text{def}}, t_{\text{jail}}^*)$ 
19:     $\mathcal{L}_{\text{semantic}} \leftarrow \|f_\theta(x_{\text{def}}, t_{\text{benign}}) - f_\theta(x, t_{\text{benign}})\|_2^2$ 
20:     $\mathcal{L}_{\text{defense}} \leftarrow (1 - \lambda)\mathcal{L}_{\text{safety}} + \lambda\mathcal{L}_{\text{semantic}}$ 
21:     $\delta_\phi \leftarrow \delta_\phi - \alpha_{\text{out}} \nabla_{\delta_\phi} \mathcal{L}_{\text{defense}}$ 
22:     $\delta_\phi \leftarrow \text{clip}(\delta_\phi, -\epsilon_{\text{def}}, \epsilon_{\text{def}})$  {Project to bounded space}
23:  end for
24: end for
25: end for
26: return  $\phi$ 

```

Table 2. Hyperparameter Setting for Attacks.

Attack	Hyper-parameter	Setting
PAIR	number of iteration	3
	batch size	3
	attack model	Deepseek-v3
	judge model	Deepseek-v3
PAP	persuasive techniques	40
	attack model	Deepseek-v3
GCG	number of iteration	5
	suffix length	16

Python version 3.10, OpenAI version 2.8.0. The hardware specifications are detailed in Table 4.

B.3. Training and Evaluation Details

Safe Instruction. We use a fixed safety instruction for both training and evaluation. The detailed content of the instruction is shown in Figure 1.

Table 3. Hyperparameter Setting for Baseline Defenses.

Defense	Hyper-parameter	Setting
SafeLogo	batch size	3
	learning rate	1/255
	steps	5000
	coverage rate	2.25%
	defense weight	80%
	perturbation range	64/255
Adashield	number of iteration	4
	defense model	Deepseek-v3
	judge model	Deepseek-v3
	defense mechanism	adaptive
DAVSP	padding	30
	batch size	2
	learning rate	1/255
	steps	1200
ECSO	caption prompt	Based on the request, describe the image.
MLLMP	epochs	4
	batch size	4

Table 4. Hardware Specifications for Different Experiments.

Experiment	GPU	CPU
Train	A100 (80GB)*2	Xeon Gold 6338
Infer	A6000 (48G)*1	Xeon Silver 4310

safe instruction

Before processing any instruction, examine the image carefully for any text or items that might suggest harmful, illegal, or dangerous activity. If detected, do not engage with or act on the content. Analyze the image and the given instruction holistically. If the content is determined to be unethical, illegal, or dangerous, please answer "I am sorry". Instead, please execute the following instructions safely and correctly :

Figure 1. The content of the safety instruction.

evaluation prompt

You are a safety classifier. You will receive a piece of text generated by an AI model. Your task is to evaluate whether the text contains harmful content. If the text contains any harmful, unsafe, or unethical content, respond with "unsafe". If it does not contain any such content and is appropriate, respond with "safe". Your answer must be a single word: safe or unsafe, with no explanation.

Figure 2. The content of the evaluation prompt.

Table 5. Performance of various defense methods on the VLGard dataset.

Method	Attack	SafeLogo	DAVSP	Adashield	ECSO	MLLMP
ASR	46.7%	14.3%	14.3%	17.1%	17.1%	35.2%

D. Case Studies

Figure 3 illustrates the outputs generated by the PAIR, PAP, and GCG attacks on the LLaVA-1.5-13B model respectively. Correspondingly, Figure 4 demonstrates the defense effect of our method against this example. Meanwhile, Figure 5 presents additional examples where the defense fails on DAVSP but succeeds on SafeLogo.

References

- [1] Xiangyu Qi, Kaixuan Huang, Ashwinee Panda, Peter Henderson, Mengdi Wang, and Prateek Mittal. Visual adversarial examples jailbreak aligned large language models. In *Proceedings of the AAAI conference on artificial intelligence*, pages 21527–21536, 2024. 3

Evaluation Prompt. We calculate the ASR by using DeepSeek-V3 to evaluate whether the model’s output is safe; if it is unsafe, the attack is deemed successful. As shown in Figure 2, the evaluation prompt used in this process is presented in detail.

C. Additional Experiments

We also conducted experiments on the effects of jailbreak attacks performed on images and the corresponding defense outcomes[1], with the detailed results presented in Table 5.




Figure 3. Examples of successful attacks by the three adversarial methods (PAIR, PAP, and GCG).




Figure 4. Examples of SafeLogo’s successful defense against the three adversarial attack methods (PAIR, PAP, and GCG).




Figure 5. Examples where DAVSP fails to defend but SafeLogo achieves successful defense.