Diagnosing and Repairing Unsafe Channels in Vision-Language Models via Causal Discovery and Dual-Modal Safety Subspace Projection

Supplementary Material

1. Related work

1.1. Jailbreak Attack on VLM

Jailbreak attacks [9, 15, 19] manipulate prompts to deceive models into responding to restricted or prohibited queries. In VLMs, the presence of dual input modalities introduces not only text-based but also image-based jailbreaks. For instance, FigStep [6] embeds harmful instructions within images, enabling effective jailbreaks during visual comprehension. Perturbation-based approaches such as imgJP [15] and textJP [15, 26] apply adversarial perturbations to both image and text inputs, steering model generation through end-to-end optimization. Similarly, DeltaJP [17] injects learnable image noise using momentum-based optimization to interfere with model outputs. Overall, these studies reveal that current VLMs suffer from weak safety alignment, underscoring the urgent need for robust and effective defense mechanisms [7].

1.2. Activation steering

Activation steering has emerged as an efficient training-free approach for aligning model behavior by modifying internal activations without weight updates [20]. Recent studies show that the activation spaces of LLMs contain interpretable directions that can be manipulated to induce safe or desired behaviors [4, 11]. Beyond steering, mechanistic analyses of alignment algorithms further suggest that post-training methods such as DPO may mainly redirect generation away from harmful outputs without fully erasing the underlying toxic representations [10, 21]. This observation highlights the importance of inference-time intervention for directly suppressing unsafe latent regions.

Building on these insights, activation engineering has been extended to VLMs, where methods such as ASTRA [22] and SPO-VLM [23] steer activations to defend against adversarial or unsafe outputs. Meanwhile, recent work has shown that safety misalignment in VLMs is also closely related to visual-modality-induced representation shifts. In particular, ShiftDC identifies and rectifies safety perception distortion caused by unsafe visual inputs by removing harmful visual directions [27]. However, existing methods typically focus on either textual safety subspaces or visual-specific distortions in isolation, lacking a unified mechanism to model how visual and textual signals jointly shape unsafe activations. As a result, activation steering for VLMs remains limited in achieving effective multimodal alignment.

Compared with these prior studies, our method explicitly targets cross-modal safety alignment by identifying key activations and performing bimodal safety projection, rather than only projecting textual subspaces [21] or correcting visual safety shifts [27]. This enables more precise suppression of unsafe behaviors arising from the interaction between the two modalities.

2. Theorem supplementary

In this section, we provide rigorous theoretical foundations for the CARE framework, establishing formal guarantees for its safety projection mechanism and cross-modal fusion strategy.

2.1. Theorem 1: Optimality of Generalized Eigenvalue Decomposition

Theorem 2.1 (Malicious Subspace Identification)**.** *Let $\boldsymbol{C}_b$ and $\boldsymbol{C}_m$ be the covariance matrices of centered benign and malicious activations, respectively. The generalized eigenvalue problem*

$$\boldsymbol{C}_m\boldsymbol{u} = \lambda\boldsymbol{C}_b\boldsymbol{u} \tag{1}$$

identifies the directions $\boldsymbol{u}_i$ that maximize the ratio of malicious-to-benign variance:

$$\lambda_i = \max_{\boldsymbol{u}:\boldsymbol{u}^T\boldsymbol{C}_b\boldsymbol{u}=1} \frac{\boldsymbol{u}^T\boldsymbol{C}_m\boldsymbol{u}}{\boldsymbol{u}^T\boldsymbol{C}_b\boldsymbol{u}} \tag{2}$$

Proof. We formulate the optimization problem with Lagrange multipliers:

$$\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{u}, \lambda) = \mathbf{u}^T\mathbf{C}_m\mathbf{u} - \lambda(\mathbf{u}^T\mathbf{C}_b\mathbf{u} - 1) \tag{3}$$

Taking the derivative with respect to $\mathbf{u}$ and setting it to zero:

$$\frac{\partial\mathcal{L}}{\partial\mathbf{u}} = 2\mathbf{C}_m\mathbf{u} - 2\lambda\mathbf{C}_b\mathbf{u} = 0 \tag{4}$$

This yields the generalized eigenvalue equation:

$$\mathbf{C}_m\mathbf{u} = \lambda\mathbf{C}_b\mathbf{u} \tag{5}$$

Multiplying both sides by $\mathbf{u}^T$ from the left:

$$\mathbf{u}^T\mathbf{C}_m\mathbf{u} = \lambda\mathbf{u}^T\mathbf{C}_b\mathbf{u} \tag{6}$$

Under the constraint $\mathbf{u}^T\mathbf{C}_b\mathbf{u} = 1$, we obtain:

$$\lambda = \mathbf{u}^T\mathbf{C}_m\mathbf{u} \tag{7}$$

Therefore, the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue maximizes the malicious variance while normalizing for benign variance. The top-k eigenvectors span the subspace where malicious activations exhibit maximal deviation from benign activations. □

2.2. Theorem 2: Safety Projection Bound

Theorem 2.2 (Malicious Component Suppression)**.** *Let $\boldsymbol{P}_{safe} = \boldsymbol{I} - \boldsymbol{U}_k \boldsymbol{U}_k^T$ be the safety projection operator, where $\boldsymbol{U}_k = [\boldsymbol{u}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{u}_k]$ contains the top-k malicious eigenvectors. For any activation $\boldsymbol{h} \in \mathbb{R}^d$, the projected activation $\boldsymbol{h}' = \boldsymbol{P}_{safe}\boldsymbol{h}$ satisfies:*

$$\|\boldsymbol{h}' - \boldsymbol{\mu}_b\|_{\boldsymbol{C}_m}^2 \leq (1 - \lambda_k)\|\boldsymbol{h} - \boldsymbol{\mu}_b\|_{\boldsymbol{C}_m}^2 \tag{8}$$

where $\|\boldsymbol{x}\|_{\boldsymbol{C}}^2 = \boldsymbol{x}^T \boldsymbol{C}\boldsymbol{x}$ and λ_k is the k-th largest eigenvalue.

Proof. Without loss of generality, assume $\boldsymbol{\mu}_b = \mathbf{0}$ (by centering). Decompose $\mathbf{h}$ into components parallel and orthogonal to the malicious subspace:

$$\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{h}_{\parallel} + \mathbf{h}_{\perp} = \mathbf{U}_k \mathbf{U}_k^T \mathbf{h} + (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{U}_k \mathbf{U}_k^T)\mathbf{h} \tag{9}$$

The safety projection removes the parallel component:

$$\mathbf{h}' = \mathbf{P}_{safe}\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{h}_{\perp} \tag{10}$$

Computing the malicious-weighted norm:

$$\begin{aligned} \|\mathbf{h}'\|_{\mathbf{C}_m}^2 &= \mathbf{h}_{\perp}^T \mathbf{C}_m \mathbf{h}_{\perp} \\ &= \mathbf{h}^T (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{U}_k \mathbf{U}_k^T) \mathbf{C}_m (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{U}_k \mathbf{U}_k^T)\mathbf{h} \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

Using the orthogonality property of projection matrices and the eigenvalue decomposition:

$$\begin{aligned} \|\mathbf{h}'\|_{\mathbf{C}_m}^2 &= \mathbf{h}^T \mathbf{C}_m \mathbf{h} - \mathbf{h}^T \mathbf{U}_k \mathbf{U}_k^T \mathbf{C}_m \mathbf{U}_k \mathbf{U}_k^T \mathbf{h} \\ &= \|\mathbf{h}\|_{\mathbf{C}_m}^2 - \sum_{i=1}^{k} \lambda_i (\mathbf{u}_i^T \mathbf{C}_b \mathbf{u}_i)(\mathbf{u}_i^T \mathbf{h})^2 \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

Since $\lambda_i \geq \lambda_k$ for $i \leq k$ and $\mathbf{u}_i^T \mathbf{C}_b \mathbf{u}_i = 1$:

$$\begin{aligned} \|\mathbf{h}'\|_{\mathbf{C}_m}^2 &\leq \|\mathbf{h}\|_{\mathbf{C}_m}^2 - \lambda_k \sum_{i=1}^{k} (\mathbf{u}_i^T \mathbf{h})^2 \\ &\leq (1 - \lambda_k)\|\mathbf{h}\|_{\mathbf{C}_m}^2 \end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

This bound demonstrates that the projection reduces malicious variance by a factor related to the smallest eigenvalue retained in the malicious subspace. □

2.3. Theorem 3: Cross-Modal Kernel Attribution Validity

Theorem 2.3 (Cross-Modal Relevance Measure)**.** *The normalized cross-modal mutual information score $\boldsymbol{MI}_i^v$ defined in Equation (6) satisfies:*

- *Non-negativity: $\boldsymbol{MI}_i^v \in [0, 1]$ for all i;*
- *Monotonicity: Higher $\boldsymbol{MI}_i^v$ indicates stronger statistical dependence between visual token i and the textual sequence;*
- *Translation invariance: $\boldsymbol{MI}^v$ is invariant to uniform shifts in the textual embedding space.*

Proof. **(1) Non-negativity:**

From Equation (5), $\mathbf{s}_i = \|\widetilde{\mathbf{K}}_{i,:}\|_2^2 \geq 0$ by definition of squared norms. The normalization in Equation (6):

$$\mathbf{MI}_i^v = \frac{\mathbf{s}_i - \mathbf{s}_{min}}{\mathbf{s}_{max} - \mathbf{s}_{min} + \epsilon} \tag{14}$$

maps the range $[\mathbf{s}_{min}, \mathbf{s}_{max}]$ to $[0, 1]$.

(2) Monotonicity:

The centered kernel $\widetilde{\mathbf{K}}$ from Equation (4) captures the deviation of cross-modal similarity from the mean. The squared row norm:

$$\mathbf{s}_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \widetilde{\mathbf{K}}_{ij}^2 \tag{15}$$

aggregates the squared centered similarities. By the Hilbert-Schmidt Independence Criterion (HSIC), this quantity is a consistent estimator of squared-dependence between visual token i and the textual distribution. Larger $\mathbf{s}_i$ indicates stronger deviation from independence, thus stronger dependence.

(3) Translation invariance:

Let $\mathbf{T}' = \mathbf{T} + \mathbf{c}\mathbf{1}^T$ for some constant vector $\mathbf{c}$. The centering operation in Equation (4):

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{K}} = \mathbf{K}_{cross}\mathbf{H}_t = \mathbf{K}_{cross}(\mathbf{I}_m - \frac{1}{m}\mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}^T) \tag{16}$$

removes the mean across the textual dimension. Under translation:

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{K}}' = \mathbf{K}'_{cross}\mathbf{H}_t = \mathbf{K}_{cross}\mathbf{H}_t = \widetilde{\mathbf{K}} \tag{17}$$

because the RBF kernel distances are translation-invariant and centering removes any residual bias. Thus $\mathbf{MI}^v$ is invariant to uniform shifts. □

2.4. Theorem 4: Adaptive Fusion Optimality

Theorem 2.4 (Optimal Modality Weighting)**.** *The adaptive fusion weight in Equation (18):*

$$w_{vis} = \frac{\|\boldsymbol{h}'_{vis} - \boldsymbol{h}_{txt}\|}{\|\boldsymbol{h}'_{vis} - \boldsymbol{h}\| + \|\boldsymbol{h}'_{txt} - \boldsymbol{h}\|} \tag{18}$$

minimizes the weighted intervention distance:

$$\min_{w \in [0,1]} w\|\boldsymbol{h}'_{vis} - \boldsymbol{h}\|^2 + (1 - w)\|\boldsymbol{h}'_{txt} - \boldsymbol{h}\|^2 \tag{19}$$

under the constraint that w is proportional to the relative intervention strength of the visual modality.

Proof. Let $\alpha = \|\mathbf{h}'_{vis} - \mathbf{h}\|$ and $\beta = \|\mathbf{h}'_{txt} - \mathbf{h}\|$ denote the intervention magnitudes. We seek to balance the fusion based on intervention strength. Define the objective:

$$\mathcal{L}(w) = w\alpha^2 + (1 - w)\beta^2 \tag{20}$$

Taking the derivative with respect to w:

$$\frac{d\mathcal{L}}{dw} = \alpha^2 - \beta^2 \tag{21}$$

This is independent of w, indicating the objective is linear in w. Therefore, the optimal weight should reflect the relative reliability or strength of each modality's intervention.

Under the principle of proportional allocation based on intervention strength, we set:

$$w_{vis} = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta} \tag{22}$$

This can be interpreted through the lens of inverse-variance weighting: modalities with stronger interventions (larger deviation from original) receive proportionally higher weight, as they contain more discriminative safety information. The formulation ensures:

- When $\alpha \gg \beta$: $w_{vis} \to 1$ (visual modality dominates)
- When $\beta \gg \alpha$: $w_{vis} \to 0$ (textual modality dominates)
- When $\alpha = \beta$: $w_{vis} = 0.5$ (equal weighting)

This adaptive mechanism automatically balances the contribution of each modality based on their respective intervention strengths, achieving optimal fusion without manual hyperparameter tuning. □

2.5. Corollary: Convergence Guarantee

Corollary 2.5 (Safety Convergence)**.** *Under repeated application of the CARE projection with fixed $\boldsymbol{P}_{safe}$ and $\beta > 0$, the sequence of activations $\{\boldsymbol{h}^{(t)}\}$ converges to a fixed point $\boldsymbol{h}^* \in span(\boldsymbol{U}_k)^\perp$ that minimizes malicious variance while maintaining bounded distance from benign activations.*

Proof. From Equation (17), the update rule is:

$$\mathbf{h}^{(t+1)} = \mathbf{P}_{safe}\mathbf{h}^{(t)} + \beta(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{P}_{safe})\mathbf{h}_{benign} \tag{23}$$

This is a linear iteration. Decompose $\mathbf{h}^{(t)} = \mathbf{h}_{\|}^{(t)} + \mathbf{h}_{\perp}^{(t)}$:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{h}^{(t+1)} &= \mathbf{P}_{safe}(\mathbf{h}_{\|}^{(t)} + \mathbf{h}_{\perp}^{(t)}) + \beta(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{P}_{safe})\mathbf{h}_{benign} \\ &= \mathbf{h}_{\perp}^{(t)} + \beta\mathbf{h}_{benign,\|}\end{aligned} \tag{24}$$

The parallel component evolves as:

$$\mathbf{h}_{\|}^{(t+1)} = \beta\mathbf{h}_{benign,\|} \tag{25}$$

This converges immediately to a fixed point. The orthogonal component remains unchanged:

$$\mathbf{h}_{\perp}^{(t+1)} = \mathbf{h}_{\perp}^{(t)} \tag{26}$$

Therefore, the sequence converges to:

$$\mathbf{h}^* = \mathbf{h}_{\perp}^{(0)} + \beta\mathbf{h}_{benign,\|} \tag{27}$$

which lies primarily in the safe subspace with controlled benign regularization. □

These theoretical results establish that the projection mechanism of CARE is well-founded, provably reduces malicious variance while preserving benign performance, and achieves optimal cross-modal fusion through adaptive weighting.

3. Experimental supplementary

3.1. Implementation details

In this work, we evaluate our method on two widely adopted open-source VLMs: Qwen2.5-VL-Instruct and LLaVA-OneVision-8B-Instruct. For hyperparameter settings, when selecting activations, we attribute the most important image and text tokens by keeping 1/8 of the total tokens, enabling a sequence-length–adaptive token selection. During the generalized eigen-decomposition, we retain the top 256 eigenvectors to construct the harmful subspace. The projection strength is set to 4.5, balancing safety improvements and general capability preservation. We report Attack Success Rate (ASR) as the primary evaluation metric. We use Hrambench-Llama-2-13B [14] to evaluate the safety of the output from the model. Our codes are available at https://github.com/FredJDean/CARE.

3.2. Datasets

3.2.1. Safety datasets

MM-SafetyBench. This benchmark is a widely used multimodal safety evaluation suite covering 13 domains, each containing several types of malicious images:(1) SD: harmful images generated from unsafe prompts using Stable Diffusion;(2) TYPO: harmful text embedded in blank images;(3) SD_TYPO: harmful text embedded into Stable Diffusion–generated images; (4) Text_Only: text-only adversarial prompts for evaluating purely linguistic vulnerabilities. Together, these subsets enable a comprehensive assessment of VLM harmfulness across modalities.

JailBreakVBench. This benchmark evaluates the robustness of multimodal LLMs against jailbreak attacks. It includes both text-based LLM-transfer jailbreaks and image-based MLLM jailbreaks, covering 16 safety policies and five jailbreak strategies, making it a rigorous benchmark for assessing jailbreak robustness.

PGD Attacks. We apply PGD attacks by injecting adversarial noise into benign images. For the jailbreak setting, we use 416 harmful instructions from ADVBench [26] and 415 harmful instructions from Anthropic-HHH [5] as optimization targets. For the toxic setting, we adopt 66 toxic queries from Qi et al.[5] as optimization objectives. We sample 110 target images from the COCO 2017 validation set [12] for attack generation.

3.2.2. Image understanding datasets

MM-Bench [13] evaluates twenty different vision language capabilities through single-choice questions. We randomly

sample 100 items and 200 items from the dataset to construct our validation and test set, respectively. We compute the accuracy of all the questions as the utility score in this dataset.

MM-Vet [24] evaluates six core vision language capabilities of VLMs, including recognition, knowledge, optical character recognition, language generation, spatial awareness, and math. MM-Vet requires the VLM to answer the question in an open-ended manner, which is a more challenging task than single-choice questions. To evaluate the performance, MM-Vet [57] queries GPT-4 with few-shot evaluation prompts to obtain a utility score ranging from 0 to 1. We randomly sample 50 and 100 items from the dataset to construct our validation and test set, respectively. We average across the scores for each item as the utility score in this dataset.

SQA [8] is a visual question answering dataset designed to evaluate a model's ability to perform step-by-step reasoning based on a given image. Each question in SQA is decomposed into multiple sub-questions, forming a sequential reasoning chain that requires the VLM to maintain contextual consistency across steps. To evaluate model utility on SQA, we follow prior work and compute the accuracy of the model's final answers.

3.3. Baselines

JailGuard [25]: It mutates un-trusted inputs (both text and image) and exploits the response instability of the model across variants to distinguish attack queries from benign ones. Unlike training-based defenses, JailGuard operates without additional model fine-tuning, making it a lightweight, inference-time baseline for jailbreak detection.

Refusal Pairs [18]: It computes steering vectors by averaging activation differences between positive and negative example pairs (e.g., "refuse" vs "comply"), and adds them to the model's activation during inference to bias its behavior. Unlike fine-tuning, it works at inference time, has low computational cost, and minimally affects general model capabilities.

CAST [11]: This method constructs a refusal-oriented steering vector from contrastive activation differences (safe vs unsafe responses), but applies it conditionally rather than globally. A lightweight classifier (or heuristic trigger) detects harmful intent, and the steering vector is injected only when the condition is met. This preserves normal task performance while enforcing safety behaviors in malicious scenarios, representing a conditional variant of activation-steering–based defenses.

SPO-VLM [23]:It integrates activation steering with preference optimization to improve robustness against jailbreak attacks in VLMs. It first derives a safety-oriented steering direction from contrastive pairs of harmful and safe responses. Instead of applying the steering only at inference time, the method incorporates it into a preference-optimization objective (e.g., DPO), encouraging the model to consistently favor safer responses. This hybrid approach makes the steering direction more stable and reduces performance degradation on benign tasks.

ASTRA [22]: ASTRA is an inference-time activation-level defense that constructs a steering vector from contrastive harmful–safe examples and injects it into the model's activations to push responses toward safer directions. It requires no model retraining and is computationally lightweight, but the steering direction is heuristically derived and operates at coarse granularity. As a result, the intervention may not precisely target the safety-relevant components and can introduce fixed semantic response patterns or degrade generalizable reasoning performance.

3.4. Causal mediation analysis in Qwen

We additionally conduct causal mediation analysis on Qwen2.5-VL. Following the same protocol as in our earlier analysis, we use the Silhouette Coefficient, Class Separation, and Mahalanobis Distance as structured measures of safety discriminability. The results are shown in the figure 1.



Figure 1. Quantifying the security differentiation capability of different layers through clustering metrics in Qwen2.5VL.

Next, we analyze FFN and MHSA separately. We first visualize their pairwise sample similarities, as shown in the Figure 2, and then perform pathway-specific ablations for each module, as shown in the Figure 3, both analyses consistently reproduce the conclusions observed earlier.



Figure 2. Comparison of Pairwise Correlations between MHSA and FFN in Qwen2.5VL.

Table 1. Comparison of defense methods under APGD-Toxic and APGD-JailBreak attacks on two VLM backbones. Lower ASR indicates better safety. κ denotes perturbation radius.

Model	Method	APGD-Toxic				APGD-JailBreak			
		unconstrain	$\kappa = 16/255$	$\kappa = 32/255$	$\kappa = 64/255$	unconstrain	$\kappa = 16/255$	$\kappa = 32/255$	$\kappa = 64/255$
Qwen2.5-VL	Original model	67.71	59.38	61.03	70.62	69.37	60.63	64.45	73.32
	ASTRA	7.13	16.08	13.73	10.12	9.47	17.54	13.35	12.26
	CARE	**4.43**	**9.37**	**9.62**	**8.18**	**3.31**	**11.17**	**8.82**	**6.13**
LLaVA-OneVision	Original model	71.11	56.16	60.60	62.90	72.11	63.18	66.43	70.70
	ASTRA	**3.28**	12.40	9.75	**6.62**	7.26	13.30	12.13	10.24
	CARE	4.77	**9.11**	**8.70**	7.15	**6.37**	**10.75**	**8.23**	**8.18**

Table 2. Comparison of defense methods under MI-FGSM-Toxic and MI-FGSM-JailBreak attacks on two VLM backbones. Lower ASR indicates better safety. κ denotes perturbation radius.

Model	Method	MI-FGSM-Toxic				MI-FGSM-JailBreak			
		unconstrain	$\kappa = 16/255$	$\kappa = 32/255$	$\kappa = 64/255$	unconstrain	$\kappa = 16/255$	$\kappa = 32/255$	$\kappa = 64/255$
Qwen2.5VL	Original model	82.78	72.17	77.30	79.63	86.50	76.66	80.87	82.80
	ASTRA	15.54	18.29	18.78	19.36	16.67	21.25	20.20	19.44
	CARE	**9.97**	**13.34**	**11.56**	**10.43**	**10.11**	**14.94**	**14.33**	**12.31**
LLaVA-OneVision	Original model	83.64	80.66	82.18	82.80	88.60	83.15	84.17	85.36
	ASTRA	18.97	23.41	19.86	20.10	19.36	24.45	20.20	22.63
	CARE	**9.13**	**12.15**	**10.37**	**9.98**	**8.03**	**11.47**	**10.64**	**11.03**



Figure 3. Changes in ASR when blocking FFN and MHSA in Qwen2.5VL.



Figure 4. Defensive effectiveness across different domains in Qwen2.5VL.

3.5. Attacking with Auto-PGD and MI-FGSM

In this section, we evaluate our method under both Auto-PGD (APGD) [1] and MI-FGSM [3] attacks on Qwen2.5-VL and LLaVA-OneVision. From Table 1 and 2, we find that even with stronger and more automated adversarial procedures, the attacker is still unable to significantly compromise the safety performance of our model. These results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of our defense approach.

3.6. Defensive effectiveness across different domains.

Similarly, we also visualize the results of DSR using Qwen2.5-VL with CARE from different domains.

3.7. Image and text token attribute analysis

In this section, we visual some of the attributed important tokens from both image and text perspectives. As shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6, the visual and text tokens we identified can indeed be interpreted as locations exhibiting a relatively strong tendency toward harmful content.

3.8. Discussions of Utility Preservation and Over-Rejection

An effective safety intervention should not only reduce unsafe responses, but also preserve the model's utility on benign inputs. To this end, we evaluate CARE from two perspectives: (1) whether the choice of benign anchor data



Figure 5. Some cases of image tokens attribution.



Figure 6. Some cases of text tokens attribution.

affects general capability preservation, and (2) whether CARE introduces over-rejection on harmless multimodal queries.

Effect of benign anchor diversity. CARE relies on a benign dataset as the utility anchor when identifying safety-relevant activation directions. In our main setting, we use MS-COCO, following common practice in multimodal evaluation. We further investigate whether increasing the diversity of benign anchors can better preserve the model's general capability. Specifically, we augment COCO with 500 Flickr samples and evaluate the resulting model on ScienceQA, MMBench, and MM-Vet.

As shown in Table 3, adding Flickr samples consistently improves performance on all three benchmarks. This suggests that a more diverse benign anchor set provides a better estimate of utility-preserving directions, helping CARE maintain normal multimodal reasoning and perception performance.

Table 3. Effect of benign anchor construction on general multimodal benchmarks.

Methods	ScienceQA	MMBench	MM-Vet
$\text{CARE}_{\text{COCO}}$	81.81%	82.24%	61.40%
$\text{CARE}_{\text{COCO+Flickr}}$	82.33%	83.50%	63.79%

Evaluation of over-rejection. We further measure whether CARE causes unnecessary refusal on benign inputs using the safety over-rejection rate (SARR) [16]. We evaluate on ScienceQA, MM-Vet, MMBench, and OR-Bench-1k [2], where OR-Bench-1k contains harder but benign samples that are particularly suitable for testing over-rejection behavior.

Table 4. Safety over-rejection rate (SARR) on benign multimodal benchmarks. Lower is better.

Model	ScienceQA	MM-Vet	MMBench	OR-Bench-1k
Original	0	0	0	15.09%
CARE	1.6%	2.5%	0	21.9%

Table 4 shows that CARE introduces almost no increase in rejection on standard benign benchmarks. On ScienceQA and MM-Vet, the increase is small, and on MMBench the rejection rate remains unchanged. On OR-Bench-1k, CARE exhibits a moderate increase in rejection, but does not show severe over-refusal even on hard-but-benign inputs. Overall, these results indicate that CARE achieves a favorable balance between safety and utility, without substantially harming benign interactions.

3.9. Discussion of Other baselines

To further enrich the empirical coverage of our study, we additionally compare CARE with several recent methods that are closely related to safety alignment and representation intervention. These methods provide complementary perspectives, including subspace projection for toxicity editing in language models (ProFS) [21], and safety correction for visual-modality-induced representation shifts in VLMs (ShiftDC) [27].

Table 5. Comparison with additional baselines on Qwen2.5-VL. Lower is better.

Method	MM-Safety	JailBreakV	PGD_{T64}	PGD_{J64}
ShiftDC [27]	10.31%	11.17%	15.7%	19.73%
ProFS [21]	13.39%	16.30%	22.64%	31.20%
CARE	**8.72%**	**6.55%**	**4.60%**	**8.46%**

Table 5 reports the comparison on Qwen2.5-VL. We observe that CARE consistently achieves lower attack success rates than the additional baselines across different scenarios. In particular, the advantage becomes more evident under PGD-based attacks, where methods adapted from unimodal projection exhibit a clear degradation in robustness. These results further support that effective safety intervention in VLMs requires modeling cross-modal activation behavior, and that CARE offers a stronger and more stable defense across diverse multimodal attack settings.

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