

–Supplementary Material–  
**G2L: Semantically Aligned and Uniform Video Grounding  
via Geodesic and Game Theory**

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## A. Overview

In this supplementary material, we present the following.

- Axiomatic Properties of Shapley Value (Section B).
- Proof of Equation 10 (Section C).

## B. Axiomatic Properties of Shapley Value

In this section, we mainly introduce the axiomatic properties of Shapley value. Weber *et al.* [1] have proved that Shapley value is the unique metric that satisfies the following axioms: *Linearity*, *Symmetry*, *Dummy*, and *Efficiency*.

**Linearity Axiom.** If two independent games  $u$  and  $v$  can be linearly merged into one game  $w(\mathcal{U}) = u(\mathcal{U}) + v(\mathcal{U})$ , then the Shapley value of each player  $i \in \mathcal{N}$  in the new game  $w$  is the sum of Shapley values of the player  $i$  in the game  $u$  and  $v$ , which can be formulated as:

$$\phi_w(i|\mathcal{N}) = \phi_u(i|\mathcal{N}) + \phi_v(i|\mathcal{N}) \quad (1)$$

**Symmetry Axiom.** Considering two players  $i$  and  $j$  in a game  $v$ , if they satisfy:

$$\forall \mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{N} \setminus \{i, j\}, v(\mathcal{U} \cup \{i\}) = v(\mathcal{U} \cup \{j\}) \quad (2)$$

then  $\phi_v(i|\mathcal{N}) = \phi_v(j|\mathcal{N})$ .

**Dummy Axiom.** The dummy player is defined as a player without interaction with other players. Formally, if a player  $i$  in a game  $v$  satisfies:

$$\forall \mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{N} \setminus \{i\}, v(\mathcal{U} \cup \{i\}) = v(\mathcal{U}) + v(\{i\}) \quad (3)$$

then this player is defined as the dummy player. In this way, the dummy player  $i$  has no interaction with other players, *i.e.*  $v(\{i\}) = \phi_v(i|\mathcal{N})$ .

**Efficiency Axiom.** The efficiency axiom ensures that the overall reward can be assigned to all players, which can be formulated as follows:

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \phi_v(i) = v(\mathcal{N}) - v(\emptyset) \quad (4)$$

## C. Proof of Equation 10

In this section, we provide detailed proof for Equation 10 in Section 3.5.2. The semantic Shapley interaction between moment  $x$  and query  $y$  in video  $V_i$  can be decomposed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak{J}([\mathcal{H}_{xy}^i]) &= \phi([\mathcal{H}_{xy}^i] | \mathcal{H}^i \setminus \mathcal{H}_{xy}^i \cup \{[\mathcal{H}_{xy}^i]\}) \\ &\quad - \phi(\mathbf{h}_{ix}^V | \mathcal{H}^i \setminus \mathcal{H}_{xy}^i \cup \{\mathbf{h}_{ix}^V\}) \\ &\quad - \phi(\mathbf{h}_{iy}^Q | \mathcal{H}^i \setminus \mathcal{H}_{xy}^i \cup \{\mathbf{h}_{iy}^Q\}) \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \mathbb{E}_C \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{\substack{u \subseteq \mathcal{H}^i \setminus \mathcal{H}_{xy}^i \\ |\mathcal{U}|=C}} [f(\mathcal{U} \cup \mathcal{H}_{xy}^i) - f(\mathcal{U})] \right\} \\ &\quad - \mathbb{E}_C \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{\substack{u \subseteq \mathcal{H}^i \setminus \mathcal{H}_{xy}^i \\ |\mathcal{U}|=C}} [f(\mathcal{U} \cup \{\mathbf{h}_{ix}^V\}) - f(\mathcal{U})] \right\} \\ &\quad - \mathbb{E}_C \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{\substack{u \subseteq \mathcal{H}^i \setminus \mathcal{H}_{xy}^i \\ |\mathcal{U}|=C}} [f(\mathcal{U} \cup \{\mathbf{h}_{iy}^Q\}) - f(\mathcal{U})] \right\} \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \mathbb{E}_C \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{\substack{u \subseteq \mathcal{H}^i \setminus \mathcal{H}_{xy}^i \\ |\mathcal{U}|=C}} [f(\mathcal{U} \cup \mathcal{H}_{xy}^i) - f(\mathcal{U} \cup \{\mathbf{h}_{ix}^V\}) \right. \\ &\quad \left. - f(\mathcal{U} \cup \{\mathbf{h}_{iy}^Q\}) + f(\mathcal{U})] \right\} \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

## References

- [1] Robert J Weber. Probabilistic values for games. *The Shapley Value. Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley*, pages 101–119, 1988. 1