

# Supplementary Material

## FLIP: Cross-domain Face Anti-spoofing with Language Guidance

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In this supplementary material, we provide the experimental results for extending the FLIP framework to the 5-shot setting in section 1. In section 2, we provide the results of the statistical significance test. In section 3, we compare the computational complexity and network parameters between all the methods in the FLIP framework. In section 4, we present the results of evaluating on unseen spoof type.

### 1. Performance of FLIP in 5-shot setting

Following [4], we evaluate the FLIP framework under the 5-shot setting, where 5 labeled samples from the target domain are available during training to help bridge the domain gap. Tables 1, 2, and 3 report the cross-domain 0-shot and 5-shot performance of Protocol 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

**5-shot performance in Protocol 1:** We observe that all the 3 methods from the FLIP framework outperform the baseline 5-shot performance. Notably, for the O protocol (where the target samples have higher image resolution and are 4 times larger than all the source domains combined), we observe a large HTER gain of +3.85%. This demonstrates that our method is able to effectively adapt to larger unknown domains with very few samples ( $\approx 0.16\%$  of target domain samples in O).

**5-shot performance in Protocol 2:** Similar to Protocol 1, we observe that our framework outperforms the baseline 5-shot methods by a huge margin of +2.43% in terms of average HTER. Notably, for the C and S protocols (which contain more than 1000 identities and have large illumination variations), we observe HTER gains of +3.87% and +5.4% respectively. This demonstrates the effectiveness of our method in adopting to unknown distributions containing diverse samples, with just a few labeled samples (0.08% for C and 0.1% for S).

**5-shot performance in Protocol 3:** To make a fair comparison, we implement the baseline ViTAF\* method [4] and

extend it to Protocol 3 under the 5-shot setting. We observe that the performance of the FLIP framework in the 5-shot setting outperforms its 0-shot counterpart. Additionally, the 5-shot FLIP framework also outperforms 5-shot ViTAF\* by a margin of +2.26% (HTER). This corroborates our previous observations on our approach’s effectiveness in adapting to unknown domains with a few labeled samples.

### 2. Statistical Significance Test

Most prior works in cross-domain FAS simply report the best result over a single trial. However, a fair comparison of different methods is possible only when the statistical variations are taken into account. Hence, we run each of our experiments 5 times with different random seeds and report the mean and standard deviation of all the metrics in Tables 1, 2, and 3. For each of the three protocols, we observe that the standard deviation of the proposed method is low, indicating stable performance across multiple runs.

Furthermore, for Protocol 1 and Protocol 2, we perform a one-sided pair-wise t-test to evaluate whether the proposed method outperforms the baseline. Specifically, we compare the proposed FLIP-MCL against ViT in the 0-shot setting and against ViTAF\* [4] in the 5-shot setting. The null hypothesis is that there is no statistically significant difference between FLIP-MCL and the baseline, while the alternate hypothesis is that FLIP-MCL is better. In Protocol 1, we find that the null hypothesis is rejected in three out of four scenarios, failing only for M (for both the 0-shot and 5-shot setting). For Protocol 2, the null hypothesis is rejected for all three scenarios in the 0-shot setting. However, for the 5-shot setting, the null hypothesis is rejected for two out of three scenarios failing only in W. These results clearly demonstrate that FLIP-MCL is superior to the baseline methods and the better generalization performance is not due to cherry picking of best trials.

Table 1. Extending evaluation of cross-domain performance in Protocol 1 from 0-shot to 5-shot. We evaluate between MSU-MFSD (M), CASIA-MFSD (C), Replay Attack (I), and OULU-NPU (O). We run each experiment 5 times under different seeds and report the mean HTER, AUC, and TPR@FPR=1%, along with their standard deviation (shown in brackets under the mean scores).

Method	OCI → M			OMI → C			OCM → I			ICM → O			Avg.	
	HTER	AUC	TPR@FPR=1%	HTER	AUC	TPR@FPR=1%	HTER	AUC	TPR@FPR=1%	HTER	AUC	TPR@FPR=1%	HTER	
0-shot	MADDG (CVPR' 19) [12]	17.69	88.06	–	24.50	84.51	–	22.19	84.99	–	27.98	80.02	–	23.09
	MDDR (CVPR' 20) [17]	17.02	90.10	–	19.68	87.43	–	20.87	86.72	–	25.02	81.47	–	20.64
	NAS-FAS (TPAMI' 20) [21]	16.85	90.42	–	15.21	92.64	–	11.63	96.98	–	13.16	94.18	–	14.21
	RFMeta (AAAI' 20) [13]	13.89	93.98	–	20.27	88.16	–	17.30	90.48	–	16.45	91.16	–	16.97
	D <sup>2</sup> AM (AAAI' 21) [1]	12.70	95.66	–	20.98	85.58	–	15.43	91.22	–	15.27	90.87	–	16.09
	DRDG (IJCAI' 21) [11]	12.43	95.81	–	19.05	88.79	–	15.56	91.79	–	15.63	91.75	–	15.66
	Self-DA (AAAI' 21) [19]	15.40	91.80	–	24.50	84.40	–	15.60	90.10	–	23.10	84.30	–	19.65
	ANRL (ACM MM' 21) [10]	10.83	96.75	–	17.85	89.26	–	16.03	91.04	–	15.67	91.90	–	15.09
	FGHV (AAAI' 21) [9]	9.17	96.92	–	12.47	93.47	–	16.29	90.11	–	13.58	93.55	–	12.87
	SSDG-R (CVPR' 20) [5]	7.38	97.17	–	10.44	95.94	–	11.71	96.59	–	15.61	91.54	–	11.28
	SSAN-R (CVPR' 22) [20]	6.67	98.75	–	10.00	96.67	–	8.88	96.79	–	13.72	93.63	–	9.80
	PatchNet (CVPR' 22) [15]	7.10	98.46	–	11.33	94.58	–	13.40	95.67	–	11.82	95.07	–	10.90
	GDA (ECCV' 22) [23]	9.20	98.00	–	12.20	93.00	–	10.00	96.00	–	14.40	92.60	–	11.45
0-shot	DiVT-M (WACV' 23) [8]	2.86	99.14	–	8.67	96.62	–	3.71	99.29	–	13.06	94.04	–	7.07
	ViT (ECCV' 22) [4]	1.58	99.68	96.67	5.70	98.91	88.57	9.25	97.15	51.54	7.47	98.42	69.30	6.00
0-shot	FLIP-V	3.79 (1.40)	99.31 (0.31)	87.99 (6.09)	1.27 (0.85)	99.75 (0.18)	95.85 (5.53)	4.71 (2.39)	98.80 (0.85)	75.84 (16.53)	4.15 (0.56)	98.76 (0.40)	66.47 (14.97)	3.48 (1.30)
	FLIP-IT	5.27 (1.3)	98.41 (0.60)	79.33 (10.93)	0.44 (0.27)	99.98 (0.02)	99.86 (0.29)	2.94 (1.3)	99.42 (0.43)	84.62 (15.14)	3.61 (0.53)	99.15 (0.19)	84.76 (7.62)	3.06 (0.80)
	FLIP-MCL	4.95 (1.01)	98.11 (0.50)	74.67 (5.81)	0.54 (0.22)	99.98 (0.01)	100.00 (0.00)	4.25 (0.31)	99.07 (0.17)	84.62 (5.35)	2.31 (0.46)	99.63 (0.12)	92.28 (3.37)	3.01 (0.50)
5-shot	ViT (ECCV' 22) [4]	3.42	98.60	95.00	1.98	99.75	94.00	2.31	99.75	87.69	7.34	97.77	66.90	3.76
	VITAF* (ECCV' 22) [4]	2.92	99.62	91.66	1.40	99.92	98.57	1.64	99.64	91.53	5.39	98.67	76.05	3.31
5-shot	FLIP-V	1.89 (0.63)	99.67 (0.13)	94.66 (3.39)	1.01 (0.67)	99.84 (0.14)	96.56 (5.48)	1.68 (0.69)	99.47 (0.38)	75.53 (22.07)	2.27 (0.65)	99.62 (0.15)	93.23 (5.42)	1.72 (0.66)
	FLIP-IT	2.63 (0.78)	99.55 (0.10)	93.00 (3.71)	0.46 (0.29)	99.97 (0.02)	99.86 (0.29)	1.18 (0.26)	99.83 (0.06)	96.15 (1.95)	3.07 (0.55)	99.30 (0.06)	83.15 (3.00)	1.83 (0.47)
	FLIP-MCL	3.42 (0.16)	99.34 (0.13)	82.67 (7.35)	0.63 (0.06)	99.98 (0.01)	100.00 (0.00)	1.52 (0.09)	99.86 (0.06)	97.23 (1.04)	1.54 (0.30)	99.81 (0.06)	96.37 (2.22)	1.77 (0.15)

Table 2. Extending evaluation of cross-domain performance in Protocol 2 from 0-shot to 5-shot. We evaluate CASIA-SURF (S), CASIA-CeFA (C), and WMCA (W). We run each experiment 5 times under different seeds and report the mean HTER, AUC, and TPR@FPR=1%, along with their standard deviation (shown in brackets under the mean scores).

Method	CS → W			SW → C			CW → S			Avg.	
	HTER	AUC	TPR@FPR=1%	HTER	AUC	TPR@FPR=1%	HTER	AUC	TPR@FPR=1%	HTER	
0-shot	ViT (ECCV' 22) [4]	7.98	97.97	73.61	11.13	95.46	47.59	13.35	94.13	49.97	10.82
0-shot	FLIP-V	6.13 (2.24)	97.84 (1.54)	50.26 (25.05)	10.89 (1.93)	95.82 (1.27)	53.93 (8.27)	12.48 (1.26)	94.43 (0.97)	53.00 (6.27)	9.83 (1.35)
	FLIP-IT	4.89 (0.85)	98.65 (0.48)	59.14 (14.63)	11.04 (0.46)	96.48 (0.56)	59.4 (5.48)	15.68 (0.89)	91.83 (0.75)	43.27 (5.93)	10.2 (0.55)
	FLIP-MCL	4.46 (1.10)	99.16 (0.31)	83.86 (6.62)	9.66 (0.50)	96.69 (0.87)	59.00 (8.87)	11.71 (0.45)	95.21 (0.38)	57.98 (2.18)	8.61 (0.51)
5-shot	ViT (ECCV' 22) [4]	4.30	99.16	83.55	7.69	97.66	68.33	12.26	94.40	42.59	6.06
	VITAF* (ECCV' 22) [4]	2.91	99.71	92.65	6.00	98.55	78.56	11.60	95.03	60.12	5.12
5-shot	FLIP-V	0.69 (0.28)	99.96 (0.05)	99.42 (0.52)	3.68 (1.32)	99.38 (0.44)	85.87 (7.05)	7.44 (0.36)	97.62 (0.27)	76.11 (0.59)	2.95 (0.49)
	FLIP-IT	0.80 (0.44)	99.96 (0.05)	98.67 (1.40)	3.19 (0.16)	99.44 (0.11)	88.80 (4.44)	7.63 (0.60)	97.42 (0.38)	71.6 (3.49)	2.90 (0.30)
	FLIP-MCL	2.43 (0.78)	99.67 (0.19)	95.16 (2.4)	2.13 (0.75)	99.74 (0.13)	93.93 (3.64)	6.2 (0.53)	98.11 (0.15)	79.44 (1.29)	2.69 (0.51)

Table 3. Extending evaluation of cross-domain performance in Protocol 3 from 0-shot to 5-shot. We evaluate all the 12 different combinations between MSU-MFSD (M), CASIA-MFSD (C), Replay Attack (I), and OULU-NPU (O). We run each experiment 5 times under different seeds and report the mean HTER along with their standard deviation (shown in brackets under the mean scores).

Method	C → I	C → M	C → O	I → C	I → M	I → O	M → C	M → I	M → O	O → C	O → I	O → M	Avg.	
0-shot	ADDA (CVPR' 17) [14]	41.8	36.6	-	49.8	35.1	-	39.0	35.2	-	-	-	39.6	
	DRCN (ECCV' 16) [2]	44.4	27.6	-	48.9	42.0	-	28.9	36.8	-	-	-	38.1	
	DupGAN (CVPR' 18) [3]	42.4	33.4	-	46.5	36.2	-	27.1	35.4	-	-	-	36.8	
	KSA (TIFS' 18) [7]	39.3	15.1	-	12.3	33.3	-	9.1	34.9	-	-	-	24.0	
	DR-UDA (TIFS' 20) [18]	15.6	9.0	28.7	34.2	29.0	38.5	16.8	3.0	30.2	19.5	25.4	27.4	23.1
	MDDR (CVPR' 20) [17]	26.1	20.2	24.7	39.2	23.2	33.6	34.3	8.7	31.7	21.8	27.6	22.0	26.1
	ADA (ICB' 19) [16]	17.5	9.3	29.1	41.5	30.5	39.6	17.7	5.1	31.2	19.8	26.8	31.5	25.0
	USDAN-Un (PR' 21) [6]	16.0	9.2	-	30.2	25.8	-	13.3	3.4	-	-	-	-	16.3
	GDA (ECCV' 22) [23]	15.10	5.8	-	29.7	20.8	-	12.2	2.5	-	-	-	-	14.4
CDFTN-L (AAAI' 23) [22]	1.7	8.1	29.9	11.9	9.6	29.9	8.8	1.3	25.6	19.1	5.8	6.3	13.2	
0-shot	FLIP-V	15.08 (4.60)	13.73 (4.81)	12.34 (4.41)	4.30 (2.41)	9.68 (1.62)	7.87 (1.39)	0.56 (0.46)	3.96 (0.77)	4.79 (0.98)	2.09 (0.63)	5.01 (1.41)	6.00 (1.69)	7.12 (2.10)
	FLIP-IT	12.33 (2.24)	15.18 (2.40)	7.98 (2.73)	1.12 (0.30)	8.37 (2.95)	6.98 (1.14)	0.19 (0.26)	5.21 (2.57)	4.96 (0.75)	0.16 (0.22)	4.27 (1.53)	5.63 (1.61)	6.03 (1.55)
	FLIP-MCL	10.57 (2.94)	7.15 (1.4)	3.91 (0.47)	0.68 (0.05)	7.22 (2.15)	4.22 (0.37)	0.19 (0.20)	5.88 (1.38)	3.95 (0.42)	0.19 (0.26)	5.69 (1.42)	8.40 (1.09)	4.84 (1.01)
ViTAF*	4.98 (0.66)	4.38 (0.80)	10.85 (1.31)	2.55 (0.34)	5.08 (0.95)	8.63 (0.97)	1.59 (0.20)	1.79 (0.13)	7.92 (0.71)	1.65 (0.36)	3.4 (0.71)	4.4 (0.73)	4.77 (0.66)	
5-shot	FLIP-V	3.37 (1.23)	2.27 (1.19)	2.96 (0.68)	0.79 (0.26)	2.37 (1.26)	3.75 (0.92)	0.42 (0.30)	2.38 (0.34)	2.76 (0.47)	0.35 (0.29)	1.62 (0.34)	2.10 (0.68)	2.10 (0.66)
	FLIP-IT	4.11 (0.74)	5.22 (0.57)	4.20 (0.59)	0.42 (0.25)	2.22 (0.79)	3.20 (0.33)	0.40 (0.33)	2.31 (0.65)	3.21 (0.46)	0.16 (0.22)	2.45 (0.55)	3.78 (0.73)	2.64 (0.50)
	FLIP-MCL	4.18 (0.60)	5.27 (0.53)	2.48 (0.53)	0.65 (0.06)	3.68 (0.53)	2.56 (0.42)	0.19 (0.20)	1.74 (0.29)	2.43 (0.26)	0.23 (0.23)	2.58 (0.59)	4.10 (1.25)	2.51 (0.45)

Table 4. Computational complexity analysis for all the methods in the FLIP framework compared with the baseline methods.

Method	Training				Inference		Inference Time (seconds/frame)
	Image Encoder		Text Encoder + Proj		Parameters	FLOPs	
	Parameters	FLOPs	Parameters	FLOPs			
ViT (ECCV' 22)	86.19M	17.58G	-	-	86.19M	17.58G	0.007
ViTAF* (ECCV' 22)	92.02M	18.68G	-	-	92.02M	18.68G	0.020
FLIP-V	86.58M	17.58G	-	-	86.58M	17.58G	0.013
FLIP-IT	86.19M	17.58G	63.11M	35.81G	86.19M	17.58G	0.010
FLIP-MCL	86.19M	52.74G	83.05M	35.86G	86.19M	17.58G	0.010

### 3. Computational Complexity

We present the model size, training, and inference time computational complexity (computed on an NVIDIA Quadro RTX 6000) in Table 4. Kindly note that our image encoder (FLIP-V) is similar to [4] except that it is pre-trained using CLIP. However, FLIP-IT and FLIP-MCL require an additional text encoder during training. Furthermore, FLIP-MCL requires additional projection layers for the contrastive loss ( $L_{simCLR}$ ). Thus, FLIP-IT and FLIP-MCL have some auxiliary parameters, only during training. Moreover, since FLIP-MCL requires three forward passes through the image encoder (original + 2 transformed views), it involves more computations. Once the training is complete, the embeddings for the text prompts can be pre-computed and stored. Hence, all the auxiliary parameters

(text encoder + proj) can be discarded and only the image encoder is required for inference. Therefore, our inference time is similar to the baseline method [4], while our approach significantly improves the generalization to unseen domains.

### 4. Robustness to Unseen Spoof Type

To understand the robustness of the proposed FLIP-MCL method to unseen spoof types, we design an experiment to evaluate its performance, where the training and testing spoof types are completely different. We present the results in Table 5. Each dataset in Protocol 1 (M, C, I, O) contains real, print attack, and replay attack samples. We aggregate the samples of real, print, and replay from all 4 datasets and split each group into a train-test split of 80%-20%. For the *Replay* experiment, we train only on real and

Table 5. HTER performance on unseen spoof type at test time. *Replay* denotes training on real+print samples and testing on unseen replay samples. *Print* denotes training on real+replay samples and testing on unseen print samples.

Method	Replay	Print
ViT (ECCV' 22) [4]	4.69	10.36
FLIP-MCL	1.07	1.98

print samples and test on unseen replay samples. Similarly, we perform the *Print* experiment by training only on real and replay samples and testing on unseen print samples. We observe that for both the unseen testing scenarios (*Replay* & *Print*) the proposed FLIP-MCL method comfortably outperforms the baseline ViT thus demonstrating its generalizability. This validates the idea that aligning images to text descriptions can also handle unseen spoof types.

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