PLA: Prompt Learning Attack against Text-to-Image Generative Models

Supplementary Material

Overview

This supplementary material presents additional methodological details, analyses, and findings that complement the main paper but are omitted due to space constraints. The supplementary materials contain herein include:

- Detailed algorithm of PLA.
- Additional experimental setup and details in Sec. 5.1.
- Additional experimental analysis.
- Ethical considerations.
- Visualization results of black-box T2I models in Sec. 5.2.
- Visualization results of T2I online services in Sec. 5.3.

Warning: Containing offensive model-generated content.

A. Detailed Algorithm of PLA

Algorithm 1 Prompt Learning Attack (PLA)

Require: Target prompt $\mathbf{p}_{\text{tar}}$; Random prompt $\mathbf{p}_{\text{ran}}$; Pre-trained text encoder $\mathcal{T}_\theta(\cdot)$; SKE module $\mathcal{S}_\lambda(\cdot)$; Prompt encoder $\mathcal{T}_e(\cdot)$; Pre-trained language model $\texttt{PLM}$; Victim T2I model $\mathcal{M}$; Auxiliary model $\mathcal{M}_s$; CLIP's text encoder $\mathcal{T}_{\text{en}}(\cdot)$ and image encoder $\mathcal{V}_{\text{en}}(\cdot)$; Iterations I.

Ensure: Optimized adversarial prompt $\mathbf{p}_{\text{adv}}$.

$\mathbf{p}_{\text{adv}} \leftarrow \mathbf{p}_{\text{ran}}$
for $i = 1$ to I **do**
  $\mathbf{e}_{\text{tar}} \leftarrow \mathcal{T}_\theta(\mathbf{p}_{\text{tar}})$, $\mathbf{e}_{\text{sen}} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_\lambda(\mathbf{e}_{\text{tar}})$
  $\mathbf{e}_{\text{pe}} \leftarrow \mathcal{T}_e(\mathbf{e}_{\text{sen}}, \mathbf{p}_{\text{tar}})$, $\mathbf{p}_{\text{adv}} \leftarrow \texttt{PLM}([\mathbf{e}_{\text{pe}}; \mathbf{p}_{\text{tar}}])$
  $\mathbf{I}_{\text{tar}} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}_s(\mathbf{p}_{\text{tar}})$, $\mathbf{I}_{\text{gen}} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}(\mathbf{p}_{\text{adv}})$
  Calculate loss $\mathcal{L}_{\text{MS}}$:
  $\mathcal{L}_a \leftarrow 1 - \cos(\mathcal{T}_{\text{en}}(\mathbf{p}_{\text{tar}}), \mathcal{V}_{\text{en}}(\mathbf{I}_{\text{gen}}))$
  $\mathcal{L}_b \leftarrow 1 - \cos(\mathcal{V}_{\text{en}}(\mathbf{I}_{\text{tar}}), \mathcal{V}_{\text{en}}(\mathbf{I}_{\text{gen}}))$
  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{MS}} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_a + \mathcal{L}_b$
  Compute gradient $\mathbf{g}_1(\varsigma)$:
  $\mathbf{g}_1(\varsigma) \leftarrow \frac{\mathcal{L}_{\text{MS}}(\varsigma + c\cdot\Delta) - \mathcal{L}_{\text{MS}}(\varsigma - c\cdot\Delta)}{2c\cdot\Delta}$
  Compute gradient $\mathbf{g}_2(\varsigma)$:
  $\mathbf{g}_2(\varsigma) \leftarrow \beta\hat{\mathbf{g}}_2 + (1-\beta)\eta \cdot \mathbf{g}_1(\varsigma + \hat{\mathbf{g}}_2)$
  if $\mathbf{g}_2(\varsigma) = 0$ **then**
    Replace generated images with Gaussian noises $\boldsymbol{\epsilon} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, I)$ to compute $\mathbf{g}_2(\varsigma)$
  end if
  Update adversarial prompt $\mathbf{p}_{\text{adv}}$
end for
Return optimized adversarial prompt $\mathbf{p}_{\text{adv}}$

B. Implementation Details

In this section, we provide comprehensive information about the details of baselines, implementation details of the victim T2I models, and the details of evaluation settings.

B.1. Details of Baselines

We select several baselines for adversarial attacks on T2I models, including QF-attack [53], SneakyPrompt [47], Ring-A-Bell [44], UnlearnDiffAtk [50], and MMA-Diffusion [45]. We provide a detailed introduction to these baseline methods.

QF-attack. The QF-attack methodology is initially conceived as an adversarial technique targeting T2I models by strategically inserting a five-character adversarial suffix into the input prompt. QF-Attack employs three optimization methods to optimize the attack suffix. We utilize the genetic algorithm, which demonstrates the best performance in their experimental results. Our implementation maintains consistency with the original parameter configurations specified in the QF-Attack repository [*].

SneakyPrompt. SneakyPrompt implements a reinforcement learning (RL) framework that modifies token representations through iterative queries to T2I models. Our experimental methodology adheres to the RL implementation parameters specified in the publicly available SneakyPrompt repository [†].

Ring-A-Bell. Ring-A-Bell performs concept extraction to obtain holistic representations for sensitive and inappropriate concepts. By leveraging the extracted concept, Ring-A-Bell automatically identifies problematic prompts for T2I models with the corresponding generation of inappropriate content. Our implementation adheres to the default parameter configurations specified in the official Ring-A-Bell repository [‡].

UnlearnDiffAtk. UnlearnDiffAtk capitalizes on the intrinsic classification abilities of DMs to simplify the creation of adversarial prompts. Our experimental methodology adheres to the implementation parameters specified in the publicly available UnlearnDiffAtk repository [§].

MMA-Diffusion. MMA-Diffusion capitalizes on both textual and visual modalities to bypass detection-based safety mechanisms for the T2I models. Our implementation adheres to the default parameter configurations specified in the official MMA-Diffusion repository [¶].

[*] https://github.com/OPTML-Group/QF-Attack
[†] https://github.com/Yuchen413/text2image_safety
[‡] https://github.com/chiayi-hsu/Ring-A-Bell
[§] https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Diffusion-MU-Attack
[¶] https://github.com/cure-lab/MMA-Diffusion

B.2. Details of Victim T2I Models

SDv1.5. In the SDv1.5 model, we set the guidance scale to 7.5, the number of inference steps to 50, and the image size to 512×512.

SDXLv1.0. In SDXLv1.0, we set the guidance scale to 7.5, the number of inference steps to 50, and the image size to 1024×1024.

SLD. For the SLD model, we set the guidance scale to 7.5, the number of inference steps to 50, the safety configuration to Medium, and the image size to 512×512.

Stability.ai and DALL·E 3. For the Stability.ai and DALL·E 3 models, we utilize their default settings.

B.3. Details of Evaluation Settings

We perform a total of 200 iterations. We conduct our experiments on the NVIDIA RTX3090 GPU with 24GB of memory. Additionally, the learning rate η is set to 0.005. The weight ω of sensitive information is set to 0.8. The length of the random text prompt L is set to 6. And the layer l for sensitive information insertion is set to 8. β is set to 0.85.

C. Additional Experimental Analysis

C.1. The Analysis of Efficiency Cost

We conduct the time cost experiment to verify the efficiency cost of PLA compared with other black-box methods. As shown in Tab. T-1, PLA significantly reduces time cost, with PLA-T5 achieving the minimum time. This improved efficiency is due to PLA's architecture design, where only the prompt encoder needs to be trained, rather than optimizing the entire attack model.

Method	Atk. Time per Prompt (mins)
QF-Attack	79.45
SneakyPrompt	53.88
Ring-A-Bell	50.93
PLA-BERT (Ours)	32.76
PLA-T5 (Ours)	**30.04**

Table T-1. Time cost comparison with other black-box methods.

C.2. The Analysis of Auxiliary Model

As shown in Tab. T-2 and Tab. T-3, in addition to SDv1.4 (UNet-based) in Tab. 1 and Tab. 2, we evaluate our method utilizing PixArt (DiT-based) as the auxiliary model. Our method (PLA) consistently outperforms each baseline under various architectures of T2I models including DiT-based and UNet-based models, demonstrating our attack method's strong adaptability.

C.3. The Analysis of SKE Module

To verify the powerful sensitive information extraction capability of the SKE module, we conduct an ablation study on it. We adopt different insertion schemes:

- We keep the SKE module and insert the sensitive embedding e_{sen} into the generation of the learnable embedding.
- We keep the SKE module and remove the p_{tar} as the input of PLM (i.e., e_{ske}).
- We remove the SKE module and insert the embedding of the target prompt e_{tar} into the generation of learnable embedding.
- We remove the SKE module and insert null embedding during the generation of learnable embedding (i.e., e_{null}).

As shown in Tab. T-4, we use PLA-T5 to attack the SLD model on the violence and nudity datasets. We can see that although removing p_{tar} as the input of PLM degrades the performance, it is almost negligible. The SKE module helps preserve the semantic intent of the target prompts to induce the generation of NSFW content. When the embedding of the target prompt is directly inserted into the generation of learnable embedding, the ASR is not ideal because it contains too explicit sensitive information, making it impossible for the generated adversarial prompt to bypass the safety mechanisms of black-box T2I models. As for inserting a null embedding into the generation process of the learnable prompt, the generated adversarial prompt does not contain any sensitive information, leading to the lowest ASR as we expected.

Sensitive Knowledge	Violence		Nudity	
	ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1
e_{sen} (w/ SKE)	**93.34**	**79.62**	**93.41**	**75.60**
e_{ske} (w/ SKE)	90.82	76.01	91.25	73.44
e_{tar} (w/o SKE)	73.28	60.34	70.26	54.20
e_{null} (w/o SKE)	66.27	40.36	62.91	39.76

Table T-4. Ablation study on the SKE module.

C.4. The Analysis of Different Hyperparameters

Learning Rate. The learning rate η of PLA is an essential hyperparameter for enhancing ASR. We use SLD as the victim model and evaluate five numbers: $\{0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1\}$. As shown in Fig. E-1a, the choice of learning rate significantly affects ASR. 0.005 is optimal for both nudity and violence datasets. An excessively high or low learning rate results in a reduced ASR.

Weight. The injection weight ω of sensitive information represents the degree of sensitive information extraction. We use SLD as the victim model and evaluate five numbers: $\{0, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 1\}$. As shown in Fig. E-1b, 0.8 is optimal for both nudity and violence datasets. A weight that is too small results in insufficient sensitive information, making it impossible to retain such information. Conversely, a weight

Model	Metric	SC [8]		Q16 [40]		MHSC [33]		AVG.	
	Method	ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1
SDv1.5	QF-Attack [53] (CVPR' 23)	27.88	12.55	26.57	10.94	19.68	7.58	24.71	10.36
	SneakyPrompt [47] (S&P'24)	44.82	24.80	35.18	19.06	33.68	16.81	37.89	20.22
	Ring-A-Bell [44] (ICLR'24)	58.05	35.80	51.75	33.58	41.79	19.97	50.53	29.78
	UnlearnDiffAtk [50] (ECCV' 24)	75.03	58.26	74.22	55.29	70.57	51.33	73.27	54.96
	MMA-Diffusion [45] (CVPR' 24)	79.14	61.30	78.38	58.36	75.77	55.48	77.76	58.38
	PLA-BERT(Ours)	**84.21**	**66.30**	**89.25**	**63.04**	**86.17**	**64.20**	**86.54**	**64.51**
	PLA-T5(Ours)	81.46	63.04	84.12	61.37	83.33	60.01	82.97	61.47
SDXLv1.0	QF-Attack [53] (CVPR' 23)	13.93	4.73	12.46	4.18	10.08	3.34	12.16	4.08
	SneakyPrompt [47] (S&P'24)	23.25	14.01	20.26	9.16	15.11	8.91	19.54	10.69
	Ring-A-Bell [44] (ICLR'24)	31.47	18.42	28.02	13.44	23.10	11.17	27.53	14.34
	UnlearnDiffAtk [50] (ECCV' 24)	66.28	37.21	68.43	40.19	60.24	39.31	64.98	38.90
	MMA-Diffusion [45] (CVPR' 24)	72.98	41.37	77.52	49.33	69.39	45.02	73.30	45.24
	PLA-BERT(Ours)	**90.12**	**66.48**	**85.23**	**63.07**	**80.20**	**58.71**	**85.18**	**62.75**
	PLA-T5(Ours)	83.22	60.79	81.43	58.94	76.64	52.11	80.43	57.28
SLD	QF-Attack [53] (CVPR' 23)	19.27	8.90	18.91	7.47	16.76	6.78	18.31	7.72
	SneakyPrompt [47] (S&P'24)	49.90	26.32	36.29	22.46	37.91	23.37	41.37	24.05
	Ring-A-Bell [44] (ICLR'24)	56.88	38.26	51.16	33.29	49.72	29.94	52.59	33.83
	UnlearnDiffAtk [50] (ECCV' 24)	72.39	40.24	62.53	47.20	65.17	51.84	66.70	46.43
	MMA-Diffusion [45] (CVPR' 24)	75.99	45.27	75.34	53.44	78.12	60.28	76.48	53.00
	PLA-BERT(Ours)	**89.46**	**66.01**	**85.22**	**59.70**	**83.98**	**66.72**	**86.22**	**64.14**
	PLA-T5(Ours)	85.22	61.73	80.36	56.79	81.28	64.30	82.29	60.94

Table T-2. The attack performance of PLA against black-box T2I models on the nudity dataset. The **bolded** values are the highest performance. The difference between PLA-BERT and PLA-T5 is the pre-trained language model used to generate adversarial prompts.

Model	Metric	SC [8]		Q16 [40]		MHSC [33]		AVG.	
	Method	ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1
SDv1.5	QF-Attack [53] (CVPR' 23)	25.15	11.76	23.81	9.44	18.59	7.28	22.52	9.49
	SneakyPrompt [47] (S&P'24)	38.71	17.77	36.26	15.14	35.62	16.61	36.86	16.51
	Ring-A-Bell [44] (ICLR'24)	65.41	40.02	54.24	38.90	53.04	37.73	57.56	38.88
	UnlearnDiffAtk [50] (ECCV' 24)	71.22	54.17	65.23	46.88	63.92	47.31	66.79	49.45
	MMA-Diffusion [45] (CVPR' 24)	80.23	64.46	78.45	61.71	76.11	56.96	78.26	61.04
	PLA-BERT(Ours)	89.91	70.44	88.45	69.30	79.91	59.06	86.09	66.27
	PLA-T5(Ours)	**90.14**	**70.97**	**90.27**	**70.92**	**81.08**	**61.23**	**87.16**	**67.71**
SDXLv1.0	QF-Attack [53] (CVPR' 23)	12.81	3.62	11.24	3.55	10.18	2.08	11.41	3.08
	SneakyPrompt [47] (S&P'24)	34.45	16.17	26.38	10.65	24.80	9.77	28.54	12.20
	Ring-A-Bell [44] (ICLR'24)	42.78	30.47	34.21	26.82	31.72	23.05	36.24	26.78
	UnlearnDiffAtk [50] (ECCV' 24)	65.29	49.42	64.83	41.27	62.81	39.90	64.31	43.53
	MMA-Diffusion [45] (CVPR' 24)	75.92	53.23	76.01	50.29	74.67	48.32	75.53	50.61
	PLA-BERT(Ours)	86.79	68.23	85.01	66.93	76.99	54.38	82.93	63.18
	PLA-T5(Ours)	**88.92**	**70.24**	**89.74**	**69.10**	**78.26**	**56.03**	**85.64**	**65.12**
SLD	QF-Attack [53] (CVPR' 23)	18.48	8.88	16.76	7.15	16.28	6.54	17.17	7.52
	SneakyPrompt [47] (S&P'24)	50.32	36.61	45.94	31.39	42.26	33.00	46.17	33.67
	Ring-A-Bell [44] (ICLR'24)	69.93	49.48	61.57	49.06	59.50	38.99	63.67	45.84
	UnlearnDiffAtk [50] (ECCV' 24)	61.08	46.74	66.28	44.91	63.02	45.27	63.46	45.64
	MMA-Diffusion [45] (CVPR' 24)	76.62	55.76	77.95	56.49	74.77	58.60	76.45	56.95
	PLA-BERT(Ours)	87.29	69.33	86.42	68.03	79.25	63.88	84.32	67.08
	PLA-T5(Ours)	**89.92**	**71.88**	**89.04**	**70.21**	**82.17**	**63.97**	**87.04**	**68.69**

Table T-3. The attack performance of PLA against black-box T2I models on the violence dataset. The **bolded** values are the highest performance. The difference between PLA-BERT and PLA-T5 is the pre-trained language model used to generate adversarial prompts.

that is too large leads to an excessive amount of sensitive information, which is more likely to be detected by safety mechanisms, resulting in a decrease in ASR.

Other Hyperparameters. We also analyze the influence of other hyperparameters specifically the random prompt's length L and the insertion layer y of sensitive information on ASR as shown in Fig. E-1c and Fig. E-1d. We use SLD as the victim model and evaluate five different numbers of L: $\{2, 4, 6, 8, 10\}$. The best performance is achieved when the length is 6. Similarly, we select six different numbers for y: $\{2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11\}$. The best performance is achieved when the insert layer is the 8th layer. This is because, in



(a) The ASR-4 of Learning Rate η (b) The ASR-4 of Weight ω



(c) The ASR-4 of Prompt Length L (d) The ASR-4 of Insert Layer y

Figure E-1. Ablation studies of different hyperparameters.

earlier layers ($l < 8$), sensitive information cannot be effectively transferred to the textual embedding. In contrast, in later layers, sensitive information more readily influences the textual embedding, increasing the likelihood of detection by safety mechanisms.

C.5. The Analysis of Defense Methods

We evaluate our PLA against the defense of Non-English Word Safety Filter [47] and concept erasure methods.

Non-English Word Safety Filter. We conduct experiments against the defense of Non-English Word Safety Filter. As shown in Tab. T-5, our proposed methods, PLA-BERT and PLA-T5, outperform all other methods significantly. For example, for the target prompt "An attractive naked blonde is sitting on the couch", our PLA generates a successful adversarial prompt "A radiant woman manifests couchbonded, her corporeal matrix exhibiting zero textile interference".

Defenses	Attack	AVG.	
		ASR-4	ASR-1
Non-EN	QF-Attack	24.19	16.83
	SneakyPrompt	64.43	48.20
	Ring-A-Bell	63.81	46.21
	UnlearnDiffAtk	70.36	54.02
	MMA-Diffusion	26.08	15.39
	PLA-BERT(Ours)	87.32	69.49
	PLA-T5(Ours)	**88.23**	**70.25**

Table T-5. The attack performance of PLA against Non-English Word Safety Filter.

Concept Erasure Defenses. Besides, we add experiments under concept erasure defenses: SafeGen [22], ESD [15], MACE [30], and Receler [17]. As shown in Tab. T-6, these concept erasure defenses cannot effectively defend PLA .

D. Ethical Considerations

Our goal is to strengthen rather than exploit T2I models. To mitigate misuse, methodological details have been intentionally omitted or generalized. We urge responsible implementation of our findings to enhance model safety and advocate for ethical awareness in generative models. We are collaborating with institutions to share technical insights for security improvements. Innovation and ethical responsibility remain equally prioritized throughout this work.

E. More Visualizations

In this section, we present a supplementary visualization result of black-box victim T2I models, as shown in Fig. E-2. Additionally, we also present visualization results of two T2I online services (i.e., Stability.ai and DALL·E 3), as shown in Fig. E-3 and Fig. E-4.



Figure E-2. Visualization results of attacking SDv1.5. The words in red color are the sensitive words that PLA avoids.



Figure E-3. Visualization results of attacking DALL·E 3. The words in red color are the sensitive words that PLA avoids.

Defenses	Attack	AVG. ASR-4	AVG. ASR-1	Defenses	Attack	AVG. ASR-4	AVG. ASR-1
SafeGen	QF-Attack	40.58	15.29	**ESD**	QF-Attack	43.01	29.94
	SneakyPrompt	42.26	18.23		SneakyPrompt	47.22	20.03
	Ring-A-Bell	33.51	13.02		Ring-A-Bell	53.19	41.47
	UnlearnDiffAtk	56.95	37.58		UnlearnDiffAtk	63.29	40.55
	MMA-Diffusion	26.35	12.88		MMA-Diffusion	31.62	20.06
	PLA-BERT(Ours)	88.06	73.21		**PLA-BERT(Ours)**	80.11	61.88
	PLA-T5(Ours)	**90.29**	**76.67**		**PLA-T5(Ours)**	**80.33**	**66.79**
MACE	QF-Attack	64.22	37.05	**Receler**	QF-Attack	48.26	20.05
	SneakyPrompt	44.39	23.40		SneakyPrompt	40.26	24.33
	Ring-A-Bell	32.19	18.86		Ring-A-Bell	36.92	17.76
	UnlearnDiffAtk	76.07	48.62		UnlearnDiffAtk	64.20	30.28
	MMA-Diffusion	80.21	59.93		MMA-Diffusion	66.46	44.29
	PLA-BERT(Ours)	87.38	69.37		**PLA-BERT(Ours)**	**80.44**	67.33
	PLA-T5(Ours)	**89.36**	**70.24**		**PLA-T5(Ours)**	80.42	**72.01**

Table T-6. The attack performance of PLA against concept erasure defenses.



Figure E-4. Visualization results of attacking Stability.ai. The words in red color are the sensitive words that PLA avoids.