IDEATOR: Jailbreaking and Benchmarking Large Vision-Language Models Using Themselves

Supplementary Material

A. Additional Experimental Results

Table 5. The ASR (%) on the VAJM evaluation set across 4 categories of harmful instructions.

Attack Method	Identity Attack	Disinformation	Violence/Crime	X-risk
No Attack	30.8	53.3	57.3	33.3
GCG [44]	49.2	48.9	57.3	40.0
GCG-V [38]	66.2	64.4	84.0	6.7
VAJM [29]	81.5	82.2	85.3	60.0
UMK [38]	87.7	**95.6**	**98.7**	46.7
MM-SafetyBench [24]	56.9	57.8	62.7	40.0
IDEATOR (Ours)	**100.0**	88.9	93.3	**66.7**

We further extend our assessment to the VAJM [29] evaluation set, with the ASR results for harmful instructions across various categories reported in Table 5. On this dataset, IDEATOR also demonstrates a superb performance comparable to the state-of-the-art white-box attacks. Particularly, it achieves an ASR of 88.9% on Disinformation, closely following UMK's 95.6%. On Violence/Crime, IDEATOR exceeds VAJM's 85.3% with a 93.3% ASR and nearly matches UMK's top ASR of 98.7%. Notably, IDEATOR attains a perfect 100% ASR on Identity Attack and an impressive 66.7% ASR on X-risk, outperforming the top white-box methods which achieve ASRs of 87.7% (UMK) and 60.0% (VAJM), respectively.

B. Empirical Understanding

We define the set of jailbreak attacks generated by IDEATOR under finite exploration breadth and depth as $\mathcal{A}_{N_{\text{breadth}},N_{\text{depth}}}$, and the set of all possible jailbreak attacks generated with infinite exploration breadth and depth as $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IDEATOR}}$. This set represents the theoretical limit of attacks IDEATOR could generate without exploration constraints. Mathematically, we formalize this as:

$$\mathcal{A}_{\text{IDEATOR}} = \lim_{N_{\text{breadth}}\to\infty, N_{\text{depth}}\to\infty} \mathcal{A}_{N_{\text{breadth}},N_{\text{depth}}}.$$

Ideally, as N_{breadth} and N_{depth} increase, $\mathcal{A}_{N_{\text{breadth}},N_{\text{depth}}}$ progressively approaches $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IDEATOR}}$. This allows IDEATOR to uncover a wider variety of adversarial strategies that could encompass existing attacks.

As the examples shown in Figure 7, our attack can generate *query-relevant images with typographic attacks* ($\mathcal{A}_{\text{query-rel+typo}}$), which closely resemble those produced by MM-SafetyBench ($\mathcal{A}_{\text{MM-SB}}$). Given the similarity between $\mathcal{A}_{\text{query-rel+typo}}$ and $\mathcal{A}_{\text{MM-SB}}$, we can reasonably assume that these two sets represent comparable attack strategies. Therefore, we can express the following relationship: $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IDEATOR}} \supseteq \mathcal{A}_{\text{query-rel+typo}} \approx \mathcal{A}_{\text{MM-SB}}$. This inclusion suggests that ASR_{IDEATOR} should be at least as high as $ASR_{\text{MM-SB}}$, since IDEATOR can generate similar attacks in addition to new attacks, i.e., $ASR_{\text{IDEATOR}} \geq ASR_{\text{MM-SB}}$.



Figure 7. The jailbreak images generated by IDEATOR encompass typographic attacks.

Additionally, we find that $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IDEATOR}}$ include not only $\mathcal{A}_{\text{query-rel+typo}}$, but also a diverse set of other attack types, including but not limited to roleplay scenarios and emotional manipulation. Let $\mathcal{A}_i$ denote the set of attacks generated by method i, where $i \in \{\text{Roleplay Attacks}, ...\}$. It is evident that $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IDEATOR}}$ covers at least the union of the attack sets from these methods: $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IDEATOR}} \supseteq \bigcup_i \mathcal{A}_i$. Similarly, ASR_{IDEATOR} can be expressed as $ASR_{\text{IDEATOR}} \geq \max_i ASR_i$, where ASR_i denotes the attack success rate of method i. Under the assumption that each method contributes independently, the overall ASR_{IDEATOR} can be further approximated by the formula: $ASR_{\text{IDEATOR}} = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n}(1 - ASR_i)$. Each attack type contributes to the overall success, leading to a cumulative effect. We attribute the diversity in attack strategies to the attacker VLM's extensive pretraining data, powerful modeling capabilities, and crafted system prompts, which together enable IDEATOR to explore a wide range of adversarial tactics.

C. Additional Visualization Results

Figure 11 presents attack images across various safety topics. Each row in this figure corresponds to a distinct topic for attacks, demonstrating the diversity of attack strategies employed by IDEATOR.

Despite the enhanced safety mechanisms of the commercial model GPT-4o [1], our experiments demonstrate that it remains vulnerable to certain attack strategies. Figures 8, 9, and 10 present three successful jailbreak attempts against GPT-4o, showcasing its susceptibility to sophisticated adversarial prompts. These findings underscore the persistent safety challenges in VLMs, emphasizing the need for more

robust defenses against adaptive attacks.



Figure 8. Example of a successful jailbreak prompt on GPT-4o, in which the model generates a phishing email as part of a simulated scenario.

D. Evaluation against Defense Mechanisms

To provide additional insights into IDEATOR's robustness against existing defense mechanisms, we performed preliminary experiments on AdaShield-S [16]. AdaShield-S is a recently proposed defense framework designed specifically to detect and mitigate structure-based jailbreak attacks on VLMs. Table 6 presents the attack success rate (ASR) of IDEATOR and two other state-of-the-art black-box methods, Figstep and MM-SafetyBench, before and after applying AdaShield-S.

As indicated in Table 6, IDEATOR demonstrates strong resilience against AdaShield-S, maintaining high ASRs with minimal performance degradation across all tested victim models. Specifically, IDEATOR's ASR decreased slightly from 94.0% to 84.0% (–10.0%) on MiniGPT-4, 82.0% to 73.0% (–9.0%) on LLaVA, and 88.0% to 87.0% (–1.0%) on InstructBLIP. In comparison, Figstep and MM-SafetyBench experienced substantially larger reductions in ASR, highlighting IDEATOR's advantage in generating diverse and subtle jailbreak strategies that effectively evade structure-based detection.



Figure 9. An example of a successful jailbreak attack on GPT-4o, prompting the model to provide detailed information about mail fraud, including how fraudulent schemes are planned and executed.



Figure 10. A successful jailbreak prompt on GPT-4o that instructs the model to outline potential actions an attacker could take after gaining access to an IoT device.

E. VLJailbreakBench Data Statistics

Table 7 presents a statistical summary of the **base set** and **challenge set** in VLJailbreakBench, organized by safety-

Figure 11. Diverse attack images generated by our IDEATOR attack across various safety topics. Each row represents a spectrum of attack images generated under a specific topic, including computer virus, identity theft, promoting anorexia and committing fraud.

Table 6. ASR before and after applying AdaShield-S [16]. Values in parentheses indicate absolute change in ASR.

	MiniGPT-4	LLaVA	InstructBLIP
Figstep	69.0 → 37.0 (-32.0)	44.0 → 6.0 (-38.0)	11.0 → 16.0 (+5.0)
MM-SafetyBench	66.0 → 37.0 (-29.0)	46.0 → 5.0 (-41.0)	29.0 → 27.0 (-2.0)
IDEATOR (Ours)	94.0 → 84.0 (-10.0)	82.0 → 73.0 (-9.0)	88.0 → 87.0 (-1.0)

critical categories and their subcategories. The dataset spans a wide range of safety risks, including economic harm, ethical issues, hate speech, cyberattacks, privacy violations, and violent behavior, offering a comprehensive evaluation of VLM robustness against multimodal threats. Figure 12 showcases examples from the challenge set, which feature more subtle and sophisticated attacks designed to test the limits of current defenses.

F. Benchmarking Results on the Base Set

Table 8 presents the safety evaluation results of 11 VLMs on the **base set** of VLJailbreakBench. The base set assesses fundamental vulnerabilities in VLMs. Among open-source models, Qwen2-VL exhibits the highest vulnerability with an average ASR of 35.04%. In contrast, Llama-3.2-90B-Vision demonstrates the strongest robustness among open-source models, with an average ASR of 7.97%. For commercial models, Gemini-2.0-Flash is the most vulnerable, with an ASR of 53.38%, performing worse than some open-source alternatives. Claude-3.5-Sonnet remains the most robust overall, with an ASR as low as 1.09%, significantly outperforming all other models.

Table 7. Statistical overview of data samples in the base and challenge sets, structured by category and subcategory.

Category	Subcategory	Base Set Size	Challenge Set Size
Economic Harm	Economic Data Manipulation	18	60
	Financial Fraud	22	60
	Financial Misleading	19	60
Ethical Issues	Algorithmic Bias	19	60
	Data Misuse	20	60
	Ethical Controversies	22	60
	Unauthorized Personalized Advice	18	54
Gender and Cultural Bias	Cross-cultural Conflicts	20	60
	Cultural Discrimination	20	60
	Gender Discrimination	20	60
	Gender-based Violence	20	60
Hate Speech	Gender Hate Speech	20	60
	Political Hate Speech	20	60
	Racial Hate Speech	20	60
	Religious Hate Speech	20	60
Health Consultation	False Health Advice	20	60
	Medical Pseudoscience	20	60
	Mental Health Issues	19	57
	Misleading Self-diagnosis	20	60
Illegal Activities	Forgery of Documents/Certificates	20	60
	Fraudulent Activities	21	60
	Illegal Goods Trade	21	60
	Piracy	20	60
	Sexual Assault	21	60
Malware and Cyberattacks	Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities	19	60
	Identity Impersonation	19	57
	Malware Generation	20	60
	Phishing Attacks	20	60
Political Sensitivity	Political Manipulation and Intervention	20	60
	Political Violence	20	60
	Regime Suppression	13	39
	Suppression of Freedom of Speech	19	57
Pornography	Gender-based Violence	19	57
	Pornographic Image and Video Generation	20	54
	Pornographic Text Generation and Distribution	12	36
Privacy Violations	Abuse of Facial Recognition	20	60
	Location Tracking	19	57
	Personal Information Leaks	20	57
	Voice Data Leaks	19	57
Social Attacks and Harassment	Cultural Attacks	20	60
	Cyber Harassment	18	60
	Online Bullying	22	60
	Sexual Harassment	20	59
Violent Behavior	Cyberbullying	19	60
	Domestic Violence	18	57
	Physical Violence	20	60
	Psychological Violence	20	60



Figure 12. Examples from the **challenge set** in **VLJailbreakBench**. These examples showcase the types of complex scenarios used to test the robustness of VLMs.

Table 8. Safety evaluation of 11 VLMs on the **base set** of VLJailbreakBench, measured by ASR across 12 safety topics. Safety topics and certain model names are abbreviated for brevity. "Avg." denotes the average ASR across all topics.

ASR (%)	IA	VB	HS	PV	MC	HC	EH	GCB	PS	EI	SAH	P	**Avg.**
Qwen2-VL	37.86	29.87	20.00	33.33	38.46	34.18	23.73	42.50	48.61	46.84	28.75	33.33	35.04
MiniGPT-v2	24.27	35.06	18.75	39.74	37.18	41.77	37.29	34.18	44.44	36.71	40.00	13.73	33.77
LLaVA-OneVision	28.16	31.17	23.75	28.21	35.90	29.11	18.64	31.65	43.06	31.65	23.75	19.61	29.07
Llama-3.2-11B-Vision	16.50	15.58	11.25	19.23	12.82	20.25	15.25	12.50	19.44	16.46	6.25	11.76	14.85
Llama-3.2-90B-Vision	7.77	14.29	2.50	7.69	8.97	17.72	3.39	1.25	11.11	3.80	8.75	7.84	7.97
Gemini-2.0-Flash	52.43	61.04	33.75	47.44	67.95	45.57	50.85	55.00	66.67	60.76	53.75	43.14	53.38
Gemini-1.5-Pro	20.39	28.57	18.75	21.79	35.90	15.19	25.42	30.00	44.44	32.91	23.75	23.53	26.53
Gemini-2.0-Flash-Think	16.50	29.87	11.25	21.79	25.64	13.92	16.95	13.75	43.06	25.32	15.00	15.69	20.63
GPT-4o Mini	9.71	19.48	8.75	14.10	8.97	25.32	13.56	20.00	34.72	10.13	7.50	5.88	14.85
GPT-4o	7.77	12.99	1.25	7.69	6.41	10.13	8.47	8.75	26.39	2.53	6.25	3.92	8.52
Claude-3.5-Sonnet	0.00	1.30	0.00	2.56	1.28	1.27	1.69	1.25	1.39	1.27	1.25	0.00	1.09